States v. Ruiz
| Decision Date | 27 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL 3:23mj28 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. KRYSTLE RUIZ, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Defendant Krystle Ruiz pled guilty to two Virginia misdemeanor offenses assimilated under the Assimilated Crimes Act (“ACA”), 18 U.S.C. § 13, including Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”). At sentencing, and among other terms of punishment, the Court imposed a $250 fine- the mandatory minimum under the assimilated Virginia DUI statute. Defendant now moves the Court to modify her sentence by striking the fine, a result she contends is required to correct clear error. Because the ACA requires the imposition of a mandatory minimum fine dictated by state law the Court finds no clear error in Defendant's sentence.
Under Fourth Circuit precedent, the Court is bound by the minimum and maximum terms of state sentencing laws for assimilated crimes and must apply federal sentencing guidelines in imposing punishment within those bounds. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit has stated that “the ‘like punishment' requirement of the [ACA] mandates that federal court sentences for assimilated crimes must fall within the minimum and maximum terms established by state law, and that within this range of discretion federal judges should apply the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual to the extent possible.” United States v. Young, 916 F.2d 147, 150 (4th Cir. 1990).
For these reasons and as further explained below, the Court did not clearly err in imposing a fine of $250, which was the mandatory minimum fine (and below the federal advisory guideline range) for Defendant's assimilated DUI conviction. Therefore, it denies Defendant's Motion to Modify Sentence Imposed Regarding Fine. (ECF No. 3.)
On April 11, 2023, the United States filed a four-count Criminal Information charging Defendant with: (1) Open Container, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 13, assimilating Va. Code Ann § 18.2-323.1; (2) Reckless Driving, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 13, assimilating Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-852; (3) Eluding Police, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 13, assimilating Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-817; and (4) DUI, first offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 13, assimilating Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266. (ECF No. 1.) Each count stemmed from Defendant's conduct at the Fort Lee Military Installation, property administered by the Department of Defense, within the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and within the Eastern District of Virginia. (Id.)
On April 18, 2023, Defendant appeared before the Court for an initial appearance and arraignment. Defendant waived her right to trial, judgment, and sentencing by a United States District Court, consented to magistrate jurisdiction, waived her right to a jury trial, and waived her right to continue the matter. (ECF No. 6.) That same day, Defendant pled guilty to Counts Three (Eluding Police) and Four (DUI), and the Court granted the Government's motion to dismiss the remaining Counts One and Two. (ECF No. 7.)
The parties jointly recommended that the Court impose the following sentence: (1) 12 months' probation; (2) 12 months' participation in an ignition interlock program; (3) participation and completion of VASAP or an equivalent program approved by probation; and (4) a $35 special assessment ($10 for Count Three and $25 for Count Four). The joint recommendation did not include any imposition of a fine. The Court advised the parties, before both the plea and sentencing, that it interpreted Virginia's DUI statute as including a mandatory minimum fine of $250, binding on the Court under the ACA. Although the Court offered to continue the sentencing hearing to provide the parties an opportunity to brief this issue, the parties decided to move forward with sentencing, with Defendant reserving the right to move under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a) for a correction of any clear error in sentencing.
That same day, on April 18, 2023, the Court imposed the following sentence: (1) a $10 special assessment on Count Three (Eluding Police) to be paid within 60 days; (2) 12 months' probation on Count Four (DUI); (3) a $250 fine on Count Four (DUI) to be paid before the expiration of the 12-month term of probation; and (4) a $25 special assessment on Count Four (DUI) to be paid within 60 days. (ECF Nos. 4, 7.) Although the advisory sentencing guideline range recommended a minimum fine of $500, the Court imposed the $250 mandatory minimum instead based on Defendant's financial resources and inability to pay.
Defendant filed her Motion to Modify Sentence Imposed Regarding Fine shortly after the sentencing hearing. (ECF No. 3.) Consistent with the position she took at sentencing, Defendant contends that the mandatory minimum fines in Virginia's DUI statutes do not bind the Court. (Id. at ¶ 2.) She argues it was clear error for the Court to think otherwise and asks the Court to modify the sentence by removing the fine. (Id.) The Government opposes the requested modification (ECF No. 11), and Defendant submitted a reply brief in support of her motion (ECF No. 12). Briefing is complete, and this matter is ripe for disposition.
