Staton v. Lamont
| Decision Date | 28 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:22-cv-00854 (VLB) |
| Parties | TERRELL STATON, Plaintiff, v. LAMONT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
Plaintiff Terrell Staton, is incarcerated at Osborn Correctional Institution within the Connecticut Department of Correction (“DOC”). He has filed a civil rights complaint alleging constitutional tort claims against a multitude of defendants. Having carefully reviewed the complaint, the Court concludes that Mr. Staton has not pled any plausible § 1983 or Bivens causes of action. Accordingly the Court DISMISSES the complaint.
I. THE COMPLAINT
Mr Staton has filed an 84-page complaint naming 44 defendants. Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 1-84.[1]But the majority of Mr. Staton's complaint is comprised of attachments. Id. at 17-84. The narrative portions of the complaint are relatively brief. Id. at 4-5, 7-8, 13-16. The following facts are alleged in the amended complaint.
On December 15, 2020, while incarcerated at Robinson Correctional Institution, Mr. Staton presented Officer Reese (not one of the named defendants) with an “emergency motion” that needed to be e-filed in a federal civil rights lawsuit that Mr. Staton was then-litigating. Id. at 13, ¶ 1. The next day, Officer Reese returned the motion to Mr. Staton, and explained that Officer Such had refused to file it. Id., ¶ 2. Mr. Staton then complained about the non-filing of his motion to a “plain clothed” person whom he thought to be a DOC official. Id., ¶ 3.
Upon noticing Mr. Staton's act of complaining, Officer Bowen yelled at him to, “Turn the f*ck around and sit the f*ck down.” Id., ¶ 4. Mr. Staton appears to allege that this outburst of profanity was recorded on a telephone conversation occurring nearby. Id. at 5, 13, ¶ 4. Mr. Staton asserts that Lieutenant Brown, Officer Clark, and another DOC official would, eight months later, “libelously” suppress a transcript of this telephone recording to “manipulate” due process at his parole hearing. Id. at 5.[2]
After yelling at Mr. Staton, Officer Bowen asked Captain Rios to place Mr. Staton in handcuffs. Id. at 13, ¶ 5. Captain Rios complied with this request, with assistance from two other correctional officers. Id. As Mr. Staton was escorted to a restrictive housing unit (RHU), Captain Rios grabbed his unfiled motion. Id. at 14, ¶ 6. She then e-filed the motion on Mr. Staton's behalf. Id.
Officer Bowen immediately prepared a purportedly “libelous” affidavit as part of a disciplinary report filed against Mr. Staton. Id. at 14, 15-16, ¶¶ 7, 14. Two days later, Captain Rios submitted a “supporting report” that Mr. Staton alleges to have been prepared for the purpose of “rationalizing” Officer Bowen's use of profanity and libel. Id. at 14, ¶ 7. The complaint never specifies what Officer Bowen or Captain Rios asserted in their respective reports. A “disciplinary ticket” arising from Mr. Staton's interaction with Officer Bowen was, ultimately, upheld. Id. at 5.
Mr. Staton remained in RHU from December 16, 2020, to December 31, 2020. Id. at 14, ¶ 10. During this time, Mr. Staton reports that he was unable to pay a filing fee, or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, in his previously mentioned federal lawsuit. Id., ¶ 8. Mr. Staton faults Federal Magistrate Judge Garfinkel for having previously noted that he was required to pay a filing fee or apply to proceed in forma pauperis. Id., 14-15, ¶¶ 9, 12.[3] According to Mr. Staton, Judge Garfinkel, Officer Such, and other unnamed defendants were involved in a conspiracy to limit his access to the courts. Id. at 14, ¶ 9. Eventually, Judge Underhill dismissed Mr. Staton's lawsuit due to his failure to pay a filing fee or apply to proceed in forma pauperis. Id. at 14-15, ¶ 10.
On August 30, 2021, a parole board denied Mr. Staton's release from prison. Id. at 15, ¶ 13. Prior to their denial of parole, the parole board reviewed the disciplinary report that Officer Bowen filed in December of 2020. Id. at 5. Mr. Staton asserts that Officers Popec and Nothe improperly influenced the decision of the parole board as retaliation for his act of naming them as defendants in the previously noted lawsuit dismissed by Judge Underhill. Id. at 4-5. According to Mr. Staton, Lieutenant Oullette also improperly influenced the parole board's decision. Id., at 5.
Mr Staton asserts that he has latent tuberculosis (TB), and that this diagnosis has subjected him to discrimination. Id. at 16, ¶ 16. Twenty days following his parole hearing, Mr. Staton was quarantined for a period of 120 days. Id. Mr. Staton appears to draw a connection between this quarantine and the discrimination that he purportedly faces due to his TB status. Id. In addition, Mr. Staton faults DOC officials for neglecting to consider his latent TB status when considering his qualification for discretionary release during the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. at 5.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court must review prisoner civil complaints against governmental actors and “dismiss . . . any portion of [a] complaint [that] is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or that “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id.; see also Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 134 n.1 (2d Cir. 1999) (); Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter, 185 F.3d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1999) () (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and assert a cause of action with enough heft to show entitlement to relief and “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570. A claim is facially plausible if “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require “detailed factual allegations,” a complaint must offer more than “labels and conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” or “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 55557. Plausibility at the pleading stage is nonetheless distinct from probability, and “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [the claim] is improbable, and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Id. at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs “must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010) ().
IV. DISCUSSION
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code creates a private federal cause of action against any person, acting under color of state law, who deprives an individual of their federally protected rights. Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). And, in some circumstances, the federal judiciary has recognized an implied cause of action for damages against federal officials alleged to have violated an individual's federal constitutional rights. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 571 (2d Cir. 2009). These claims are often called “Bivens” claims, in reference to the U.S. Supreme Court opinion first recognizing such a cause of action. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
In this case, Mr. Staton primarily alleges that state actors violated his federal constitutional rights. But he also brings claims against two federal judges. Thus, this case includes § 1983 and Bivens claims. In addition to these constitutional tort claims, Mr. Staton also appears to bring state tort claims against the defendants.
Mr Staton brings claims against the defendants named to this suit in their individual and official capacities. Dkt. No. 1 at 1-2. However, sovereign immunity principles preclude tort plaintiffs from suing state or federal officials in their official capacities for an award of monetary damages. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (considering § 1983 claims); see also Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 1994) (considering Bivens claims). Plaintiffs may sue state and federal officials in their official capacities in some contexts, but only to the extent that they seek non-monetary, injunctive relief. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10; see also Garmhausen v. Holder, 757 F.Supp.2d 123, 135 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Sovereign immunity is therefore no bar to claims for prospective relief that seek to compel [federal] governmental defendants...
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