Steele v. Ayotte
| Decision Date | 06 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3: 17 - CV - 1370 (CSH) |
| Parties | JEREMY A. STEELE, Plaintiff, v. CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS: C.O. AYOTTE, C.O. OLSEN, CORRIGAN CORRECTIONAL CENTER; and JOHN DOE, UCONN HOSPITAL EMPLOYEE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Jeremey A. Steele, currently incarcerated at MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution ("MacDougall-Walker"), has commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Correctional Officers Ayotte and Olsen, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. He has also brought a state law claim for negligence against John Doe, a truck driver employed by UCONN Hospital. The Court has conducted its statutorily mandated initial review of the case. For the reasons set forth below, the Complaint will be dismissed in part.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court must review a prisoner's civil complaint against governmental actors and "dismiss . . . any portion of the complaint [that] is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted," or that "seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2). This requirement applies whether the inmate has paid the filing fee or is proceeding in forma pauperis. See Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
In order to proceed, the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S 544, 570 (2007)).1 "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The complaint must provide "more than the unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
"[W]hether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will [ultimately] . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 663-64. When "well-pleaded factual allegations" are present, "a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. at 679. Factual disputes do not factor into a plausibility analysis under Iqbal and its progeny.
"Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is `inapplicable to legal conclusions.'" LaMagna v. Brown, 474 F. App'x 788, 789 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). See also Amaker v. New York State Dept. of Corr. Servs., 435 F. App'x 52, 54 (2d Cir.2011) (same). Accordingly, the Court is not "bound to accept conclusoryallegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions." Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir.2011) (quoting Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Consequently, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
With respect to pro se litigants, it is well-established that "[p]ro se submissions are reviewed with special solicitude, and 'must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'" Matheson v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 706 F. App'x 24, 26 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)(per curiam)). See also Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (same); Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010) (); Boykin v. KeyCorp., 521 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir. 2008) () (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) () (quoting McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004)); Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) ().
Despite being subject to liberal interpretation, a pro se plaintiff's complaint still must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Mancuso v. Hynes, 379 F. App'x 60, 61 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). See also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) ()(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Therefore, even in a pro se case, "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Nor may the Court "invent factual allegations that [the plaintiff] has not pled." Id.
Plaintiff alleges that on October 28, 2016, he had a scheduled appointment to be examined by a physician at UCONN Hospital. See Doc. 1 ("Complaint"), at 3, ¶ 1. On that date, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Corrigan Correctional Institution ("Corrigan"). Id. at 6, ¶¶ 34-35. Correctional Officers Ayotte and Olsen placed physical restraints upon Plaintiff in preparation for his transport to UCONN Hospital. Id., at 3, ¶ 2.
After Officers Ayotte and Olsen loaded Plaintiff into the prison van, Plaintiff asked the officers to buckle his seatbelt for him because he was unable to do so while wearing restraints. Id., ¶ 3. Ayotte allegedly replied that Plaintiff "really didn't need a seatbelt" in view of the fact that the hospital was only "a short distance" from the prison. Id., ¶ 4. Moreover, Ayotte added, perhaps in jest, "Why would you need a seatbelt; you don't believe in my driving." Id., ¶ 5. Neither Ayotte, nor Olsen buckled Plaintiff's seatbelt.
At approximately 7:00 a.m., Officers Ayotte and Olsen began the drive to UCONN Hospital. Id., at 4, ¶ 6. During the trip, Plaintiff observed that the two officers were allegedly "constantly sharing, and showing each other video clips on their personal cell phones. Id., at 4, ¶ 7. Concerned for his safety, Plaintiff requested that they cease this distracting activity while driving the van, butAyotte and Olsen "simply ignored" these requests. Id., ¶¶ 8-9.
Plaintiff and the two officers arrived in the van at UCONN Hospital at approximately 8:00 a.m. Id., ¶ 10. Ayotte and Olsen escorted Plaintiff into the hospital for his appointment. Id., ¶ 11. After the appointment concluded, at approximately 11:15 a.m., Ayotte escorted Plaintiff back to the prison van. Id., ¶ 12. Ayotte once again did not buckle Plaintiff's seatbelt after placing him in the back of the van. Id., at 5, ¶ 21. Ayotte then started up the van and "continue[d] to ingauge [sic] in his personal cell phone [use]" while waiting for Olsen to return to the van. Id., at 4, ¶¶ 13-14.
As Ayotte and Plaintiff waited in the prison van, John Doe, who was allegedly working "first shift" as a truck driver for UCONN Hospital, drove a UCONN truck into the area of the loading dock where the prison van was parked. Id., at 2; at 4, ¶ 15. Plaintiff noticed that John Doe began to back his truck up toward the loading dock where the prison van was parked. Id., at 4, ¶ 16. Meanwhile Ayotte continued to use his cell phone so failed to see Doe backing the truck towards the van. Id., ¶ 18. Plaintiff yelled a warning to the "distracted" Ayotte, informing him that the prison van was "going to [be] hit" by the truck. Id., at 5, ¶ 19.
Before Ayotte could take any evasive action, Doe ran the truck into the right side of the prison van. Id., at 5, ¶ 20. Plaintiff was unable to brace himself for the impact due to his physical restraints and lack of a seatbelt. Id., ¶ 21. Consequently, he bounced "uncontrollably" around the van, thereby causing injury to his lower back. Id., ¶¶ 21-22, and at 6-7, ¶¶ 40-43.
John Doe parked the truck and exited from it. Id., at 5, ¶ 24. Someone called the Farmington Police Department. Id., ¶ 25. Officer Olsen then arrived at the van and was informed about the collision. Id., ¶ 26. Olsen then asked Plaintiff if he needed medical attention, and Plaintiff indicated that he did. Id., ¶¶ 27-28. Although Olsen noted at that time that he saw "nothing wrong with thePlaintiff," he and Ayotte escorted Plaintiff to the emergency room at UCONN Hospital. Id., ¶¶ 28-29. Both officers blamed Plaintiff for making them late in returning to Corrigan. Id., ¶ 31. At about 12:40 p.m., the two officers decided not to wait any longer for Plaintiff to be seen by a physician in the emergency room. Id., at 6, ¶ 32. They loaded him into the prison van and once again refused to buckle his seatbelt for the ride back to Corrigan, "in violation" of the Department of Corrections ("DOC") "Administrative Directive 6.4."2 Id., at 6, ¶¶ 33-34.
Upon returning to Corrigan at around 2:30 p.m., Plaintiff was taken to the medical unit for examination. Id., ¶ 35. Plaintiff explained to medical personnel that he felt discomfort in his lower back and neck. Id., ¶ 37. Staff instructed Plaintiff to submit a request to return to the medical unit if he felt "more discomfort" in the next several days. Id., ¶ 38.
Four days later, on November 1, 2016, Corrigan prison...
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