Steddum v. Kirby Lumber Co.
Decision Date | 13 November 1912 |
Parties | STEDDUM v. KIRBY LUMBER CO. et al. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, San Augustine County; W. B. Powell, Judge.
Action by N. B. Steddum against the Kirby Lumber Company and another. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
W. J. Townsend, of Lufkin, Foster & Davis, of San Augustine, H. B. Short, of Center, G. P. Dougherty, of Beaumont, and Wm. McDonald, Rufus Price, and E. A. Davis, all of San Augustine, for appellant. Hightower, Orgain & Butler, of Beaumont, and Andrews, Ball & Streetman, of Houston, for appellees.
This is an action of trespass to try title and for partition, brought by the appellant against the Kirby Lumber Company and the Houston Oil Company. Plaintiff's petition, which is in the usual form in actions of trespass to try title, seeks to recover against appellees the title and possession of an undivided one-half of a tract of 3,153 acres of land in San Augustine county, known as the Samuel Steddum survey, and also contains the following prayer: "And in the event it is shown, and the court so holds, that the defendants are entitled to the other undivided one-half of said tract of land not herein sued for, then plaintiff prays for partition between plaintiff and said defendants of the property in controversy." The defendants disclaimed as to all of the land in controversy, except certain portions thereof described in their answer, as to which they pleaded a general demurrer, plea of not guilty, pleas of limitation of three, five, and ten years, and plea of stale demand. Upon the trial of the case, after plaintiff had introduced his evidence and rested his case, the court, on motion of defendants, instructed the jury to return a verdict in their favor; and, upon return of such verdict, judgment was rendered that plaintiff take nothing, and that defendants recover of plaintiff the portions of the land in controversy claimed by them.
The evidence introduced by plaintiff, and upon which the court instructed the jury to find a verdict in favor of the defendants, is as follows:
Appellant states in his brief that the trial court granted appellees' motion to instruct a verdict in their favor on the ground that, under the law in force in Texas in 1839, a married woman, by commiting the act of adultery, forfeited to her husband her interest in their community property, and that the recitals in the divorce decree, put in evidence by plaintiff, established that Phœbe Steddum, under whom plaintiff claims, was guilty of adultery; and, her interest in the land having been thereby forfeited to her husband, plaintiff has no title. All of appellant's assignments of error assail this holding of the trial court. The authorities cited in support of the contention that the court erred in his construction of the Spanish or Mexican Codes in force in Texas in 1839 are not accessible to us, and we have reached no conclusion upon this question; its decision being unnecessary to a proper disposition of this appeal.
It does not appear from the record upon what ground the trial court sustained appellees' motion to instruct the jury to return a verdict in their favor; but, if it did so appear, the judgment could not be reversed, if appellees were entitled to the instruction upon any ground disclosed by the record. If, upon the evidence disclosed by the record, the court should have instructed a verdict for the defendants, the fact that the reason assigned by him for such instruction was not sound would not authorize a reversal of the judgment.
As before shown, plaintiff's petition seeks to recover an undivided one-half of the tract of land therein described. Upon this pleading, plaintiff would only be entitled to recover by a prima facie showing of title to all of the land claimed by him, or to some definite interest less than the interest claimed in his petition. Unless the evidence shows to what interest in the land plaintiff has title, the court was not authorized to render any judgment in his favor, and the jury were properly instructed to return a verdict for the defendant. Baldwin v. Goldfrank, 88 Tex. 261, 31 S. W. 1064. In the case cited, our Supreme Court says: It seems that the rule that, as against a naked trespass, a plaintiff, showing title to an undivided interest in land, may recover the whole of the tract is not applicable where the plaintiff only sues for an undivided interest. He cannot recover more than he sues for; and, by restricting his claim to an undivided interest, he admits that he has no right to the title or possession of the whole, and cannot evict even a trespasser from that interest in the land not claimed by him and not involved in the suit. It is also held "that, when a cotenant seeks to recover of a defendant exclusive possession of land, he should prove not only his own title to an undivided interest, but also that the defendant has no title to any interest." Davidson v. Wallingford, 88 Tex. 619, 32 S. W. 1030. There is nothing in the record to show what title defendants had or claimed in the land. The plaintiff's pleading does not challenge defendants' title to an undivided one-half of the land, and there is nothing in the evidence introduced which tends to show that defendants were naked trespassers; and under...
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Steddum v. Kirby Lumber Co.
...Action by N. B. Steddum against the Kirby Lumber Company and another. Judgment for defendants was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals (154 S. W. 273), and plaintiff brings error. Reversed and Foster & Davis, of San Augustine, H. B. Short, of Center, G. P. Dougherty, of Houston, W. F. Ram......