Staub v. City of Baxley, 36161

• Decision Date: 24 February 1958
• Docket Number: No. 2,No. 36161,36161,2
• Citation: 102 S.E.2d 643,97 Ga.App. 221
• Parties: Rose STAUB v. CITY OF BAXLEY
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 643

102 S.E.2d 643

97 Ga.App. 221

Rose STAUB v. CITY OF BAXLEY.

No. 36161.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 2.

Feb. 24, 1958.

Wilson & Wilson, Waycross, Poole, Pearce & Hall, Fred W. Elarbee, Jr., Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Highsmith & Highsmith, Baxley, Gordon Knox, Hazlehurst, for defendant in error.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

GARDNER, Presiding Judge.

This case came originally to the Court of Appeals on a question of whether or not a certiorari bond had been properly signed. This court ruled that the bond had been properly signed. See Staub v. City of Baxley, 91 Ga.App. 650, 86 S.E.2d 712. The case came before this court again assigning error on the overruling and the denying of a writ of certiorari by the Judge of the Superior Court of Appling County wherein that court sustained the judgment of the Mayor's Court of Baxley. The Court of Appeals sustained the judgment of the Superior Court of Appling County. See Staub v. City of Baxley, 94 Ga.App. 18, 93 S.E.2d 375. When the case was here previously the pleadings and the facts were set forth in detail. Hence, there is no reason to reiterate them.

To the judgment of this court sustaining the judgment of the trial court, counsel for the plaintiff Staub carried the case to the United States Supreme Court, 78 S.Ct. 277, 284, assigning error in that it was alleged that the ordinance "shows on its face that it is repugnant to and violative of the 1st and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States in that it places a condition precedent upon, and otherwise unlawfully restricts, the defendant's freedom of speech as well as freedom of the press and freedom of lawful assembly' by requiring, as conditions precedent to the exercise of those rights, the issuance of a 'license' which the mayor and city council are authorized by the ordinance to grant or refuse in their discretion, and the payment of a 'license fee' which is discriminatory and unreasonable in amount and constitutes a prohibitory flat tax upon the privilege of soliciting persons to join a labor union.' This contention was made in each forum in the legal process of getting the case to the United States Supreme Court, but in each forum the plaintiff was not granted relief under this contention. The United States Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and closed the opinion as follows: 'It is undeniable that the ordinance authorized the Mayor and council of the City of Baxley to grant 'or refuse to grant' the required permit in their uncontrolled discretion. It thus makes enjoyment of speech contingent upon the will of the Mayor and council of the...