State v. Yohn

Decision Date05 May 2023
Docket Number124,830
PartiesState of Kansas, Appellee, v. James D. Yohn, Appellant.
CourtKansas Court of Appeals

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

Appeal from Reno District Court; TRISH ROSE, judge.

Kai Tate Mann, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Brian Koch, assistant district attorney, Thomas Stanton, district attorney, and Kris Kobach, attorney general, for appellee.

Before ISHERWOOD, P.J., SCHROEDER, J., and TIMOTHY G. LAHEY, S.J.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM.

James D. Yohn timely appeals from his convictions and sentences for possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, arguing: (1) The district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence; (2) the district court erred in denying his motion for new trial; and (3) prosecutorial error. After an extensive review of the record we find no errors, and we affirm.

FACTS

On July 12, 2019, Lieutenant Jason Hoffman of the Kansas Highway Patrol (KHP) was dispatched to the scene of a single-vehicle motorcycle crash on Highway K-14 in Reno County. Hoffman spoke with a witness who explained the motorcycle left the roadway, entered tall grass and went into a ditch, then rolled several times. Hoffman later determined the motorcycle was being driven by Yohn and there had been no other riders. However, Yohn was already being attended to by emergency medical services, so Hoffman did not speak with Yohn at the scene. Because Yohn was being treated for his injuries and was later transported to the hospital, Hoffman determined he needed to arrange to have the motorcycle towed as it was inoperable due to the crash and there was no one present to remove it. Hoffman contacted dispatch to arrange for a tow while he continued with his accident investigation. Pursuant to KHP policy, Hoffman conducted an inventory search of the motorcycle prior to the tow truck's arrival. In the motorcycle's saddlebag, Hoffman found a sock with a bulb-like object, which he removed and determined was a glass pipe with suspected drug residue. Hoffman also found a baggie of methamphetamine in a toiletry case.

At some point after Hoffman requested a tow truck, Yohn's mother Emma German, arrived at the scene in an SUV. Hoffman was uncertain whether this was before or after he conducted the inventory search. Hoffman was also uncertain whether German gave her name at that time; he could only recall German identifying herself as the mother of the motorcycle driver. At the time, Hoffman was unaware German was the registered owner of the motorcycle and he did not believe German was equipped to remove the motorcycle, given the size of her vehicle and lack of a trailer. German did not indicate she was the owner of the motorcycle, nor did she discuss making her own arrangements to have it towed. Hoffman's conversation with German was about Yohn's condition and the fact he was taken to the hospital. German then promptly left to check on her son at the hospital.

Hoffman later went to Hutchinson Regional Hospital to speak with Yohn. After being advised of his rights under Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), Yohn agreed to speak with Hoffman. Yohn stated he was the only rider of the motorcycle and it belonged to him although it was registered to German and her husband. Yohn indicated he kept rain gear and a cell phone in the motorcycle's saddlebags and sometimes kept a toiletry kit. When Hoffman told Yohn he was concerned about some of the other items found in the saddlebags, Yohn told Hoffman he had loaned the motorcycle to a friend and had gotten it back earlier that day but did not want to identify his friend.

Yohn was charged with possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence collected in Hoffman's inventory search. The district court denied his motion, finding Hoffman's decision to tow and inventory the motorcycle was reasonable and the inventory search was not an investigatory ruse.

At trial, Hoffman testified as previously described. Yohn testified in his own defense. On cross-examination, Yohn indicated he loaned the motorcycle to a friend earlier that day but refused to say who it was and admitted he had not told anyone who he loaned the motorcycle to. The jury convicted Yohn as charged.

Yohn filed a motion for new trial, arguing the district court improperly admitted the evidence obtained in Hoffman's inventory search. The district court denied Yohn's motion and sentenced him to 24 months' imprisonment for possession of methamphetamine with a concurrent sentence of 6 months in jail for possession of drug paraphernalia, suspended to 18 months' supervised probation. Additional facts are set forth as necessary.

