State v. Young
| Decision Date | 18 October 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 46A03-0512-CV-583.,46A03-0512-CV-583. |
| Citation | 855 N.E.2d 329 |
| Parties | STATE of Indiana, et. al., Appellants-Defendants, v. Eugene YOUNG, et. al., Appellees-Plaintiffs. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Ryan D. Johanningsmeier, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellants.
Eric M. Hylton, David E. Kress, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellees.
The State of Indiana, et al., (collectively "the State") appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Eugene Young, et al., (collectively "the Teachers"), a group of teachers employed by the Department of Correction ("DOC"). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The State raises one issue, and the Teachers raise two issues on cross-appeal. Combined, reordered, and restated, the issues before us are:
I. whether the State's notice of appeal was filed within thirty days of a final judgment;
II. whether the trial court properly concluded that the DOC had to increase the Teachers' pay by four percent, but not an additional one percent.
The Teachers are employed by the DOC at the Indiana State Prison and the Westville Correctional Facility. Both facilities are located in LaPorte County. Pursuant to statute, the Teachers' salaries must equal the "daily rate of pay" of teachers located in the largest school corporation in LaPorte County, as determined by that corporation's "salary schedule." See Ind. Code § 11-10-5-4(b). Michigan City Area Schools ("MCAS") is the largest school corporation in LaPorte County.
In 2000, MCAS and the local teachers' union negotiated a new "salary schedule" as an addendum to a 1995 collective bargaining agreement. The "salary schedule" is a grid that lists various salaries for teachers based on years of experience and educational attainment. Following the "salary schedule" on a separate page was a "Memorandum of Understanding," which stated:
The parties recognize teachers' need for the continued personal expenditure of funds on technology to support the instructional program of Michigan City Area Schools.
Each teacher that completes at least one hundred twenty (120) schools days of service during the 1999-2000 school year shall be paid a one-time technology stipend of four percent (4%) of his/her base salary. Each teacher that completes at least sixty (60) schools days of service but less than one hundred twenty (120) school days of service during the 1999-2000 school year shall be paid a one-time technology stipend of two percent (2%) of his/her base salary.
App. p. 102. The MCAS board approved payment of this stipend, and the teachers employed by MCAS received this payment in one lump sum in May 2000.
Also attached to the "salary schedule" was another "Memorandum of Understanding" that stated:
The parties hereby agree that the additional state funding received because of the increase in student counts, commonly referred to as ADM, from the inclusion of students from Private Schools, for calendar years 2001 and 2002 shall not be available for bargaining; however, if the formula is funded as the parties expect, the Board will place not less than an additional one percent (1%) of each teacher's base salary into each teacher's 403(b) account.
Id. at 103. In January 2001, the conditions required to implement the one percent payment into MCAS teachers' 403(b) accounts2 under this "Memorandum of Understanding" were satisfied, and MCAS began making the payments accordingly.
In 2000, the DOC calculated the salaries of the Teachers using the MCAS "salary schedule" as reflected in the 2000 addendum. However, it did not include the four percent stipend as part of the Teachers' salary or make any other arrangements to pay it to the Teachers. Additionally, the DOC's salary calculation did not take into consideration the additional one percent 403(b) contribution for MCAS teachers. The Teachers unsuccessfully sought to have the DOC recalculate their salaries to include the four percent stipend and the additional one percent 403(b) contribution. They then filed a complaint with the Indiana State Personnel Department ("ISPD"), which refused to overrule the DOC's decision. The Teachers took the next step of appealing the ISPD's determination to the State Employees' Appeals Commission ("SEAC"). A SEAC hearing officer granted summary judgment in favor of the DOC, finding it had correctly interpreted Indiana Code Section 11-10-5-4 and calculated the Teachers' salaries. The SEAC affirmed the hearing officer's determination.
