State v. Yusef L.
Decision Date | 14 September 2021 |
Docket Number | AC 43612 |
Citation | 207 Conn.App. 475,262 A.3d 1017 |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. YUSEF L. |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Raymond L. Durelli, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Christopher W. Iverson, certified legal intern, with whom, on the brief, was Michele C. Lukban, senior assistant state's attorney, Rocky Hill, CT, for the appellee (state).
Elgo, Cradle and DiPentima, Js.
The defendant, Yusef L., appeals from the judgment revoking his probation and the judgments of conviction, rendered after his admission to a violation of his probation in violation of General Statutes § 53a-32 and after pleas of guilty, pursuant to the Alford doctrine,1 of violation of a protective order in violation of General Statutes § 53a-223 and strangulation in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-64bb. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas because they were not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Specifically, the defendant claims that the court (1) failed to determine whether he fully understood the maximum possible sentence that could result from consecutive sentences, (2) incorrectly advised him that a mandatory minimum sentence applied, and (3) failed to determine whether he fully understood that he had the right to plead not guilty and the right to the assistance of counsel.2 We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On January 11, 2019, the defendant, while represented by counsel, admitted that he violated his probation and entered guilty pleas pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), to the charges of violation of a protective order and strangulation in the second degree with an agreed on sentence of "four years and two days to serve, followed by 2184 days of special parole." After conducting a plea canvass, the court, Doyle , J. , found that the defendant's admission and pleas were made knowingly and voluntarily, and accepted each of them. The court then ordered a presentence investigation report and continued the case for sentencing.
On January 12, 2019, the defendant sent a letter to the court seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas because he was "confused [as] to what [he] plead[ed] guilty to." On January 14, 2019, the defendant sent a second letter to the court, again stating that he wanted to withdraw his guilty pleas, and stating that he was not satisfied with the representation that he had received and that he was prepared to go trial. The court construed these letters as a motion by the defendant to withdraw his guilty pleas. On March 18, 2019, the defendant and his counsel appeared before the court. At that time, the defendant stated that he "was confused" and "didn't know what was going on" during the January 11, 2019 plea hearing. The court ordered a copy of the transcript from the January 11, 2019 hearing and informed the defendant that they would discuss its contents at a hearing on April 1, 2019.
At the April 1, 2019 hearing, the court stated to the defendant: The defendant persisted in his claim that he did not understand what had happened at the January 11, 2019 plea hearing, and the court responded that the defendant would receive a copy of the transcript so that he could "tell [the court] where [he] ... [didn't] understand ...."
On April 26, 2019, the defendant sent a third letter to the court, this time requesting to represent himself in future proceedings. At a hearing on May 22, 2019, concerning his request for self-representation and after a lengthy canvass of the defendant, the court found: 3 (Footnote added.) The court also ordered that the defendant's former attorney, Christopher J. Molyneaux, act as standby counsel for the defendant if he did not retain a private attorney.
On June 26, 2019, the self-represented defendant, with standby counsel present, argued that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas because the sentence "exceed[ed] the specified agreement [to] which [he] pleaded ...." Specifically, the defendant stated that he understood that he was accepting five and one-half years of special parole, and that he did not agree to "shy of six years" of special parole. The defendant further argued that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas because the court never used the word " ‘consecutive’ " when it canvassed him with regard to the charges to which he was pleading guilty. The defendant gave no other reasons to withdraw his plea. The court denied the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, stating:
On July 9, 2019, after reviewing the presentence investigation report, the court sentenced the defendant as agreed. The defendant then appealed from the judgments of conviction, claiming that the court improperly denied his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
(Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Warner , 165 Conn. App. 185, 191–92, 138 A.3d 463 (2016).
The defendant's first claim challenging the court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas is that the court failed to determine whether he fully understood the maximum possible sentence that could result from consecutive sentences.4 Specifically, the defendant argues that "[n]othing in the record suggests [that] [he] was aware of the actual sentencing possibilities," and that "[t]here was no substantial compliance with Practice Book § 39-19 (4)."5 The state counters that the record shows substantial compliance with § 39-19 (4), and that the defendant was aware of the maximum possible sentence that would result from consecutive sentences. We agree with the state.
It is well established that (Citations omitted.) State v. Badgett , 200 Conn. 412, 418, 512 A.2d 160, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940, 107 S. Ct. 423, 93 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1986). Accordingly, "[o]ur courts repeatedly have held that only substantial compliance is required when warning the defendant of the direct consequences of a ... plea pursuant to ... § 39-19 in order to ensure that the plea is voluntary pursuant to ... § 39-20." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hanson , 117 Conn. App. 436, 444, 979 A.2d 576 (2009), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 907, 989 A.2d 604 (2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 986, 131 S. Ct. 425, 178 L. Ed. 2d 331 (2010).
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...We afford review because the record is adequate for review and the claim is of constitutional dimension. See State v. Yusef L. , 207 Conn. App. 475, 487, 262 A.3d 1017 (defendant's due process rights are implicated if plea is not voluntarily and knowingly made), cert. denied, 340 Conn. 910,......
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State v. Yusef L.
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