State v. Yates

• Decision Date: 14 December 1906
• Docket Number: 14,928 - (17)
• Citation: 109 N.W. 1070,99 Minn. 461
• Parties: STATE v. EMMA YATES and Another
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

109 N.W. 1070

99 Minn. 461

STATE v. EMMA YATES and Another

Nos. 14,928 - (17)

Supreme Court of Minnesota

December 14, 1906

Appeal by Emma Yates from an order of the district court for Hennepin county, John Day Smith, J., denying her motion for a new trial, after trial and conviction of the crime of arson. Reversed and a new trial granted.

SYLLABUS

Criminal Law -- Charge to Jury.

It is error for a trial court in a criminal prosecution to review in its instructions to the jury, in an argumentative manner the evidence before them for consideration, or to single out and give undue prominence to the testimony of particular witnesses sworn on the trial.

Arson.

In a prosecution for arson, defendant's substantial rights are held to have been violated in three respects: (a) In the refusal of the court to strike from the record certain incompetent prejudicial testimony introduced by the state; (b) in the action of the court, in its instructions to the jury, in singling out and giving undue prominence to the testimony of particular witnesses; and (c) in the argumentative character of the court's charge as a whole.

Hall & Kolliner, for appellant.

Edward T. Young, Attorney General, Al. J. Smith, County Attorney, and John F. Dahl, Assistant County Attorney, for the State.

OPINION

BROWN, J.

Emma Yates, Emma Anderson, and one Erwin A. Perry were jointly indicted, charged with the crime of arson in the first degree. Yates and Anderson were tried together in the court below, and a verdict of guilty returned as to both. Each made a motion for a new trial, and this appeal is from an order denying the motion of Mrs. Yates. The court granted the motion of Mrs. Anderson.

The facts in the case, briefly stated, are as follows: Defendants Yates and Anderson were, on November 23, 1905, and for some time immediately prior thereto, the owners of and conducting a small grocery store in the city of Minneapolis, which was on that day nearly consumed by fire. Circumstances pointed to the conclusion that the fire was purposely started, and suspicion was directed to the owners, Yates and Anderson. Subsequent investigation connected defendant Perry with its origin, and he finally disclosed to the authorities all the facts with reference to it. He related to them, and testified upon the witness stand, among other things, that he started the fire at the instigation of the two women; that he had been acquainted with both women for some time, particularly with Mrs. Yates; that they came to him with the story that they were unable to meet their bills, and that it was necessary to burn the stock of goods in order to obtain an insurance of $800; that he agreed with them to burn the property, and, as a preliminary to the commission of the act, constructed a contrivance made up of inflammable material saturated with gasolene and kerosene oil, completely inclosed, and with two candles on the inside. The intention was to light the candles and leave the store, in the expectation that they would later on ignite the machine in which they were placed, and the fire would follow. Perry and both women were at the store about nine o'clock in the evening of the day in question, and all arrangements were then made to carry out the scheme. They intended to light the candles when all were there, but observing a policeman on the opposite side of the street, they changed their mind and left the store together for their homes. Perry, however, returned soon, entered the building and struck a match for the purpose of igniting the candles. An explosion immediately occurred, the room having, from the time of their departure to his return, become filled with gas from the oil and gasolene with which the parties had saturated the "fire machine" and other articles in the room. He was badly injured and was taken to the hospital. It was there that his conscience smote him and he disclosed all these facts to the officers.

Both women contradicted his testimony and stoutly denied any complicity or connection with him in respect to a plot to burn the building; and it was insisted in their behalf, in the court below and again in this court, that Perry acted in the matter on his own volition and for purposes of revenge for some slight to which, it is claimed, Mrs. Yates had subjected him. The state relied largely for conviction on the testimony of Perry, and, as he was a co-conspirator with the two women, according to his own testimony, conviction could not be had upon his uncorroborated testimony. The court below granted the motion of Mrs. Anderson for a new trial on the ground that the corroborative evidence, as to her, was insufficient.

In the view we take of the case, it is unnecessary to determine whether Perry was sufficiently corroborated to justify the conviction of Mrs. Yates. Whether she be guilty or not depends upon whether she or Perry testified falsely. But, whatever the fact may be, a question we do not determine, it is clear that, for certain errors committed on the trial, she is entitled to a new trial, for her substantial rights were thereby so far invaded that we are unable to say that they were not prejudicial. To these we make a brief reference.

During the course of the trial one Babcock was called as a witness on the part of the state. He was apparently unfriendly and hostile to Mrs. Yates. He testified to his acquaintance with her and related a conversation had with her relative to some goods he had bought of her while she was in business on Hennepin avenue, and which he had moved to his home on Charles street. The question was asked him whether Mrs. Yates at that time, which was about a year prior to the transaction in question, said anything to him about those goods. The question was objected to as irrelevant and immaterial, as referring to a transaction not connected with the matters charged in the indictment. The objection was overruled, to which defendant excepted, whereupon the witness answered: "She said to me: 'Why don't you get everything you have got here insured for $800 or $1,000 and in four or five days after you get the insurance all right set them afire?' I was thunderstruck never so much so in my life. It was the first intimation I had ever had of anything like that from that woman at all, and I said: 'Emma, for God's sake; the idea of burning that property and Mr. Moffet's house here!' I walked out of the room and downstairs in disgust." Counsel for defendant promptly moved to strike out the answer as irrelevant and immaterial, but the court denied the motion.

In this the court was...