On September 22, 2003, the Teachers filed an amended complaint and petition for judicial review against the State. In the prayer for relief, the Teachers requested either remand to the SEAC, or, alternatively, an order directing the DOC to include the stipend and 403(b) payments when calculating the Teachers' salaries and an "award [of] damages to make up for Defendant's failure to pay such benefits in the past. . . ." App. p. 116. The State moved for summary judgment; the Teachers responded and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. On May 16, 2005, the trial court entered an order concluding that the DOC was required to pay the stipend, but not the 403(b) contribution, to the Teachers. This order did not specify the judicial relief to which the Teachers were entitled. On October 13, 2005, the trial court granted the State's motion to treat the May 16, 2005 order as a final appealable order. The State filed its notice of appeal on November 7, 2005, challenging the trial court's determination regarding the technology stipend. The Teachers cross-appeal the trial court's determination regarding the 403(b) contribution.
As an initial matter, the Teachers argue on cross-appeal that the trial court's May 16, 2005 order was a final appealable order and, therefore, the State's notice of appeal filed on November 7, 2005, exceeded the thirty-day time limit under Indiana Appellate Rule 9(A) for initiating an appeal. Appellate Rule 2(H) states that a judgment is "final" if:
(1) it disposes of all claims as to all parties;
(2) the trial court in writing expressly determines under Trial Rule 54(B) or Trial Rule 56(C) that there is no just reason for delay and in writing expressly directs the entry of judgment (i) under Trial Rule 54(B) as to fewer than all the claims or parties, or (ii) under Trial Rule 56(C) as to fewer than all the issues, claims or parties;
(3) it is deemed final under Trial Rule 60(C);
(4) it is a ruling on either a mandatory or permissive Motion to Correct Error which was timely filed under Trial Rule 59 or Criminal Rule 16; or
(5) it is otherwise deemed final by law.
A final judgment disposes of all issues as to all parties, thereby ending the particular case and leaving nothing for future determination. Georgos v. Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448, 451 (Ind.2003). Id. at 452.
Here, the concluding paragraph of the trial court's May 16, 2005 order stated:
As a matter of law, pursuant to Ind. Code § 11-10-5-4, the Court hereby finds that the Plaintiffs are entitled to be paid the 4% technology stipend by the Defendants as provided for in the Michigan City Area Schools' collective bargaining agreement. However, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to be paid the 1% 403(b) contribution since such payment is in the form of a retirement benefit.
App. pp. 313-14. This conclusion leaves much for future determination. It does not state whether the case should be remanded to the SEAC, ISPD, or DOC for further proceedings. It also does not contain any indication whether the Teachers are owed back pay and what the amount of damages for improperly withheld back pay would be and whether the trial court or one of the agencies below would be responsible for making that determination. In sum, the order contains no remedy to the Teachers. As such, it cannot be considered a final judgment. See Georgos, 790 N.E.2d at 452.
By contrast, the trial court's order of October 13, 2005, contains the "magic language" of Indiana Trial Rule 54(B) for making a non-final order final by stating that there is no just reason for delay and that the May 16, 2005 order be entered as a final judgment as to the issues addressed in that order. See id. The State had thirty days from October 13, 2005 to timely initiate its appeal. It did so, and this appeal is properly before us.
The primary issue in this case, and the one that parallels the Higgins case, is whether the DOC properly calculated the Teachers' salaries. We review a summary judgment ruling by using the same standard as the trial court: summary judgment is appropriate only where the evidence shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No.73 v. City of Evansville, 829 N.E.2d 494, 496 (Ind.2005). All facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party. Fraternal Order of Police, 829 N.E.2d at 496. The review of a summary judgment motion is limited to those materials designated to the trial court. Id. There do not appear to be any genuinely disputed issues of material fact in this case; the question presented here essentially is the proper construction of a statute and its application to the undisputed facts of this case.
Under Indiana Code Section 4-21.5-5-14(a), "[t]he burden of demonstrating the invalidity of agency action is on the party . . . asserting invalidity." Additionally, a court may invalidate agency action:
only if it determines that a person seeking judicial relief has been...
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