Stearns v. Colvin
| Decision Date | 24 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 3:14-cv-05611 JRC |
| Parties | RICHARD E. STEARNS, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73 and Local Magistrate Judge Rule MJR 13 (see also Notice of Initial Assignment to a U.S. Magistrate Judge and Consent Form, Dkt. 5; Consent to Proceed Before a United States Magistrate Judge, Dkt. 6). This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff's contested motion for attorneys' fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (hereinafter "EAJA") (see Dkt. 34; see also Dkts. 35, 36).
Subsequent to plaintiff's success at obtaining a reversal of the decision of the Social Security Administration, defendant Commissioner challenged plaintiff's request for statutory attorneys' fees on the grounds that the requested fees are unreasonable given the circumstances of this case (see Response, Dkt. 35, p. 2 (citing 28 § U.S.C. 2412(b))).
After considering and reviewing the record, including plaintiff's Application for Costs and Fees, and the attached time and expense sheet (see Dkt. 34), the excellent results obtained by plaintiff's counsel but the large amount of hours requested in this matter (46.4 attorney hours and 3.3 paralegal hours) relative to other social security cases, the Court concludes that plaintiff has requested reimbursement for attorneys' fees that were not reasonably expended on the litigation. Therefore, plaintiff's fees for preparation of the Opening Brief should be reduced by 10 hours, for a total number of hours of 39.7, which is less than the requested reduction by defendant of a reduction to 30 total hours.
Plaintiff requests $9,132.14 in total fees for the underlying litigation. Although the 3.3 paralegal hours reasonably were expended ($330), the 46.4 attorney hours were not reasonably expended. Plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees representing attorney work for $8,802.14, should be reduced by 10 hours ($1,896.80) to $6,905.34
Defendant does not object to plaintiff's request for $27.13 in expenses, which shall be granted. Plaintiff also requests 1.8 additional hours for the time incurred defending the fee petition, which should be awarded at the 2016 rate of $189.68, for an additional $341.42 in fees.
Therefore, plaintiff's motion for fees and expenses is granted pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 ("EAJA") in the amount of $7,576.76 in attorneys' fees (which includes 3.3 hours of paralegal time) and $27.13 for expenses.
On October 21, 2015, this Court issued an Order reversing and remanding this matter for further consideration by the Administration (see Dkt. 31).
The Court found that the ALJ erred when evaluating the medical evidence (see id. at 3-6). This matter was reversed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further consideration due to the harmful error in the evaluation of such evidence (see id. at 3-7).
Subsequently, plaintiff filed a motion for EAJA attorneys' fees, to which defendant objected (see Dkt. 34). Defendant contends that the amount of hours incurred in this matter is unreasonable (Dkt. 35). Plaintiff filed a reply (see Dkt. 36).
In any action brought by or against the United States, the EAJA requires that "a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses . . . . unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
According to the United States Supreme Court, "the fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). The government has the burden of proving that its positions overall were substantially justified. Hardisty v. Astrue, 592 F.3d 1072, 1076 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 179 L.Ed.2d 1215, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3726 (U.S. 2011) (citing Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 569-70 (9th Cir. 1995)). Further, if the government disputes the reasonableness of the fee, then it also"has a burden of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence to the district court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours charged or the facts asserted by the prevailing party in its submitted affidavits." Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397-98 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). The Court has an independent duty to review the submitted itemized log of hours to determine the reasonableness of hours requested in each case. See Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. at 433, 436-37.
In this matter, plaintiff clearly was the prevailing party because he received a remand of the matter to the administration for further consideration (see Order on Complaint, Dkt. 31). In order to award a prevailing plaintiff attorney fees, the EAJA also requires a finding that the position of the United States was not substantially justified. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Defendant conceded that the government's position was not substantially justified, and argues that plaintiff's recovery for attorneys' fees should be reduced, not eliminated (see Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's EAJA Motion for Fees, Dkt. 35, p. 2, 5).
The Court agrees with defendant's concession (see id.). This conclusion is based on a review of the relevant record, including the government's administrative and litigation positions regarding the evaluation of the medical evidence. For these reasons, and based on a review of the relevant record, the Court concludes that the government's position in this matter as a whole was not substantially justified. See Guitierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258-59 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
The undersigned also concludes that no special circumstances make an award of attorney fees unjust. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Therefore, all that remains is to determine the amount of a reasonable fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b); Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. at 433, 436-37; see also Roberts v. Astrue, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80907 (W.D. Wash. 2011), adopted by 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80913 (W.D. Wash. 2011).
Once the court determines that a plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable fee, "the amount of the fee, of course, must be determined on the facts of each case." Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. at 429, 433 n.7. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, "the most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. at 433. Here, defendant challenges the number of hours expended on this matter (see Dkt. 35, p. 2).
Here, plaintiff prevailed on the single claim of whether or not the denial of his social security application was based on substantial evidence in the record as a whole and not based on harmful legal error. When the case involves a "common core of facts or will be based on related legal theories . . . . the district court should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation." See Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. at 435. The Supreme Court concluded that where a plaintiff "has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee." Id.
The Court concludes that plaintiff's results here were excellent. Although plaintiff did not receive a remand with a direction to award benefits, the circumstances allowingfor such a result do not exist often in social security appeals before this Court. Plaintiff here obtained a new hearing and a new decision following remand of this matter. Although defendant claims that plaintiff's "limited success" also is demonstrated by the fact that this Court "decided to address only one of Plaintiff's arguments," such is not the case (Dkt. 35, p. 4). Simply because the Court chooses to conserve judicial resources and discusses only one dispositive issue does not mean that the plaintiff has not obtained excellent results. Here, the Court discussed the ALJ's error when reviewing the medical evidence and concluded that because "resolving th[is] issue is dispositive, the Court will assume that upon remand, the ALJ will reevaluate the entire record for purposes of reaching a decision" (Dkt. 31, p. 3). In addition, the Court explicitly determined that because of the ALJ's error when evaluating the medical evidence, the ALJ also "'thereby provide[d] an incomplete residual functional capacity [RFC] determination'" (Id. at 5 (quoting Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012)). The Court also concluded that "plaintiff's credibility should be assessed anew following remand of this matter" and that regarding "the other issues raised by plaintiff, the ALJ is directed to reevaluate the record anew on remand, in light of the comments set forth above" (id. at 7). Defendant's contention that plaintiff achieved limited success is unpersuasive.
Because the Court concludes based on a review of the relevant evidence that the plaintiff here obtained excellent results, the Court will look to "the hours reasonably expended on the litigation," which, when combined with the reasonable hourly rate, encompasses the lodestar. See Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. at 435. Other relevant factors identified in Johnson, supra, 488 F.2d at 717-19 "usually are subsumed within the initialcalculation of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate."1 See Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. at 434 n.9 (other citation omitted); see also Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975) (adopting Johnson factors); Stevens v. Safeway, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17119 at *40-*41 (C.D....
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