State v. Young

• Decision Date: 06 April 2015
• Docket Number: No. CA2014–05–074.,CA2014–05–074.
• Parties: STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Christopher Wayne YOUNG, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

31 N.E.3d 178

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Christopher Wayne YOUNG, Defendant–Appellant.

No. CA2014–05–074.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Twelfth District, Warren County.

April 6, 2015.

David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, Michael Greer, Lebanon, OH, for plaintiff-appellee.

Fowler, Demos & Stueve, William G. Fowler, Lebanon, OH, for defendant-appellant.

OPINION

M. POWELL

, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Christopher Young, appeals a decision of the Warren County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to suppress and sentencing him to 60 months in prison following his conviction for illegal assembly of chemicals for the manufacture of drugs.

{¶ 2} In September 2013, appellant and his wife Ashley lived in a duplex in Lebanon, Ohio. Detective John Wetzel of the Lebanon Police Department knew appellant had previously been convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine. In September 2013, upon receiving “drug tips” that methamphetamine abuse and manufacturing was occurring at appellant's residence, Detective Wetzel entered appellant's name and that of his wife into the National Precursor Log Exchange (NPLEx), a nationwide real-time electronic logging system used by pharmacies and law enforcement to track sales of over-the-counter cold and allergy medications containing pseudoephedrine.¹ The detective testified that if either appellant or Ashley purchased pseudoephedrine anywhere in the United States, an alert would be emailed to the detective.²

{¶ 3} On September 18, 2013, Detective Wetzel received an alert that Ashley had purchased pseudoephedrine at a Walgreens in Lebanon, Ohio. A week later, on September 25, the detective received an alert that Ashley had unsuccessfully tried to purchase pseudoephedrine at a Kroger in Lebanon, Ohio. Minutes later, the detective received an alert that appellant had purchased pseudoephedrine at that Kroger. Believing that appellant and Ashley might try to manufacture methamphetamine that evening, Detective Wetzel and a police officer went to appellant's home to try to make contact with appellant and Ashley.

{¶ 4} Once at appellant's home, Detective Wetzel went to the front door. The detective testified it looked like appellant and Ashley were home as the front window of their home was “wide open, unsecured” and the television was “blaring really loud.” The detective knocked on the front door. Nobody answered. “[Feeling] like somebody was home with the T.V. being on and the house being left open,” the detective walked to the back of the house and onto a back patio and knocked “real loud” on the back door. Once again, nobody answered.

{¶ 5} Sitting outside the back door was a trash can with an open trash bag. The detective noticed a Mountain Dew bottle sitting on the very top of the trash bag. The two-liter bottle was crushed and had a milky white residue inside of it. The bottle cap had a hole punched in it. Detective Wetzel testified that, based on his training and experience in investigating methamphetamine manufacture, those characteristics indicated the bottle had been used to produce methamphetamine. As the detective took a photo of the bottle with his cell phone, appellant and Ashley came home carrying Kroger grocery bags. Inside one of the bags was the pseudoephedrine appellant had purchased earlier that afternoon.

{¶ 6} Appellant and Ashley were interviewed separately at the scene. Appellant was very cooperative and ultimately granted Detective Wetzel consent to search his home. During the search, police officers found camping fuel and lithium batteries stripped of their lithium strips. The detective testified the items were indicative of methamphetamine manufacturing. Appellant admitted the pseudoephedrine pills were going to be used to manufacture methamphetamine but adamantly denied he was going to manufacture methamphetamine. Rather, appellant told the detective he was going to trade or sell the pseudoephedrine pills to a drug dealer. Appellant was arrested but was subsequently released on electronic monitoring.

{¶ 7} While out on bond, appellant was arrested in early November 2013 for stealing lithium batteries at a Walmart in Lebanon, Ohio. The record shows that appellant brought a couple, a man and a woman, with him to Walmart and gave them money to purchase pseudoephedrine at the store. At the time, appellant, Ashley, and the couple were all staying at the same motel. Appellant told Detective Wetzel that someone else was going to manufacture methamphetamine with the pseudoephedrine and the lithium batteries.

{¶ 8} In January 2014, appellant was indicted on two counts of illegal assembly of chemicals for the manufacture of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.041

, both felonies of the third degree.³ Both counts alleged that appellant, “two or more times previously, ha[d] been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a felony drug abuse offense and at least one of those convictions or guilty pleas was a violation of [R.C.] 2925.041(A).”

{¶ 9} Appellant moved to suppress the evidence seized in his home on the ground Detective Wetzel unlawfully invaded the curtilage of appellant's home when the detective entered the back patio without a warrant and knocked on the back door. In February 2014, a hearing on the motion was held during which Detective Wetzel and two other law enforcement officers testified. At appellant's request, the matter was set for a further hearing in March 2014. During that hearing, the property owner of the duplex occupied by appellant testified about the back patio. Photographs of the back patio were also admitted into evidence. Contrary to the testimony of Detective Wetzel and the other two officers, the testimony of the duplex property owner and the photographs of the back patio revealed that the patio was completely enclosed by a wooden fence. The fence was approximately six feet tall and had a gate through which to enter the patio. The gate was two-thirds the height of the fence. The property owner testified that the fence and the gate were built several years before 2013.

{¶ 10} On March 21, 2014, the trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress on the ground that Detective Wetzel's actions at appellant's home on September 25, 2013, did not violate appellant's Fourth Amendment rights. Specifically, the trial court found that Detective Wetzel's decision to proceed around the house to seek out a back door was a lawful “knock and talk.” The trial court further found that the back patio was not part of the home's curtilage, and thus, the detective's “entry into this portion of the property and his observations [were] not barred by the Fourth Amendment.” In support of its finding the patio was not part of the home's curtilage, the trial court noted that the gate was not closed or locked, and that appellant failed to protect the contents of the trash bag “from observation from people passing by.” Finally, the trial court found that appellant “ultimately consented to a search of his home.”

{¶ 11} Following the denial of his motion to suppress, appellant entered a plea of no contest to the two counts of illegal assembly of chemicals for the manufacture of drugs. Appellant subsequently filed a sentencing memorandum with the trial court in which he argued that the maximum allowed prison term for his offenses was 36 months. On May 1, 2014, the trial court sentenced appellant to 60 months in prison on each count of illegal assembly of chemicals for the manufacture of drugs, and ordered that the sentences be served concurrently, for an aggregate prison term of 60 months.

{¶ 12} Appellant appeals, raising two assignments of error.

{¶ 13} Assignment of Error No. 1:

{¶ 14} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT AND IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTION BY DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE.

{¶ 15} Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Appellant asserts that Detective Wetzel's presence on the back patio without a warrant or a legitimate basis for a warrantless search was a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because the back patio was part of the home's curtilage.

{¶ 16} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8

; State v. Dean, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2013–03–007, 2014-Ohio-448, 2014 WL 545737, ¶ 8. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of the trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Burnside at id. Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Id. Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, as a matter of law, and without deference to the trial court's conclusions, whether the trial court applied the proper legal standard. Id.; Dean at id.

{¶ 17} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their * * * houses * * * against unreasonable searches and seizures.” A presumption of unreasonableness attaches to all warrantless home entries. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984)

. The Fourth Amendment's protection against warrantless home entries extends to the curtilage of an individual's home. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) ; State v. Williamson, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2003–02–047, 2004-Ohio-2209, 2004 WL 937326, ¶ 16. A house's curtilage is an area “[s]o intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home's ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection.” State v. Payne, 104 Ohio App.3d 364, 368, 662 N.E.2d 60 (12th Dist.1995), quoting Dunn at 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134.

{¶ 18} I...