Statewide Grievance Committee v. Presnick, 6232

• Decision Date: 09 May 1989
• Docket Number: No. 6232,6232
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE v. Daniel V. PRESNICK.

Page 220

559 A.2d 220

18 Conn.App. 316

STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE v. Daniel V. PRESNICK.

No. 6232.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 3, 1989.

Decided May 9, 1989.

[18 Conn.App. 317] Daniel V. Presnick, pro se.

Clinton L.A. Wright, New Haven, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before [18 Conn.App. 316] BORDEN, EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL and STOUGHTON, JJ.

EDWARD Y. [18 Conn.App. 317] O'CONNELL, Judge.

The defendant attorney appeals from a judgment finding him in violation of the code of professional conduct and imposing sanctions therefor. This matter came to the trial court on a presentment from the statewide grievance committee alleging four separate and unrelated episodes of

misconduct. The court dismissed two counts for insufficient evidence and found the defendant in violation of disciplinary regulations of the code of professional conduct on the remaining counts. It imposed a reprimand for the first violation and a one year suspension from the practice of law for the second violation. We find no error

I

FACTS

The following facts are pertinent to this appeal. The defendant has been engaged in the practice of law as a member of the bar of this state since October 4, 1977. He maintains an office in the city of New Haven.

A DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES COMPLAINT

The scenario resulting in the reprimand arose out of a dispute between the defendant and the department of children and youth services (DCYS). In the fall of 1985, the Hamden school department contacted DCYS concerning a possible child abuse situation. The mother of the children involved engaged the defendant to represent her. The matter proceeded without resolution until DCYS filed a neglect petition with the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters in New Haven. See Practice Book § 1038 et seq. The defendant took a strong position that DCYS was infringing on the parent-child relationship. The thrust of his argument was that DCYS should be abolished and that its workers should be prosecuted.

On October 4, 1985, a hearing on the neglect petition was scheduled to be held in a courtroom on the third floor of the New Haven courthouse. Prior to the hearing, the DCYS workers and other concerned officials met with the defendant in a conference room adjacent to the juvenile courtroom. This conference was an effort to resolve the matter without trial. The defendant became quite agitated and appeared to lose control of himself while directing loud and abusive remarks to the DCYS personnel. He accused one DCYS worker of being a child molester and characterized DCYS as a nazi or neo-nazi organization. The defendant's boisterous and tumultuous conduct brought the court officer from the adjacent court area to the conference room to inquire whether his services were required to quell the uproar.

Not surprisingly, the matter was not settled in the conference room and the parties ultimately repaired to the courtroom where a trial date was set. Upon leaving the courtroom, the defendant resumed ranting and raving, waving his arms and shouting as he followed the group down the stairs. This attracted the attention of onlookers and put at least one DCYS worker in fear.

The trial court found that the defendant's words and actions were designed to intimidate the DCYS workers and their attorney, thereby thwarting the judicial process and inhibiting the orderly functioning of the court. As a result, it concluded that this conduct violated disciplinary rule 1-102(A)(6), which provides that a lawyer shall not "[e]ngage in any conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law." As a sanction, the court reprimanded the defendant and issued a warning that "if he engages in such conduct in the future, appropriate disciplinary action will be forthcoming."

B REAL ESTATE COMPLAINT

The scenario leading to the defendant's suspension from practice began when he was retained to represent a client of advanced age and doubtful mental competence ¹ in a municipal tax foreclosure action.

                A judgment of foreclosure by sale was rendered and January 11, 1986, was set as the sale date.   The property was appraised at $68,000 in the foreclosure action.   Notwithstanding the $68,000 appraisal, the defendant's aged client decided to sell the property for only $18,000
                

Upon learning of his client's desire to sell his house at this bargain price, the defendant contrived to purchase the property. He contacted his brother, a Florida lawyer, who agreed to form a corporation in that state for the purpose of acquiring the property. In addition, the defendant also contacted a Connecticut lawyer to perform certain duties in connection with the sale. That lawyer was not called in until after the agreement of sale had been executed. Moreover, he never met the client, saw the contract of sale, or knew anything about the purchaser. Nor did he consider that an attorney-client relationship existed between himself and the defendant's client. Thus, it was obvious to the trial court that this Connecticut lawyer was brought into the picture solely for the purpose of passing checks through his trustee account to create a facade that he was the client's attorney, rather than to act as independent counsel for the defendant's client.

