State v. Yeazizw
| Decision Date | 05 August 2003 |
| Docket Number | CX-02-1486. |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Mebrat Belay Yeazizw, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Hennepin County District Court, File No. 01014419.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Jill Clark, Esq., Jill Clark, P.A., Special Assistant State Public Defender, 2005 Aquila Avenue North, Golden Valley, MN 55427; and
Jill Waite, Esq., Attorney at Law, Special Assistant State Public Defender, 2856 Humbolt Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55408 (for appellant).
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 525 Park Street, Suite 500, St. Paul, MN 55103; and
Christopher P. Renz, Thomsen & Nybeck, P.A., Edinborough Corporate Center East, 3300 Edinborough Way, Suite 600, Edina, MN 55435 (for respondent).
Considered and decided by Shumaker, Presiding Judge, Wright, Judge, and Forsberg, Judge.*
In this appeal from her convictions of disorderly conduct and obstructing legal process, appellant argues that (1) the disorderly conduct and obstructing legal process statutes are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support her convictions; (3) the district court abused its discretion in finding probable cause to support the charged offenses; (4) the district court abused its discretion in denying her a hearing on her motion to dismiss for discriminatory enforcement; (5) because of the cumulative effect of several evidentiary rulings, she did not receive a fair trial; (6) the district court erred in denying her motion for a new trial; and (7) the district court erred in denying her motion for a Schwartz hearing. The state argues that appellant's brief should be disregarded because it fails to comply with rules of appellate procedure. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
On January 18, 2001, appellant Mebrat Yeazizw was no longer employed by English Rose Suites (ERS), a private residential facility in Edina that provides care for people with dementia and related disorders. She visited the facility to pick up her last paycheck. Yeazizw went to an office on the lower level of the facility and spoke with Geralyn Mornson, a co-owner of ERS, regarding her paycheck. During the conversation, Yeazizw and Mornson began to argue about a discrepancy in the number of work hours reflected in Yeazizw's paycheck. Testimony differs about the argument and subsequent events. Co-owner Jayne Clairmont, whose office was nearby, testified at trial that she asked Yeazizw three times to lower her voice because of the adverse effect it would have on the patients in the facility. After repeatedly asking Yeazizw to leave, Clairmont put her hand on Yeazizw's arm to guide her from her seat. When Yeazizw did not comply with the requests to leave, Clairmont asked Mornson to call the police.
Yeazizw testified that Mornson became angry while recalculating Yeazizw's hours and threw a calculator at Yeazizw, striking her arm and causing it to bleed. Yeazizw also stated that she tried to call the police, but Mornson pulled the telephone away from her and took her earring. Yeazizw testified that Clairmont and another individual restrained her, and she was never asked to leave before the police arrived.
There are also differing accounts of what happened once Edina police officers Kris Eidem, Troy Kemp, and Abagail Hammond responded. Clairmont testified that, after the police arrived, they spoke with Yeazizw and gave her a card explaining how she could pursue a civil lawsuit to recover any money ERS owed her. Clairmont testified that the officers were able to understand Yeazizw1 and Yeazizw did not ask for an interpreter. The officers also spoke with Clairmont to determine how she was involved in the incident. The officers asked Yeazizw more than once to leave the property. According to Clairmont, on the way up the stairs, Yeazizw began to flail and resist the officers, such that the officers had to put her against a wall. Eidem, Kemp, and Hammond also testified that, as they walked Yeazizw up the stairs, she was struggling, physically resisting, and screaming in a high tone of voice. Eidem also testified that, once the officers got Yeazizw outside of ERS, Yeazizw started to pull away. Consequently, the officers handcuffed her because they were concerned that she would hurt someone or break a window.
Yeazizw testified that when the police arrived, they went directly to her, handcuffed her, and dragged her out of the facility. She stated that she had difficulty understanding the officers and did not have an opportunity to tell her side of the story.
