Staton v. Staton

• Decision Date: 20 June 1955
• Citation: 143 N.Y.S.2d 369
• Parties: Charlotte STATON v. Herbert STATON.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 369

143 N.Y.S.2d 369

Charlotte STATON v. Herbert STATON.

Supreme Court, Kings County.

June 20, 1955.

George Knopp, New York City, for plaintiff.

Herbert G. Friedgen, New York City, for defendant.

OLLIFFE, Justice.

Application by plaintiff to punish defendant for contempt of court for failure to comply with a final judgment of divorce directing him to name the plaintiff and the issue of the marriage irrevocable beneficiaries in a $20,000 group life insurance policy. Defendant cross-moves for an order to strike out this provision from the judgment.

The record shows that in 1939 a judgment of separation was granted to the plaintiff against the defendant upon consent of the parties providing for the payment of alimony and a direction was made and a decree was entered that defendant forthwith, if he has not already done so, have plaintiff and her daughter named as irrevocable beneficiaries in his life insurance policies. It is conceded that at that time there was only one policy of $20,000 held by defendant as an employee under a group insurance plan with his employer. Judgment further directed an affidavit of compliance to be filed within ten days after service of the judgment. This apparently was done. In 1944 plaintiff instituted an action for divorce at which time defendant appeared by an attorney with instructions not to contest the action. The decree of divorce entered in 1944 contained the same provisions relating to the insurance protection. In 1948, as appears by the defendant's affidavit, the defendant, his employer and the insurance carrier, as a result of a new arrangement, canceled the existing group insurance certificate which designated plaintiff and her daughter as beneficiaries and a new certificate was issued wherein defendant designated his present wife as the beneficiary. This act on defendant's part brought about the present proceeding upon its discovery by plaintiff. It is contended by defendant that his attorney, who is now deceased, was never authorized to consent to the inclusion of the insurance provision and, further, that the court had no authority or jurisdiction to order the defendant to provide for the designation of the plaintiff and the daughter as beneficiaries.

The Supreme Court has general jurisdiction over all matrimonial actions, but its powers to award alimony in such an action are solely those conferred on it by statute, Harris v. Harris, 279 App.Div. 542, 110 N.Y.S.2d 824, which are clearly set forth in sections 1155 and 1170 of the Civil Practice Act and cannot go beyond such scope. Baskin & Co., Inc., v. Howe, 225 App.Div. 553, 233 N.Y.S. 648; Ostrom v Ostrom, 270 App.Div. 872, 61 N.Y.S.2d 775; Donnelly v. Donnelly, 272 App.Div. 779, 69 N.Y.S.2d 651. In view of the fact, however, that the defendant did not have the provision deleted or modified on appeal or otherwise, renders him subject to compliance therewith. Since the court had jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter, the judgment cannot be collaterally attacked even though it was providently or erroneously made. The remedy of the party aggrieved was by application to vacate or appeal as demonstrated in Donnelly v. Donnelly, supra. Cox v. Cox, 266 App.Div. 38, 43 N.Y.S.2d 707; Doe v. Doe, 52 Hun 405, 5 N.Y.S. 514. It is not a void judgment and it cannot be reviewed upon an application to punish for a disobedience of it. So long as it remains in force, it was and is the defendant's duty to obey it. Disobedience of such a decree made by a court within its jurisdiction and power is a contempt although the order may be clearly erroneous. People ex rel. Day v. Bergen, 53 N.Y. 404; Boland v. Parisi, 259 App.Div. 847, 19 N.Y.S.2d 166; Baksi v. Wallman, 272 App.Div. 752, 69 N.Y.S.2d 208. The case of Ostrom v. Ostrom, supra, heavily relied upon by defendant, is clearly distinguishable. There the judgment was...