State v. Zuniga
| Decision Date | 08 November 2017 |
| Docket Number | A161931 |
| Citation | 288 Or.App. 742,407 P.3d 961 |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Alicia Ramos ZUNIGA, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
288 Or.App. 742
407 P.3d 961
STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Alicia Ramos ZUNIGA, Defendant-Appellant.
A161931
Court of Appeals of Oregon.
Argued and submitted August 8, 2017.
November 8, 2017
Thomas A. Hill argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.
Taylor Housley, Certified Law Student, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Greg Rios, Assistant Attorney General.
Before Egan, Presiding Judge, and DeHoog, Judge, and Aoyagi, Judge.
AOYAGI, J.
Defendant was convicted of reckless driving and careless driving, in connection with a car accident that seriously injured another driver, Reed. The trial court ordered defendant to pay $596,472.46 to Reed's health insurer as restitution for Reed's medical bills. Defendant contends that the restitution award is unlawful under ORS 137.106, a statute that provides for the payment of restitution to "victims" as defined in ORS 137.103. We affirm.
The relevant facts are undisputed. On the morning of January 7, 2015, defendant was driving a vehicle in Malheur County. While attempting to pass another vehicle, she collided head-on with a vehicle driven by Reed. Reed was seriously injured in the collision and incurred substantial medical bills.
Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of reckless driving, ORS 811.140, which is a misdemeanor, and one count of careless driving, ORS 811.135, which is a violation. The state asked that defendant be ordered to pay restitution to Reed's health insurer, Moda Insurance (Moda), in the amount of $596,472.46, for medical expenses incurred by Reed and paid by Moda. Defendant opposed the request, arguing that her crimes were not committed "against" Reed within the meaning of ORS 137.103(4)(a) and that Moda therefore had no right to restitution under ORS 137.103 (4)(d). After a hearing, the trial court entered an amended judgment of conviction, ordering defendant to pay $596,472.46 to Moda as restitution.
Whether ORS 137.106 authorizes the restitution award to Moda is a question of statutory construction. As such, we examine the statutory text, context, and any helpful legislative history to determine the legislative intent. State v. Gaines , 346 Or. 160, 171-72, 206 P.3d 1042 (2009). The correct construction of a statute is a question of law. Karjalainen v. Curtis Johnston & Pennywise, Inc. , 208 Or.App. 674, 681, 146 P.3d 336 (2006), rev. den., 342 Or. 473, 155 P.3d 51 (2007) ("[S]tatutes are—by definition—law, and their interpretation always is a question of law.").
ORS 137.106(1)(a) provides for a trial court to order a defendant to pay restitution to a "victim" who has suffered economic damages as a result of the defendant's crime. The statute states, in relevant part:
"When a person is convicted of a crime, or a violation as described in ORS 153.008,
that has resulted in economic damages, the district attorney shall investigate and present to the court, at the time of sentencing or within 90 days after entry of the judgment, evidence of the nature and amount of the damages. *** If the court finds from the evidence presented that a victim suffered economic damages, in addition to any other sanction it may impose, the court shall enter a judgment or supplemental judgment requiring that the defendant pay the victim restitution in a specific amount that equals the full amount of the victim's economic damages as determined by the court."
(Emphases added.)
ORS 137.103(4) defines "victim," as used in ORS 137.101 to 137.109.
" ‘Victim’ means:
"(a) The person or decedent against whom the defendant committed the criminal offense, if the court determines that the person or decedent has suffered or did suffer economic damages as a result of the offense.
"(b) Any person not described in paragraph (a) of this subsection whom the court determines has suffered economic damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
"(c) The Criminal Injuries Compensation Account, if it has expended moneys on behalf of a victim described in paragraph (a) of this subsection.
"(d) An insurance carrier, if it has expended moneys on behalf of a victim described in paragraph (a) of this subsection.
"* * * * *
"(5) ‘Victim’ does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities."
(Emphasis added.)
The parties agree that Reed is a "victim" under the restitution statutes and that, if Reed had paid her own medical bills, it would have been proper for the trial court to order defendant to pay restitution to her under ORS 137.106. That position accurately reflects our case law. We have long recognized that restitution is appropriate under ORS 137.106 when there is a causal relationship between the defendant's crime(s) and reasonably foreseeable economic damages suffered by the person to whom restitution is to be paid. State v. Ramos , 358 Or. 581, 584, 368 P.3d 446 (2016) ; State v. Dillon, 292 Or. 172, 181, 637 P.2d 602 (1981) ; State v. Akerman , 278 Or.App. 486, 490, 380 P.3d 309 (2016) ; State v. Kirkland , 268 Or.App. 420, 424, 342 P.3d 163 (2015). Thus, if the causal requirement for restitution is proved, the person as to whom it is proved is necessarily a "victim" within the meaning of the restitution statutes.1
Having established that Reed is a "victim," the issue in this case is what type of victim she is. The trial court agreed with the state that Reed is a victim under ORS 137.103(4)(a), i.e., a person "against whom" defendant committed the offenses of reckless driving and careless driving, and that Moda therefore is a victim under ORS 137.103(4) (d), i.e., an insurance carrier that "has expended moneys on behalf of a victim described in paragraph (a)." Defendant disagrees. In defendant's view, the words "against whom the defendant committed the criminal offense" limits paragraph (a) to victims of crimes or violations that require injury to another person as an element of the offense. Paragraph (b), defendant asserts, captures all other victims, including victims of crimes like reckless driving and careless driving that make certain conduct unlawful regardless of whether anyone gets hurt. If Reed is a victim under paragraph (b), not paragraph (a), then defendant cannot be ordered to pay restitution to Moda. See ORS 137.103(4)(d) (defining an
insurance carrier as a "victim" only "if it has expended
moneys on behalf of a victim described in paragraph (a)").
The critical question then is whom the legislature intended to include in the paragraph (a) definition of "victim." The answer to that question is not immediately apparent from the text of the statute, which reasonably could be interpreted as the trial court interpreted it, but also reasonably could be interpreted as defendant proposes. The context...
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..."[t]he word ‘victim’ appears throughout our statutes, and *** it has different meanings in different statutes." State v. Zuniga , 288 Or. App. 742, 745 n. 1, 407 P.3d 961 (2017) (citation omitted); see also State v. Lykins , 357 Or. 145, 156-57, 348 P.3d 231 (2015) ("[T]he word ‘victim’ has......
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