State v. Young
| Decision Date | 21 March 1900 |
| Parties | STATE v. YOUNG. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Appeal from superior court, King county; O. Jacobs, Judge.
William Young was convicted of an assault with intent to commit murder, and he appeals. Reversed.
J. E Hawkins, for appellant.
James F. McElroy, John B. Hart, and Walter S. Fulton, for the State.
The appellant was tried upon the following information 'William Young is hereby accused by James F. McElroy prosecuting attorney in and for King county, state of Washington, and in the name of and by the authority of said state of Washington, and on oath, by this information, of the crime of an assault to commit the crime of murder, committed as follows, to wit: He, the said William Young, in the county of King, state of Washington, on the 23d day of May, A. D 1899, willfully, unlawfully, purposely, and feloniously, and of his premeditated and deliberate malice, with intent to kill and murder one Frank Johnson, did make an assault in and upon the person of the said Frank Johnson with a deadly weapon, to wit, a razor, then and there held in the hand of said Young, and with which he then and there struck, beat cut, and wounded the person of the said Frank Johnson, with the intent aforesaid; no considerable provocation appearing therefor,'--and was convicted of an assault with intent to commit murder. The court instructed the jury that under the information they could find the defendant guilty of assault with intent to commit murder, or of assault and battery, or of simple assault, but refused to instruct, although requested by the prosecuting attorney so to do, that they could find him guilty of an assault with a deadly weapon with intent to do bodily harm. The refusal of the court to give this instruction is alleged here as error. We think it was error, and prejudicial to the defendant. It is true that in State v. Ackles, 8 Wash. 462, 36 P. 597, we held that under the information in that case it was not competent for the jury to return a verdict of guilty of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to do bodily harm, but for the reason that the lesser crime was not described in the information; there being no allegation that the assault was without considerable provocation, or that it was the impulse of a willful, abandoned, or malignant heart. 'The accused in criminal prosecutions,' said the court in that case, 'has a constitutional right to be apprised of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; * * * and this can only be made known by setting forth in the indictment or information every fact constituting an element of the offense charged.' Under our statute, an assault with a deadly weapon, with intent to inflict upon the person of another a bodily injury, is made a felony only upon the express condition that the assault is without considerable provocation, or where the circumstances of the assault show a willful, malignant, and abandoned heart; and, when an act is punishable in a particular manner under certain conditions, these conditions must be set forth, so as to show that the act is punishable. But the information in this case meets all the objections urged by the court in the case cited. It is alleged that the assault was made in the manner and form stated, no considerable provocation appearing therefor; and as the statute is in the alternative, so far as the conditions mentioned (viz. no considerable provocation appearing, or that it was the impulse of a willful, abandoned, and malignant heart) are concerned, the statement of the existence of either was sufficient.
The only other question presented is whether the information sufficiently describes the offense of an assault with a deadly weapon with intent to do bodily harm. There is no question but that the weapon is sufficiently described, and the argument that the allegation 'with intent to kill and murder' is an equivalent allegation, and has included within it the allegation 'to inflict bodily injury,' is not only in consonance with common sense, but is supported by universal authority. In fact, no other conclusion could be reached without reversing the laws of nature. It is not necessary to use any...
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State v. Condon, 88854–0.
...did not employ the general presumption that the jury followed the court's instructions. Id. at 164, 683 P.2d 189 (quoting State v. Young, 22 Wash. 273, 276–77, 60 P. 650 (1900)). Instead, we declined to speculate on the probable results had the instruction been given. Id. (quoting Young, 22......
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State v. Condon
...not employ the general presumption that the jury followed the court's instructions. Id. at 164, 683 P.2d 189 (quoting State v. Young, 22 Wash. 273, 276–77, 60 P. 650 (1900) ). Instead, we declined to speculate on the probable results had the instruction been given. Id. (quoting Young, 22 Wa......
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State v. Romero
...degree of the offense inferior to and included in the one charged, the law of such inferior degree ought to be given." State v. Young, 22 Wash. 273, 60 P. 650, 651 (1900), but later modified. See State v. Norby, 20 Wash.App. 378, 579 P.2d 1358 We should hold that "some evidence tending to e......
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State v. Condon
...results in the absence of such instructions." State v. Parker, 102 Wn.2d 161, 163-64, 683 P.2d 189 (1984) (quoting State v. Young, 22 Wash. 273, 276, 60 P. 650 (1900)). The State argues that the jury's returning a verdict of guilty of premeditated murder rather than felony murder makes this......
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The Doctrine of Lesser Included Offenses
...to instruct the jury to that effect. Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 315 (1896) (citation omitted). See also State v. Young, 22 Wash. 273, 277, 60 P. 650, 651 49. See infra text accompanying notes 177-96. 50. See infra text accompanying notes 199-223. 51. United States v. Johnson,......