State v. Yeaw
| Decision Date | 12 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 36255.,36255. |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Jeffrey YEAW. |
162 Conn.App. 382
131 A.3d 1172
STATE of Connecticut
v.
Jeffrey YEAW.
No. 36255.
Appellate Court of Connecticut.
Argued Sept. 16, 2015.
Decided Jan. 12, 2016.
Ilana R.N. Ofgang, Wethersfield, for the appellant (defendant).
Jonathan M. Sousa, special deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Brian Preleski, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
SHELDON, KELLERand HARPER, Js.
HARPER, J.
The defendant, Jeffrey Yeaw, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of three counts of attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–49 (a)(2)1 and 53a–59 (a)(5),2 and three counts of attempt to commit assault of a peace officer in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–49 (a)(2)and 53a–167c (a)(1).3 On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court violated his due process rights when it failed to order, sua sponte, a competency evaluation; (2) the state adduced insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the specific intent to commit all six counts he was charged with; and (3) the court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence testimony concerning arrest warrants against him for uncharged misconduct. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. In March, 2012, the defendant resided at the home of his uncle, Richard Landry, located at 18 Peck Street
in Berlin. On the evening of March 8, 2012, the defendant and Landry became involved in a verbal altercation, which eventually escalated to the point where Landry called the police. At approximately 10:30 p.m., Officers Scott Calderone and Michael Silverio of the Berlin Police Department were dispatched to Landry's house to respond to a domestic disturbance. The dispatcher informed Calderone that a man on the back porch of the house had a gun. Calderone and Silverio arrived at the house at approximately the same time and observed Landry, who was outside on the grass in between the house and a church next door. Calderone shined his spotlight on Landry and motioned for Landry to approach him. Landry approached, identified himself, and spoke with Calderone and Silverio. Shortly thereafter, Sergeant Mark Soneson arrived at the scene. All three officers were in uniform, and all three officers arrived in separate marked police vehicles.
After Landry called the police, the defendant—aware that he had outstanding warrants—decided to flee Landry's house.
The defendant gathered some of his belongings, stepped out onto the front porch, and observed a police vehicle outside of the house. He then reentered the house, retrieved a firearm, turned off all of the lights in the house, and returned to the front porch.
After speaking with Landry, Calderone, Silverio, and Soneson concluded that they needed to enter the house. The officers proceeded to the rear of the house and entered through the rear door. Upon entry, they realized that all of the lights in the house were off and that the house was completely dark. Soneson announced the officers' presence to the defendant, stating, "Jeff, it's the police department. Would you come out; we have to talk to you." When the defendant did not respond, the officers, each of whom was carrying a lighted flashlight, began to search the first floor of the house, proceeding, room by room, from the rear of the house toward the
front. After inspecting several rooms at the rear of the house, they entered a narrow interior hallway that led to the front porch. The inside door between the hallway and the front porch was closed. Silverio opened the door with Soneson and Calderone behind him. Once the door was opened, Silverio saw the defendant crouched on the floor and holding a gun, which the defendant pointed directly at him. Silverio promptly yelled out, "gun," and the defendant fired several shots. Silverio quickly retreated and took cover in the home office to his left. Calderone, who saw the muzzle flash from the defendant's weapon and felt a bullet whiz by his head, ducked quickly into a room to his right and across the hall from the home office. In the meantime, Soneson, who ducked into the home office after Silverio, returned fire and struck the defendant at least twice. The defendant was severely wounded, but refused medical treatment at the scene, in the ambulance, and at the hospital. While first responders were treating the defendant at the scene, the defendant begged the officers to shoot and kill him. In the ambulance, the defendant ordered the treating paramedic to leave him alone and let him die.
The defendant was charged with three counts of attempt to commit assault in the first degree and three counts of attempt to commit assault of a peace officer. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of all six counts. The defendant subsequently was sentenced to a total effective term of forty-eight years incarceration. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
I
The defendant first claims that the court abused its discretion by failing, sua sponte, to order a competency hearing. He argues that his competency was called into question on numerous occasions, and that the court's
failure to address his competency violated his due process rights. The state objects, arguing that the evidence before the court did not raise a reasonable doubt about the defendant's competency, and thus the court had no reason to address the defendant's competency. We agree with the state.
