State v. Yaggy
| Decision Date | 19 January 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-803 / 10-1186,1-803 / 10-1186 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRENDA JEAN YAGGY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Joseph Moothart, Judge.
Brenda Yaggy appeals her conviction of assault causing bodily injury in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.1 and 708.2(2). AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Teresa R. Wilson, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Elisabeth S. Reynoldson, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Dustin Lies, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and Tabor, JJ.
Brenda Yaggy was convicted of assault causing bodily injury after striking her downstairs neighbor. She contends the district court erred in allowing the State to impeach a defense witness with his prior conviction for first-degree harassment, and that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct in the State's closing argument and rebuttal. Although the probative value of the harassment conviction was low, it was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The court did not abuse its discretion under Iowa Rules of Evidence 5.403 and 5.609. Additionally, because none of the prosecutor's statements amounted to misconduct such that Yaggy was deprived of her right to a fair trial, her counsel had no duty to object. Even if the prosecutor's statements constituted misconduct, trial counsel effectively refuted the statements during the defense closing argument, mitigating any potential prejudice.
Brenda Yaggy and William Sires Jr. lived on the second floor of a four-unit apartment building in Waterloo. They kept three adult cats and four kittens in their apartment. Michelle Sinkuler and Christopher Buhmann resided on the first floor of the building, near the entrance to the complex. On August 7, 2008, the neighbors clashed, resulting in Yaggy's arrest. The four participants' accounts of the incident substantially differ from one another.
According to the testimony of Sinkuler and Buhmann, they woke up at 5:00 a.m. when Yaggy ran down the stairs, pounded on their apartment door,and accused them of taking one of her kittens. When Buhmann opened the door, the couple's Shih Tzu escaped. Yaggy kicked the dog down the stairs outside the complex. As Sinkuler reached for her dog, Yaggy kneed her in the back and pushed her to the ground. When Sinkuler tried to return to her feet, Yaggy punched her in the jaw. Sinkuler admits she may have "brushed past" Yaggy as she pursued her dog. Buhmann directed Sinkuler to go inside their apartment and call the police. He waited outside to prevent Yaggy from continuing her assault on Sinkuler.
Officer Dustin Yates of the Waterloo police department responded to a dispatch of an assault in progress. He spoke with the four residents, but took written statements from only Sinkuler and Buhmann. Officer Yates also photographed marks on Sinkuler's chin and scrapes on her toes. She received no medical treatment for her injuries. Although Yaggy initially denied any physical contact with Sinkuler, she later admitted she pushed her.
Yaggy's account of events substantially diverges from that of Sinkuler and Buhmann. She testified to waking up to the sound of a distressed cat. Believing two of her own cats were outside, she descended the stairs from her apartment unit with a flashlight to search for them. Yaggy threw open the main door to the complex, which banged against the doorstop next to Sinkuler's apartment door. She denies knocking on their door. Yaggy contends Sinkuler opened the door and that the couple began swearing at her and calling her names. She went outside to look for her cats on the front porch of the building when the Shih Tzu rushed by. She almost stepped on the dog, and kicked him out of the way toavoid falling down the steps. As one of her cats came running up the steps, she believes Sinkuler made a grab for it, which prompted Yaggy to push her out of the way and hit her shoulder, knocking Sinkuler off balance. Yaggy believes Buhmann came out and "clubbed" her, causing her to briefly lose consciousness, but she did not testify to suffering any physical injuries.1
Sires also said he heard a commotion at 5:00 a.m. he attributed to cats fighting outside. He watched Yaggy run downstairs and saw Sinkuler open her apartment door and hit Yaggy. Both Sires and Yaggy note the police never took statements from them, and that the police were aggressive with Yaggy.
On September 19, 2008, the State charged Yaggy with assault causing bodily injury in violation of Iowa Code section 708.1 and 708.2(2) (2007). The jury found her guilty as charged on March 4, 2010. On July 2, 2010, the court sentenced her to 180 days in jail, with all but thirty-nine days suspended and gave her credit for thirty-nine days served. The court also placed her on supervised probation for one year. She now appeals.
We review the district court's evaluation of the probative value and prejudicial effect of impeachment evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Redmond, 803 N.W.2d 112, 117 (Iowa 2011). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court exercised its discretion "on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable." State v. Roby, 495 N.W.2d 773, 775 (Iowa 1992) (citations omitted). If the ground or reason is not supported bysubstantial evidence, or is based on an erroneous application of the law, it is untenable. Graber v. City of Ankeny, 616 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Iowa 2000).
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is an alleged constitutional violation, and therefore our review is de novo. State v. Blair, 798 N.W.2d 322, 328-29 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011).
Before the defense called Yaggy's boyfriend William Sires to testify, the State informed the court that it planned to impeach him with his 2004 conviction for first-degree harassment. Over Yaggy's objection, the district court ruled that pursuant to Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.609(a), so long as the State only referred to the fact of the prior conviction, the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the factors listed in rule 5.403. The State limited its questioning to whether Sires was convicted of harassment and the date of the conviction.
Yaggy argues the court abused its discretion by allowing in the conviction and that such error was not harmless. She contends the harassment charge had little bearing on Sires's veracity, and asserts the similarity between harassment and assault compounded the risk that the prior conviction prejudiced her case. She also points to the corroborating nature of Sires's testimony, the lack of additional witnesses, and the contrasting versions of the events presented at trial.
The State counters the district court properly balanced the conviction's probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice under the rule 5.403 test applied to witnesses other than the accused. The State contends that even had the court abused its discretion, error would be harmless because the jury could find Yaggy guilty based on her inconsistent statements and admission that she "hit [the victim's] shoulder and her back and just pushed her, and [ ] knocked her off balance." Moreover, the court instructed the jury to use the conviction solely for determining Sires's credibility.
The rule for impeachment based on prior convictions states, in part:
Iowa R. Evid. 5.609(a). Because Sire's conviction for first-degree harassment does not involve a crime of dishonesty or false statement, we focus our analysis on subsection 1.2
The recent holding in State v. Redmond clarifies the admissibility framework under rule 5.609(a)(1). See 803 N.W.2d 112, 119-22 (Iowa 2011). Redmond held the rule "applies to a witness's prior convictions that: (1) are punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, (2) do not involve dishonesty or false statement (governed by rule 5.609(a)(2)), and (3) are within ten years (governed by rule 5.609(b))." Id. Because Sires was convicted of harassment, harassment is punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year, and the conviction occurred within ten years of his testimony, rule 5.609(a)(1) applies. Therefore we must turn to a review of the district court's balancing of the probative value against the prejudicial effect of the testimony.
We measure a prior conviction's probative value by how greatly it undermines the witness's credibility. Id. at 122. We gauge prejudicial effect by anticipating the extent to which a jury may misuse a witness's prior conviction thereby deciding the case on an improper basis. Id. at 124. When balancing the two, the trial court should consider factors such as "the conviction's (1) nature, (2) bearing on veracity, (3) age, and (4) tendency to improperly influence the jury." State v. Martin, 704 N.W.2d 674, 676 (Iowa 2005). Because Sires is a witness other than the accused, Yaggy had the burden to prove the unfair prejudice from introducing Sires's prior conviction...
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