State v. Ybarra, 18506

• Decision Date: 28 November 1990
• Docket Number: No. 18506,18506
• Parties: , 59 USLW 2361 STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dennis A. YBARRA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 1053

804 P.2d 1053

111 N.M. 234, 59 USLW 2361

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dennis A. YBARRA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18506.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Nov. 28, 1990.

Jacquelyn Robins, Chief Public Defender, Jerry Todd Wertheim, Asst. Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellant.

Hal Stratton, Atty. Gen., Anthony Tupler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee.

OPINION

WILSON, Justice.

Defendant-appellant Dennis A. Ybarra appeals his conviction of first degree murder. We reverse.

On June 22, 1988, Ybarra and his girlfriend's brother, Ricky Garcia, quarreled outside of Ybarra's apartment. Garcia knocked Ybarra down by striking him in the face twice and then kicked him in the chest while Ybarra lay on the ground. A witness later testified that, as Garcia left the apartment, Ybarra threatened to get even with Garcia. Ybarra then went to the local police department with his brother to file a complaint against Garcia. When Ybarra was told that a complaint could not be filed until morning because a judge was not available, Ybarra became angry and said that the police would find Garcia in pieces. Consequently, the police agreed to escort Ybarra back to the apartment to collect his belongings. However, Ybarra left two or three minutes ahead of the police and arrived at the apartment to find that Garcia had returned as well. Ybarra got out of the truck and moved towards Garcia, waving a knife as he approached. Garcia retreated and kicked Ybarra in the knee. Ybarra then stabbed Garcia.

Garcia was taken to the local hospital where he underwent surgery to repair the stabbing damage to his abdominal organs. Complications to the stab wounds developed and Garcia was transferred to another hospital where he died on the operating table several days after the incident.

After the stabbing, the police took Ybarra to the police station. Although Ybarra was placed under arrest, he was not advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The police then transported Ybarra to the hospital for treatment to his knee which had been injured in the incident.

Ybarra arrived at the emergency room in handcuffs with two police officers assisting him. There he was treated by Nurse Price. Officer Wright remained with Nurse Price and Ybarra during the medical treatment and while Nurse Price asked Ybarra several questions. Nurse Price first asked Ybarra how he hurt his knee. He said that Garcia had kicked him. She then asked, "Are you the one that stabbed him?" Ybarra replied, "Yes." Nurse Price told Ybarra that Garcia was not doing well, to which Ybarra responded that Garcia deserved it and that if he'd had a gun he would have shot him. Nurse Price asked Ybarra what kind of knife he used to stab Garcia. Ybarra responded with a description. She also asked why he had stabbed Garcia, and Ybarra said that he had done it because of the earlier beating and because Garcia had kicked him in the knee during the stabbing encounter. Finally, Officer Wright who had been present in the room with Nurse Price and Ybarra during the questioning asked Ybarra if he knew where the knife was. Ybarra replied that he did not know what happened to it.

At trial Ybarra objected to the introduction of his statements to Nurse Price and requested the court to suppress the testimony concerning such statements as being the result of an impermissible custodial interrogation. The state's response was that there was no interrogation. The state argued that since the police did not instigate or participate in the conversation between Nurse Price and Ybarra, and since Nurse Price was not an agent for the police, it was not a custodial interrogation. Thus, the state contended, a Miranda warning was not required.

After hearing testimony and argument of counsel, and after researching the issue itself, the trial court found: (1) There was an interrogation, and Ybarra was in police custody at the hospital; (2) There was not a coordinated plan between the police and Nurse Price to elicit information from Ybarra for his prosecution; (3) The police had a duty to inform Ybarra of his Miranda rights; (4) Nurse Price's conversation with Ybarra began in order to aid in the diagnosis and treatment of his injury, and therefore any statements by Ybarra regarding his injuries would be admissible; (5) Ybarra's nonresponsive or volunteered statements also would be admissible; (6) Nurse Price was faced with the compelling emergency of Garcia's treatment which caused her to ask questions about the kind of knife used in the stabbing, and therefore, under the rescue doctrine, Ybarra's statements regarding this matter would be admissible; and (7) Officer Wright's question in the hospital and Ybarra's response would be suppressed.

On appeal Ybarra maintains his claim that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony regarding his statements to Nurse Price. Ybarra asserts that these statements were the result of a custodial interrogation in violation of the Miranda warning rule. The state admits that the conversation between Nurse Price and Ybarra was inadmissible under the rescue doctrine and concedes: "There is not a proper factual predicate to reach the issue of the rescue doctrine." See People v. Riddle, 83 Cal.App.3d 563, 576, 148 Cal.Rptr. 170, 177 (1978) (failure to give Miranda warning excused when there exists: (1) an urgent need and no other course of action promises relief; (2) the possibility of saving human life by rescuing a person in danger; and (3) rescue as the primary purpose and motive of the interrogator), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 937, 99 S.Ct. 1283, 59 L.Ed.2d 496 (1979). On appeal the state resurrects its original argument, namely, that the trial court erred in finding an interrogation. The state contends, however, that the court's decision allowing the testimony should be sustained under the "right for any reason" doctrine. See State v. Hensel, 106 N.M. 8, 738 P.2d 126 (Ct.App.) (trial court will be affirmed on appeal if right for any reason), cert. denied, 105 N.M. 720, 737 P.2d 79, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 958, 108 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed.2d 383 (1987).

We affirm the trial court's finding of interrogation, but reverse the court's ruling that the rescue doctrine permitted the admission of Ybarra's statements to Nurse Price regarding Garcia. As we find this issue of custodial interrogation dispositive, we do not reach the other points of error raised by Ybarra on appeal.

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) the United States Supreme Court held that the fifth amendment of the Federal Constitution prohibits the use of "statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless [the prosecution] demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." This Miranda protection "come[s] into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent." State v. Edwards, 97 N.M. 141, 143-44, 637 P.2d 572, 574-75 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 97 N.M. 621, 642 P.2d 607 (1981). An interrogation, therefore, is the threshold requirement when a defendant alleges a violation of his Miranda rights. Id. 97 N.M. at 144, 637 P.2d at 575.

The United States Supreme Court first addressed the meaning of "interrogation" in the case of Rhode Island v. Innis. The Court stated:

[T]he term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation.

Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1690, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980).

Returning to the issue again in Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 107 S.Ct. 1931, 95 L.Ed.2d 458 (1987), the United States Supreme Court questioned whether the police actions in question "rose to the level of interrogation--that is, in the language of Innis, whether they were the 'functional equivalent' of police interrogation." Id. at 527, 107 S.Ct. at 1935. In Mauro the defendant was allowed to speak with his wife in the presence of a police officer who recorded the defendant's conversation. The Court held that under both Miranda and Innis the defendant was not interrogated because there was no evidence that the police instigated or participated in the defendant's discussion with his wife, that the police used the defendant's wife for the purpose of eliciting incriminating statements, or that the defendant felt that he was being coerced to incriminate himself in any way. Id. at 527-28, 107 S.Ct. at 1935-1936. Additionally, the Court noted that the police officers had attempted to dissuade the defendant's wife from speaking with her husband and that the defendant had been given advance warning that he would be allowed to speak to his wife only with a police officer present. Id. at 528, 522, 107 S.Ct. at 1936, 1933.

Other courts also have grappled with the definition of "interrogation." In United States v. Webb, 755 F.2d 382 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038, 107 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed.2d 846 (1987) a jail officer asked the defendant a preliminary question in order to determine where in the jail population to place the defendant. The defendant...