The following additional facts are relevant to our disposition of this issue. On March 29, 2012—approximately three weeks after the incident at Landry's house—the defendant was interviewed by Detective Matthew Gunsalus of the state police. During this interview, the defendant stated that while he was sitting on Landry's front porch on the day of the incident, he attempted to shoot himself. He also stated that he would not have minded if the police killed him at Landry's
house, and that his intent that evening was not to surrender to the police.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel addressed the court regarding the defendant's mental state. Defense counsel represented to the court that the defendant "has some mental health problems," and that he believed "that there is some sort of compromise to [the defendant's] mental state." At the conclusion of defense counsel's remarks, the defendant addressed the court for forty-five minutes. During this address, the defendant accused the prosecutor of perjury, fabricating evidence, and tampering with witnesses; he accused the state and its various political subdivisions of racketeering and other conduct allegedly designed to frustrate equal protection of the law and the administration of justice; he accused Landry of nine crimes, including assault in the first degree, attempted murder, and fabricating evidence; and he asserted that the Connecticut Bar Association regulates the legal profession so as to impede access to the courts and to further its own interests. At no point during these proceedings did the court order a competency evaluation.
The defendant claims that the court, sua sponte, should have ordered a competency evaluation. Specifically, the defendant argues that (1) his expressed suicidal ideation during and immediately following the incident with the police at Landry's house; (2) his counsel's representations that he suffered from "some mental health problems"; and (3) his conduct during sentencing, which he characterizes as "bizarre and incoherent," all provided sufficient indicia of incompetency such that the court should have inquired into his ability to understand the proceedings against him. We disagree.
"We review the court's determination of the defendant's competency under the abuse of discretion standard. As this court has stated, [t]he trial judge is in a particularly advantageous position to observe a defendant's conduct during a trial and has a unique opportunity to assess a defendant's competency." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Edwards, 158 Conn.App. 119, 133–34, 118 A.3d 615, cert. denied, 318 Conn. 906, 122 A.3d 634 (2015). "In determining whether the trial court [has] abused its discretion, this court must make every reasonable presumption in favor of [the correctness of] its action.... Our review of a trial court's exercise of the legal discretion vested in it is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and could reasonably have reached the conclusion that it did." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jordan, 151 Conn.App. 1, 32–33, 92 A.3d 1032, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 909, 100 A.3d 402 (2014).
The defendant failed to raise...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Ward, AC 40534
...then lacked a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him, and thus was incompetent. See State v. Yeaw , 162 Conn. App. 382, 389–90, 131 A.3d 1172 (2016). By contrast, the additional, well documented facts presented to the trial court in the motion to correct concernin......
-
State v. Tierinni
...in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. D'Amato, 163 Conn. App. 536, 543 n.9, A.3d (2016); see also State v. Yeaw, 162 Conn. App. 382, 388-89, 131 A.3d 1172 (2016). "In the usual Golding situation, the defendant raises a claim on appeal which, while not preserved at trial, ......
-
State v. Polanco
...internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. D'Amato, 163 Conn.App. 536, 543 n. 9, 137 A.3d 38 (2016) ; see also State v. Yeaw, 162 Conn.App. 382, 389, 131 A.3d 1172 (2016) ; State v. Terry, 161 Conn.App. 797, 812, 128 A.3d 958 (2015). “[U]nless the defendant has satisfied the first Golding ......
-
State v. Tierinni
...quotation marks omitted.) State v. D'Amato, 163 Conn.App. 536, 543 n. 9, 137 A.3d 38 (2016) ; see 165 Conn.App. 847 also State v. Yeaw, 162 Conn.App. 382, 388–89, 131 A.3d 1172 (2016). “In the usual Golding situation, the defendant raises a claim on appeal which, while not preserved at tria......