Statzer v. Statzer
| Decision Date | 26 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | S-22-0016 |
| Citation | 517 P.3d 574 |
| Parties | Delores M. STATZER, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Lonnie D. STATZER, Appellee (Defendant). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellant: Joshua J. Merseal, Merseal Law, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.
Representing Appellee: Alexander K. Davison and Patrick D. Kent, Patton & Davison LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Kent.
Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.
[¶1] Delores M. Statzer filed suit against her son, Lonnie D. Statzer, seeking title to a parcel of property in Laramie County he acquired when he exchanged it for a parcel of property in Carbon County—a parcel his parents deeded to him years prior. Delores alleged claims for unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and quiet title. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Delores now appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to Lonnie on all three claims. We affirm.
[¶2] We restate the issue:
Is Lonnie entitled to summary judgment on Delores’ claims for unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and quiet title?
[¶3] This case involves a dispute over family property. Through two quitclaim deeds—one in 2015 and one in 20161 —Delores and Duwayne Statzer conveyed a parcel of land in Carbon County (the Carbon County property) to their son, Lonnie Statzer. Both deeds identified Delores and Duwayne as "Grantor" and Lonnie as "Grantee," and the 2016 deed stated "neither the Grantor nor any other person ... shall or will hereafter claim or demand any right or title to the subject property or any part thereof[.]" The 2015 deed was for $0; the 2016 deed specified that Lonnie paid $10 in consideration.
[¶4] Delores and Duwayne continued utilizing and controlling the Carbon County property in certain ways over the next few years. They leased the property to a power company, accepted payments on the lease, and at one point signed an option contract for sale of the property. They also paid the property taxes. Duwayne passed away in January 2019.
[¶5] In Spring 2019, Lonnie traded the Carbon County property for a parcel of property in Laramie County (the Laramie County property), accepting the Laramie County property via a special warranty deed. Following this transaction, the relationship between Lonnie and Delores deteriorated. This deterioration is evidenced by a seven page letter Lonnie wrote to Delores in June 2019, in which he discussed his understanding of both property transactions, his belief Duwayne wanted him to acquire the Laramie County property, Delores’ "lies [and] rumors" about him and favoritism toward her other son, and Delores’ repeated demands for title to the Laramie County property.
[¶6] In August 2019, Delores sent Lonnie a letter, through her attorney, demanding he "return [ ] legal ownership" of the Laramie County property. When Lonnie refused, Delores filed suit against him.
[¶7] Delores’ complaint sought legal title to the Laramie County property, asserting claims for unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and quiet title. In an accompanying affidavit, she stated:
Lonnie responded, generally denying her claims, and asserting several affirmative defenses.
[¶8] After completing discovery, Lonnie moved for summary judgment on all three of Delores’ claims, and Delores moved for summary judgment on her unjust enrichment and constructive trust claims. In support of his motion, Lonnie submitted a Rule 56.1 statement of facts, deeds for the Carbon County and Laramie County properties, and Delores’ responses to his first set of interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for production. In support of her motion, Delores submitted a Rule 56.1 statement of facts, deeds and other documents related to the Carbon County property, deeds and related documents for the Laramie County property, Lonnie's June 2019 letter, Lonnie's admission that he wrote the letter, her affidavit, her August 2019 letter to Lonnie, and Lonnie's responses to her requests for production. Following a hearing, the district court awarded summary judgment to Lonnie on all three claims. Delores appealed.
[¶9] W.R.C.P. 56(a) states "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
[¶10] We review a district court's summary judgment ruling de novo. Spence v. Sloan , 2022 WY 96, ¶ 22, 515 P.3d 572, 579 (Wyo. 2022) (citing Miller v. Sweetwater Cnty. Sch. Dist. #1 , 2021 WY 134, ¶ 13, 500 P.3d 242, 246 (Wyo. 2021) ).
We ... afford no deference to the district court's ruling. Thornock v. PacifiCorp , 2016 WY 93, ¶ 10, 379 P.3d 175, 179 (Wyo. 2016). This Court reviews the same materials and uses the same legal standard as the district court. Id. The record is assessed from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion ..., and we give a party opposing summary judgment the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the record. Id. A material fact is one that would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. Id.
Id. (quoting Miller , ¶ 13, 500 P.3d at 246 ).
[¶11] As to the burdens on the parties:
The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case and showing there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Once that burden is met, the opposing party is obligated to respond with materials beyond the pleadings to show a genuine issue of material fact. When the moving party does not have the ultimate burden of persuasion, it establishes a prima facie case for summary judgment by showing a lack of evidence on an essential element of the opposing party's claim.
Id. ¶ 23, 515 P.3d at 579 (quoting Miller , ¶ 14, 500 P.3d at 246 ).
[¶12] Delores contends the district court erred by granting summary judgment to Lonnie because, at the very least, there are genuine issues of material fact on all three of her claims. At best, she contends, the district court should have granted her summary judgment on her unjust enrichment and constructive trust claims. On our de novo review, we agree with the district court that Lonnie is entitled to summary judgment on all three claims.
[¶13] "Unjust enrichment (or quantum meruit ) is an equitable remedy which implies a contract so that one party may recover damages from another." Electrical Wholesale Supply Co., Inc. v. Fraser , 2015 WY 105, ¶ 27, 356 P.3d 254, 261 (Wyo. 2015) (quoting Bowles v. Sunrise Home Center, Inc. , 847 P.2d 1002, 1004 (Wyo. 1993) ). The plaintiff must prove:
Id. (quoting Bowles , 847 P.2d at 1004 ).
[¶14] The fourth element of an unjust enrichment claim includes two separate requirements. Jacoby v. Jacoby , 2004 WY 140, ¶ 12, 100 P.3d 852, 856 (Wyo. 2004) ; see also Nuhome Invs., LLC v. Weller , 2003 WY 171, ¶ 22, 81 P.3d 940, 948 (Wyo. 2003) ; Elec. Wholesale Supply , ¶ 34, 356 P.3d at 263. First, the plaintiff must prove "the circumstances were such that the [defendant] was reasonably notified that the [plaintiff] expected to be paid[.]" Jacoby , ¶ 12, 100 P.3d at 856 (quoting Nuhome , ¶ 22, 81 P.3d at 948 ). An "express demand for payment" is not required. Redland v. Redland , 2012 WY 148, ¶ 146, 288 P.3d 1173, 1205 (Wyo. 2012). Second, the plaintiff must prove the defendant would be unjustly enriched if the plaintiff is not paid. Jacoby , ¶ 12, 100 P.3d at 856 (quoting Nuhome , ¶ 22, 81 P.3d at 948 ).
[¶15] In his summary judgment memorandum, Lonnie argued there was no evidence the Carbon County property was conveyed to him under circumstances reasonably notifying him that Delores expected to be paid for the Carbon County property. We conclude Lonnie met his prima facie burden by showing a lack of evidence on this requirement.
Delores therefore had to come forward with evidence supporting the reasonable notification requirement. She did not.
[¶16] Delores argued Lonnie was wrong on the facts and the law. On the facts, she asserted Lonnie's June 2019 letter created a genuine issue of material fact because Lonnie knew she and Duwayne wanted the Carbon County property back:
Dad said he didn't want to sell the [Carbon County] property but he would trade for some deer or elk property with tags. No one in the family said a word while this process was going on over [three] proposed properties. As soon as they offered this new property and I told you [and] Dad all hell broke loose, why? Because David wanted it [an...
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