On February 9, 2001, Yeazizw was charged with disorderly conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3) (2000), and obstruction of legal process, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(1) (2000). After a jury trial, Yeazizw was convicted of both offenses and sentenced to serve 180 days in the workhouse, with 175 days stayed. This appeal followed.
Yeazizw contends that the statutes underlying her convictions are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, both facially and as applied. The constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Wright, 588 N.W.2d 166, 168 (Minn. App. 1998), review denied (Minn. Feb. 24, 1999). "In evaluating constitutional challenges, the interpretation of statutes is a question of law." State v. Manning, 532 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Minn. App. 1995) (citation omitted), review denied (Minn. July 20, 1995).
Yeazizw argues that Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3) (2000), which proscribes disorderly conduct, is unconstitutional on its face because it is both vague and overbroad. Established precedent holds otherwise. Section 609.72 provides, in pertinent part:
Whoever does any of the following in a public or private place, * * * knowing, or having reasonable grounds to know that it will, or will tend to, alarm, anger or disturb others or provoke an assault or breach of the peace, is guilty of disorderly conduct, which is a misdemeanor:
* * * *
(3) Engages in offensive, obscene, abusive, boisterous, or noisy conduct or in offensive, obscene, or abusive language tending reasonably to arouse alarm, anger, or resentment in others.
Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3).
Vague statutes are prohibited under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7, of the Minnesota Constitution. State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn. 1985). A statute must "define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Id. (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 1858 (1983)). "A statute is overbroad on its face if it prohibits constitutionally protected activity, in addition to activity that may be prohibited without offending constitutional rights." State v. Machholz, 574 N.W.2d 415, 419 (Minn. 1998) (citation omitted). In a facial challenge to a statute punishing spoken words, the conduct underlying the conviction is irrelevant. In re Welfare of S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d 412, 419 (Minn. 1978). Thus, we need not consider Yeazizw's charged conduct to consider whether the statute is facially constitutional.
Although it narrowed the reach of Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3), in S.L.J., the Minnesota Supreme Court has upheld the facial constitutionality of the statute in terms of both vagueness and overbreadth. S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d at 419; see also State v. Klimek, 398 N.W.2d 41, 42 (Minn. App. 1986). As to its application to speech, the disorderly conduct statute may only prohibit "fighting words." In re Welfare of M.A.H., 572 N.W.2d 752, 756 (Minn. App. 1997) (quoting S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d at 418-19). Prohibiting speech that merely arouses "`alarm, anger or resentment' is overbroad and vague." Id. "Fighting words" are defined as Klimek, 398 N.W.2d at 43 (quotation and citation omitted). Thus, "a conviction of disorderly conduct cannot be predicated only on a person's words unless those words are `fighting words.'" State v. McCarthy, 659 N.W.2d 808, 810-11 (Minn. App. 2003) (quoting S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d at 419). As Yeazizw points out, the relevant language of Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3), has not changed since S.L.J. was decided. Although the reach of the statute has been narrowed, Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3), is facially constitutional.
In examining the conduct of a person accused of disorderly conduct, the words of a defendant are considered as a "package" along with conduct and physical movements. M.A.H., 572 N.W.2d at 757 (citation omitted). Here, Yeazizw's charged conduct included physically resisting the officers and was not merely oral statements. At the least, the disorderly conduct statute's proscription of abusive and boisterous conduct applies to both Yeazizw's speech and her physical conduct. Thus, the application of Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3), to the total "package" of Yeazizw's conduct is constitutional. Id.
Yeazizw also contends that Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(1) (2000), which prohibits obstruction of legal process, is unconstitutional on its face. The statute prohibits conduct that "obstructs, hinders, or prevents the lawful execution of any legal process, civil or criminal, or apprehension of another on a charge or conviction of a criminal offense." Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(1).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that section 609.50, subdivision 1(1), is not...
To continue reading
Request your trial