ANALYSIS

The Denial of Yohn's Motion to Suppress Evidence Was Proper

Standard of Review and Applicable Legal Principles

"On a motion to suppress, an appellate court generally reviews the district court's findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence and reviews the ultimate legal conclusion de novo." State v. Cash, 313 Kan. 121, 125-26, 483 P.3d 1047 (2021). In reviewing the factual findings, we do not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. When the material facts supporting a district court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence are not in dispute, the ultimate question of whether to suppress is a question of law subject to unlimited review. State v. Hanke, 307 Kan. 823, 827, 415 P.3d 966 (2018).

The State has the burden to prove the search and seizure were lawful. K.S.A. 223216(2); Cash, 313 Kan. at 126. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, and warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v Heim, 312 Kan. 420, 422-23, 475 P.3d 1248 (2020). One such exception-the point at issue here-is an inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle. Our Supreme Court recognizes a vehicle may be lawfully impounded in the following circumstances:

"'(1) an unattended-to car illegally parked or otherwise illegally obstructing traffic; (2) an unattended-to car from the scene of an accident when the driver is physically or mentally incapable of deciding upon steps to be taken to deal with his property, as in the case of the intoxicated, mentally incapacitated or seriously injured driver, (3) a car that has been stolen or used in the commission of a crime when its retention as evidence is necessary; (4) an abandoned car; (5) a car so mechanically defective as to be a menace to others using the public highway; [and] (6) a car impoundable pursuant to ordinance or statute which provides therefor as in the case of forfeiture.'" State v. Shelton, 278 Kan. 287, 294, 93 P.3d 1200 (2004).

To prove a lawful inventory search, the State must show the search was conducted pursuant to a standardized department policy. See State v. Evans, 308 Kan. 1422, 143233, 430 P.3d 1 (2018).

Discussion

Yohn argues Hoffman's inventory search was improper because he never consulted with Yohn or German about the disposition of the motorcycle. He asserts the search could have been avoided if Hoffman consulted with Yohn or German because German was the registered owner and could have arranged for a tow through her own prepaid tow service. Yohn's argument is problematic because he puts too much emphasis on what German could have done as the registered owner. But as Hoffman explained at the suppression hearing, he was unaware German was the registered owner of the motorcycle; he was not even certain if she gave her name. He also did not know if Yohn was the owner because he did not speak with Yohn at the scene as Yohn was receiving medical care from the responding EMTs.

Further in Shelton, our Supreme Court explained:

"The first question arising is whether under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer must give a driver who is competent of making a rational disposition of the vehicle, the opportunity to make that disposition in order to justify impoundment. The answer to this question is no. What is required under the Fourth Amendment is that the impoundment be reasonable under the totality of circumstances. The officer's inquiry of the driver regarding disposition is but one of the circumstances that is considered in the court's determination of whether the impoundment is reasonable." 278 Kan. at 293.

Here, Hoffman's actions were reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Hoffman did not inquire what Yohn wanted done with the motorcycle because Yohn was seriously injured in the crash and required medical attention at the scene. Hoffman did not want to interfere with Yohn receiving the necessary medical attention-a far more pressing matter than the disposition of the motorcycle. Yohn's injuries were so serious he had to be taken by ambulance to the hospital where he received several tests for head trauma, and it was determined he suffered a broken wrist, a broken collar bone, and other serious injuries. Accordingly, Hoffman's decision to proceed with his accident investigation and wait to speak to Yohn at the hospital was reasonable.

Similarly Hoffman reasonably limited his discussion with German to Yohn's condition and whereabouts. He had no reason to know German was the registered owner because, at the time, dispatch was determining who owned the motorcycle, and Hoffman did not recall whether German even gave her name. German did not tell Hoffman she was the registered owner; she did not ask about or discuss arranging for a tow on her own; and she did not appear to be equipped to transport the motorcycle, which was inoperable as a result of the crash. In...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT