State v. Young
| Citation | 117 A. 713 |
| Parties | STATE v. YOUNG. |
| Decision Date | 19 June 1922 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey) |
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Guilford C. Young was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he brings error. Affirmed.
John T. Cleary, of Camden, for plaintiff in error.
Charles A. Wolverton and Albert E. Burling, both of Camden, for the State.
The defendant was convicted of murder of the first degree, and has brought the record here on specifications of causes for reversal under the 136th section of the Criminal Procedure Act (2 Comp. St. 1910, p. 1863); no assignments of error having been filed.
The first specification argued is that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, as permitted by statute. P. L. 1921, p. 951. The testimony shows that defendant left Camden with deceased in an automobile belonging to and driven by the latter; that a few miles from the city the lifeless body of deceased was found partially secreted from casual observation; that defendant was found in possession of the automobile; and of articles taken from the body of the deceased; that the number of the engine of the automobile had been changed by order of the defendant, and a fraudulent bill of sale obtained and exhibited by him to show his ownership. The defendant admitted that he had killed deceased, but testified it was done in self-defense The verdict is not against the weight of the evidence, for the conduct of the defendant was shown, by the weight of the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, not to justify a killing in self-defense, but the inference that the object of the killing was robbery.
The next point is that defendant's confession, admitted in evidence, was not voluntary, but was induced by a statement, made to defendant by Doran, a policeman, and other officers investigating the truth of defendant's explanatory statements, that it would be better for him to tell the truth. This was said to defendant while the officers were investigating the truth of certain statements made by defendant which tended to show that he had not stolen the automobile, and also that he had done other things inconsistent with his guilt, which, being investigated, proved to be untrue, and it was with reference to such statements that the officers told defendant it would be better to tell the truth in his alleged exonerating statements. He was not advised to confess guilt, but to tell the truth in his explanatory statements, which were found to be not true, and which defendant afterwards admitted were false. It appears from defendant's testimony that what Doran told him" about telling the truth did not influence him, for he persisted in his claim of innocence, and tried to support it by other false statements, until it was shown to him that they were false, when he made the confession admitted in evidence. The testimony is abundant that before he made the admissions complained of he was distinctly and repeatedly told by the prosecutor that no promises would be made, and that whatever he said must be voluntary, with the expectation it would be used against him, and the evidence on this point justified the trial court in finding that the confession was voluntary, and therefore defendant by its admission in evidence did not "suffer manifest wrong or injury" within section 136 of the Criminal Procedure Act.
The next point argued is admission of testimony showing that defendant attempted to procure means of escape from the county jail by requesting another person, visiting a prisoner in the jail where defendant was confined, to bring him a saw and other implements useful to carry out that purpose. The evidence was competent. The argument by defendant to the contrary only goes to its weight on the question of conscious guilt, and that was for the jury. An attempt to procure tools for the purpose of escaping from prison would perhaps be more persuasive of conscious guilt than flight before arrest, but either act is competent on the question of guilt although of little value in determining the grade of the offense.
It is next urged that it was error to permit the witness Bandall to use, for the purpose of refreshing his recollection of what defendant said to him, a letter written by the witness to the wife of the defendant, under defendant's direction and by his dictation. The facts shown were that at defendant's request Randall wrote the letter, and was allowed to read it for the purpose of refreshing his recollection. It being read, the witness testified that it was what he had written, and that he had written what defendant dictated to him to write. The fact that the writing corresponds with the testimony of the witness as to his refreshed recollection does not make it incompetent; the question is whether the witness adopts the words as his recollection, and, as was done in this case, he may be cross-examined as to the extent of his recollection. The witness testified that he wrote just what he was told to write by the defendant, and its effect and credibility was for the jury....
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State v. Szemple
...N.J.Super. 571, 579, 489 A.2d 1272 (Law Div.1984); 8 Wigmore on Evidence § 2332, at 642 (McNaughton rev. 1961); cf. State v. Young, 97 N.J.L. 501, 505, 117 A. 713 (1922) (discussing requirement that communication loses privileged nature if overheard by third Like other evidentiary privilege......
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...... Id. at 417, 640 A.2d 817. The Court concluded that "the involvement of a third party vitiate[d] the requirement of confidentiality." Ibid. The Court's refusal to apply the privilege comported with prior decisions dealing with the subject. See, e.g., State v. Young, 97 N.J.L. 501, . Page 14 . 505, 117 A. 713 (E. & A.1922); State v. Laudisi, 86 N.J.L. 230, 231, 90 A. 1098 (E. & A.1914); State v. Sidoti, 134 N.J.Super. 426, 430-31, 341 A.2d 670 (App.Div.1975); State v. Brown, 113 N.J.Super. 348, 353, 273 A.2d 783 (App.Div.1971). . Because ......
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