Under Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[w]ithin 14 days after sentencing, the Court may correct a sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.”
Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a). If the Court does not act within that 14-day period to correct a sentence, it loses jurisdiction to do so. United States v. Smith, 631 Fed.Appx. 181, 182 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Shank, 395 F.3d 466, 470 (4th Cir. 2005)) (describing Rule 35(a) as “‘establish[ing] a [14]-day jurisdictional limit'”) (second alteration in original). The rule defines “sentencing” to mean “the oral announcement of the sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(c). Therefore, Defendant properly filed her motion immediately following the sentencing hearing even though she did so before entry of the Judgment. United States v. Layman, 116 F.3d 105, 108 (4th Cir. 1997). The Court has jurisdiction to consider the motion to modify through May 2, 2023, 14 days following the April 18, 2023 oral announcement of the sentence.
As Defendant acknowledges (ECF No. 3, at ¶ 3), “‘[t]he authority to correct a sentence under [Rule 35(a)] was intended to be very narrow and to extend only to those cases in which an obvious error or mistake had occurred ....'” Shank, 395 F.3d at 468 (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 advisory committee's note on 1991 amendments). Clear error “requires some reversible error at the initial sentencing.” United States v. Fields, 552 F.3d 401, 404 (4th Cir. 2009). Therefore, Rule 35(a) relief “extend[s] only to those cases in which an obvious error or mistake has occurred in the sentence, that is, errors which would almost certainly result in a remand of the case to the trial court.” United States v. Fraley, 988 F.2d 4, 7 (4th Cir. 1993).
The ACA provides in relevant part:
Whoever within or upon [federal property] is guilty of any act or omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State . . . in which such place is situated, by the laws thereof in force at the time of such act or omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to like punishment.
18 U.S.C. § 13(a) (emphasis added).
Under Virginia's DUI law, the assimilated crime at issue here, a first offense DUI is a misdemeanor punishable by up to 12 months in jail and a maximum $2,500 fine. Va. Code. Ann. §§ 18.2-11(a), 18.2-270(A). Virginia statute, however, also imposes a “mandatory minimum fine of $250” for first offense DUIs. Va. Code. Ann. § 18.2-270(A). The question raised by Defendant's motion is whether “like punishment” under the ACA requires the Court to impose the mandatory minimum fine. Based on Fourth Circuit precedent and prior decisions in this District, the Court answers that question in the affirmative.
The ACA does “not contemplate selective incorporation of state criminal law.” United States v. Kelly, 989 F.2d 162, 164 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Instead, the ACA requires federal courts to assimilate state offenses and punishments unless doing so conflicts with a federal policy. United States v. Pierce, 75 F.3d 173, 176 (4th Cir. 1996). “The areas which have been found to conflict with federal policy so as not to warrant assimilation have, for the most part, involved matters pertaining to parole, probation, good time credits, and special assessment.” United States v. Mason, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3225, at *10 (E.D. Va. Jan. 15, 2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In other words, “[t]he Act assimilates for federal prosecutions a state's substantive law, such as the elements of a crime and terms of punishment, but generally does not use state procedural law or rules of evidence.” United States v. Jacobs, 815 F.Supp. 898, 899 n.1 (D.S.C. 1993) (citing United States v. Price, 812 F.2d 174, 175 (4th Cir. 1958)).
Defendant argues that Virginia's mandatory minimum fine conflicts with federal policy governing imposition of fines. (ECF No 3, at ¶¶ 6-11.) Specifically, she contends that federal law sets forth a schedule of fines, which do not require any minimum fine, and a requirement that the Court consider a person's ability to pay prior to imposing any fine. (See, e.g., Id. ¶¶ 6, 9, (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3571, 3572(a))). However, to avoid assimilation, any asserted conflict between the state statute and federal sentencing policy must be direct. United States v. Clark, 361 F.Supp.2d 502, 507 (...
To continue reading
Request your trial