On January 10, 1986, the defendant's client died. The client's estate refused to consummate the sale, presumably because of the $50,000 discrepancy between the appraisal value and the sale price. In December, 1986, the estate sold the property for $113,000 in an arms length transaction.

The court found that the defendant's dealings with his client violated disciplinary rule 1-102(A)(4), which provides that a lawyer shall not "[e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." The court also found that he violated disciplinary rule 5-104(A), which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client if they have differing interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer to exercise his professional judgment therein for the protection of the client unless the client has consented after full disclosure." Consequently, the court suspended the defendant from practicing law for one year.

II

CONSTITUTIONALITY

The defendant's first claim is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the presentment on grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction. The defendant's lengthy and tautological argument that the grievance committee is a constitutionally defective body, and in fact is a constitutionally defective court itself, misses the mark. Whether or not the grievance committee might constitutionally discipline attorneys is irrelevant to his situation. He was not disciplined by the grievance committee. His suspension from practice and reprimand were imposed by the Superior Court and not by the grievance committee.

It is elementary that "[t]he Superior Court possesses inherent authority to regulate attorney conduct and to discipline members of the bar." Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 190 Conn. 510, 523, 461 A.2d 938 (1983); Grievance Committee v. Goldfarb, 9 Conn.App. 464, 470, 519 A.2d 624, cert. denied, 203 Conn. 802, 522 A.2d 292 (1987); see also General Statutes § 51-84. The only action taken by the statewide grievance committee was to refer the matter to the Superior Court, which then proceeded in accordance with its inherent and statutory powers. Hence, the defendant's constitutional challenge to the jurisdiction of the statewide grievance committee is meritless.

III

CORRUPT MOTIVE OR EVIL INTENT

The defendant next claims that the trial court erred in imposing a suspension from practice without a finding that the defendant acted with a corrupt motive or with an evil intent. The defendant misconstrues three Connecticut cases ² as holding Here, the defendant was charged with specific violations of the disciplinary rules of the code of professional conduct, which resulted in his suspension. While the trial court may consider evidence of good motives and good faith in reaching its conclusions, neither of the disciplinary rules involved requires a finding of corrupt motive or bad faith. After a full evidentiary hearing, the court found to have been established by clear and convincing proof (see part IV, infra) that the defendant had violated each of the specified disciplinary rules. Nothing further was required to impose appropriate disciplinary action, including suspension from practice. There is no merit to this claim of error.

                that a corrupt motive or evil intent is a prerequisite to suspension.   The most that can be said is that these cases recognize the principle that attorneys who act with corrupt motives or evil intent should be disciplined, and that attorneys who act in good faith should not be disciplined.   We agree with this principle in general, but we do not find that it mandates finding a corrupt motive or an evil intent as a prerequisite for disciplining an attorney by suspending him from the practice of law
                

IV

STANDARD OF PROOF

In his third claim of error, the defendant argues that while a clear and convincing standard of proof furnishes a sufficient basis to support the reprimand, a suspension from practice requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, he fails to supply any precedent for this bifurcation. Since disciplinary matters are neither criminal proceedings nor civil proceedings; In re Application of Pagano, 207 Conn. 336, 339, 541 A.2d 104 (1988); it is logical that a question of the standard of proof should arise.

The standard of proof applicable to disciplining lawyers is a question of first impression in this state. ³ In Council on Probate Judicial Conduct re: James H. Kinsella, 193 Conn. 180, 476 A.2d 1041 (1984), however a case of alleged misconduct of a judge, our Supreme Court elected to follow the vast majority of jurisdictions which have concluded that the proper standard for disciplinary proceedings...