State v. Yoder

• Citation: 130 N.W. 10,113 Minn. 503
• Parties: STATE v. YODER.
• Decision Date: 17 February 1911
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

113 Minn. 503

130 N.W. 10

STATE

v.YODER.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Feb. 17, 1911.

Case Certified from District Court, Becker County.

Claude Francis Yoder was indicted for bigamy. A demurrer to the indictment was overruled, and upon facts stipulated the case was certified to the Supreme Court for final determination. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

A marriage contract is a nullity ab initio only where expressly so declared by statute. In such a case it is absolutely void, requiring no judicial decree for its dissolution.

A voidable marriage contract arises where, though prohibited by law, it may be ratified or confirmed by the subsequent cohabitation and conduct of the parties, and is valid until dissolved by judicial decree.

A voidable marriage is sufficient upon which to base a prosecution for bigamy, and the fact that the contract is voidable constitutes no defense.

A remarriage of divorced persons within six months from the date of their divorce, though prohibited by section 3554, Rev. Laws 1905, is valid until dissolved by judicial decree. George T. Simpson and Peter F. Schroeder, for the State.

A. T. Cole and Nye & Dosland, for defendant.

BROWN, J.

Defendant was indicted and thereby charged by the grand jury of Becker county with the crime of bigamy. Upon arraignment he interposed a general demurrer to the indictment. At the hearing of the demurrer the parties stipulated to certain facts for the consideration of the court in ruling upon the question presented. The demurrer was overruled, and the court certified the question arising from the facts to this court for final determination. The facts, as so agreed upon, are as follows:

In January, 1908, defendant and Inga Marie Yoder, residents and domiciled in the state of North Dakota, were duly married to each other, and thereafter continued to reside together as husband and wife until the 1st day of May, 1909, when by a decree of divorce entered in the district court of Cass county, N. D., the marriage was dissolved. By the statutes of North Dakota divorced persons are prohibited from remarrying until after the expiration of three months from the rendition of the divorce. Thereafter, on August 9, 1909, and at a time when the parties could lawfully have remarried in the state of North Dakota, having evidently concluded that their divorce was a mistake, they came from their home in North Dakota to the city of Detroit, in this state, and there procured a marriage license, and were then and there again married to each other. The marriage was in violation of the laws of this state, which prohibits the remarriage of divorced persons within six months from the date of the divorce. They thereafter resided for a time in this state, but before the expiration of six months from the date of the North Dakota divorce returned to that state. They later, for reasons not stated in the record, separated and ceased to live together as husband and wife. On May 27, 1910, defendant and one Ruth Hull, both residents of North Dakota, came to the city of Detroit, this state, and after procuring the necessary license were then and there duly married, following which they returned to North Dakota as husband and wife. The second marriage between defendant and Inga Marie Yoder has never been dissolved or declared void in any judicial proceeding. The charge of bigamy laid in the indictment is founded upon the defendant's marriage to Miss Hull.

Though several questions are certified by the trial court, the ultimate and decisive question is whether the second marriage of the Yoders was an absolute nullity, and therefore no foundation for the charge against defendant of bigamy by reason of the marriage with Miss Hull. We pass, without considering, the suggestion of the state that since, at the time of the second marriage between the Yoders, they lawfully could enter into that relation in the state of North Dakota, where they resided, they might come into this state and become lawfully married (citing Bullock v. Bullock, 122 Mass. 3, and Philips v. Madrid, 83 Me. 205, 22 Atl. 114,12 L. R. A. 862, 23 Am. St. Rep. 770), and, for the purpose of the case, adopt the contention of defendant that the question presented must be determined by the construction and effect to be given to the statutes of this state.

It is well settled that, in order to justify a conviction on the charge of bigamy, the state must establish a valid first marriage and a second marriage in fact. It is also settled that evidence of a ceremonial first marriage carries with it a presumption of validity, except in those cases where shown to have been of a character declared by statute an absolute nullity. If the first marriage be declared null and void by statute, defendant may show the facts in defense without the production of a decree of court so declaring it. But the rule is different with respect to marriages which are only voidable, as distinguished from those which are mere nullities. Hughes, Criminal Law, 1989; Schouler's Domestic Relations, § 14; State v. Parker, 106 N. C. 711, 11 S. E. 517;Beggs v. State, 55 Ala. 108. As remarked in Schouler on Dom. Rel. § 14: ‘A void marriage is a mere nullity, and its validity may be impeached in any court, whether the question arises directly or collaterally, and whether the parties be living or dead. But a voidable marriage is valid for all civil purposes until a competent tribunal has pronounced the sentence of nullity in direct proceedings instituted for the purpose.’

It is the contention of defendant in the case at bar that his second marriage with his first wife, having been entered into in violation of section 3554, Rev. Laws 1905, prohibiting the remarriage of divorced persons within six months from the date of the decree of divorce, was an absolute nullity, requiring no decree or other judicial proceeding setting it aside, and therefore his marriage with Miss Hull was not bigamous. The statute relied upon in support of this contention provides that: ‘No marriage shall be contracted while either of the parties has a husband or wife living; nor within six months after either has been divorced from a former spouse; nor between parties who are nearer of kin than first cousins, whether of the half or full blood, computed by the rules of civil law; nor between persons either one of whom is epileptic, imbecile, feeble-minded, or insane.’

The statute is prohibited, and declares that marriage shall not be contracted between the parties mentioned, but does not declare the same, if consummated, void or a nullity. Defendant invokes the general rule applicable to all contracts entered into in violation of law, and insists that thereunder the marriage in question was a nullity. We are unable to concur in this claim. While it is true that ordinary contracts entered into in violation of positive law are nullities and unenforceable, the rule has not, at least not by a uniform...