State v. Young
| Decision Date | 01 December 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 40631,40631 |
| Citation | 278 Minn. 381,154 N.W.2d 699 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota ex rel. Norman HALVERSON, Appellant, v. Jack G. YOUNG, Superintendent Minnesota State Reformatory, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. It is beyond the power of a court to impose banishment as a condition of probation, and the imposition of such condition is a void and separable part of the order granting probation. The condition is 2. Minn.St. 243.16, the Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision, comprehends that courts shall not relinquish continued supervision of defendants who reside outside the state during a probationary period.
contrary to the underlying policy of the probation law, which is to rehabilitate offenders without compromising the public safety.
3. A probationer under the provisions of Minn.St. 609.14 is entitled to a hearing on charges alleging violation of the terms of probation. The statute contemplates a summary hearing and not a formal trial. The sufficiency of the evidence in such proceeding is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its action will be reversed only upon a clear showing of abuse of that discretion.
C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Robert E. Oliphant, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Douglas M. Head, Atty. Gen., Gerard W. Snell, Acting Sol. Gen., David C. Weinberg, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for respondent.
This is an appeal from a order of the district court denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by defendant, who is now serving a sentence for the crime of burglary. When sentence was originally imposed, the court granted probation on condition that defendant take up residence and employment in the State of Nevada and not return to the State of Minnesota. A few months later, defendant returned to Minnesota, whereupon his probation was revoked. He contends that the court erred in revoking his probation on that ground. Both parties seem to agree that the issue thus presented calls for a decision by this court as to whether or not banishment from the State of Minnesota is a valid condition for probation.
It appears from the record before us that on September 7, 1965, defendant entered a plea of guilty in Ramsey County District Court to the charge of burglary in violation of Minn.St. 609.58, subd. 2(1)(a). Preliminary to sentence, defendant informed the court that he had been offered employment with a company in Nevada and that if probation were granted he would leave the next day for that state. At that time defendant was 22 years of age, was married with an 8-month-old child, had one prior conviction, and felt that his difficulties in Minnesota grew out of bad associations. In considering the proposal, the trial court interrogated the defendant:
The court thereupon imposed an indeterminate sentence from 0 to 20 years and granted defendant 'a suspension of this sentence imposed by the Court on the condition that you leave the State of Minnesota no later than 6:00 o'clock p.m. tomorrow, the 8th day of September, 1965, to take up residence and employment, as you have stated to the Court, in the State of Nevada, and conditioned on the fact that you remain out of the State of Minnesota and conduct yourself as a law-abiding citizen.'
From the record it next appears that on February 18, 1966, an order was made setting a hearing for revocation of probation pursuant to § 609.14. The order was based upon an affidavit of the assistant county attorney to the effect that defendant had been named as an accomplice in a burglary and had been in custody of police authorities in Hudson, Wisconsin; that extradition proceedings were undertaken, as a result of which defendant had been brought to Washington County where a burglary charge was pending against him. It was also represented that defendant had violated the conditions of his probation by returning to the State of Minnesota. At the hearing, the trial court heard evidence with relation to the alleged breach of conditions of his parole. From the record it appears that on January 12, 1966, the police in Hudson, Wisconsin, received a radio message to watch for a red Mustang automobile crossing the interstate bridge from Minnesota into Wisconsin. The car was thought to have been involved in a burglary in Minnesota. Eight minutes later a red Mustang, driven by defendant, crossed the bridge at Hudson, at which time defendant was arrested. There is nothing in the record to indicate one way or the other as to what defendant's involvement with the reported burglary may have been. Nor is there anything in the record to indicate the disposition of the criminal charge made against defendant in Washington County. It does not appear that the circumstances surrounding his arrest in Wisconsin and return to Minnesota were considered as wrongful conduct which would warrant revocation. The inquiry at the hearing was primarily directed to evidence bearing upon whether defendant violated the terms of his probation by returning to the State of Minnesota. At the hearing, defendant stated:
In support of his contention that probation was illegally revoked, the public defender argues that the condition requiring defendant to remain out of the state constitutes the unlawful punishment of banishment, and since that condition was void, the court could not revoke probation because of an alleged violation of it. Without taking a strongly opposing position, the attorney general states that the banishment issue is one of first impression in Minnesota and one of great significance. He insists, however, that if this court decides that the condition is illegal, the original sentence must be imposed upon defendant.
1. It is obvious that the trial court, in granting probation, sought to give defendant an opportunity to reform by permitting
him to take employment in another state where correctional and rehabilitation opportunities might be more favorable. We must hold, however, that there was no authority to impose, as a condition of the stay, that defendant 'remain out of the State of Minnesota.' We are in accord with the great weight of American decisional law which holds that it is beyond the power of a court to impose banishment as a condition of probation. The imposition of such a condition is a void and separable part of the judgment of conviction. 1 The condition is unauthorized by statute, is contrary to public policy, and is repugnant to the underlying policy of the probation law, which is to rehabilitate offenders without compromising the public safety. 50 Minn.L.Rev. 1146; 45 Minn.L.Rev. 814.
2. Had the stay been granted pursuant to ...
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