Steele v. Capuano
| Decision Date | 27 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | NNHCV136037659 |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | Victoria Steele v. Anthony Capuano |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#145)
The issue presented is whether this court should grant the defendant Anthony Capuano's motion for summary judgment on the ground that, as a matter of law, the defendant has been released from liability pursuant to a settlement between the plaintiff and the co-defendant City of New Haven. This court denies the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
This case arises from a motor vehicle collision that occurred on July 17, 2012 between the plaintiff, Victoria Steele, and the defendant, Anthony Capuano. Steele alleges that due to Capuano's negligence in operating his vehicle, she suffered a number of physical injuries and economic losses. On April 12, 2013, Steele filed her initial complaint against Capuano for negligence. Capuano denied that he operated his vehicle in the course of his employment at the time of the collision in his initial unsigned response to Steele's interrogatories dated August 15, 2013. Capuano, then, made a supplemental discovery response, dated April 23, 2014 changing the response to state that he was operating his vehicle in the course of his employment at the time of the collision. Thereafter, Steele cited in Capuano's employer, the City of New Haven (City), as a second defendant on April 25, 2014.
On July 29, 2014, Steele filed an amended complaint as served reflecting the addition of the City as a defendant. In this complaint, Steele added allegations that the City was Capuano's employer and a claim for vicarious liability against the City under the doctrine of respondeat superior. On November 6, 2014, Steele filed her second amended complaint against Capuano and the City to expand on her allegations against the City. Capuano and the City filed answers to Steele's second amended complaint on November 17, 2014 and November 24, 2014 respectively. Significantly while the City admits to being Capuano's employer, it denies that Capuano was acting within the course and scope of his employment when operating his vehicle on July 17, 2012. On December 18, 2015, Steele filed a third amended complaint, removing the allegations against the City and the allegation that the City was Capuano's employer at the time of the collision. Pursuant to a covenant not to sue entered into with the City on December 18, 2015, Steele withdrew her cause of action against the City on December 21, 2015.
In response to the agreement between Steele and the City, Capuano requested permission to file summary judgment as this case is assigned for trial on March 1, 2016. On January 8, 2016, Capuano filed his motion for summary judgment. A memorandum of law and exhibits accompany his motion. Capuano moves for summary judgment on the ground that, as a matter of law, he has been released from liability pursuant to the settlement between Steele and the City. On January 13, 2016, Steele filed an opposition to Capuano's motion for summary judgment with exhibits. Oral argument on this matter was heard at the short calendar on January 25, 2016.
" [S]ummary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809, 820-21, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015). " The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact . . . A material fact . . . [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 821. " [T]he party moving for summary judgment . . . is required to support its motion with supporting documentation, including affidavits." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 324 n.12, 77 A.3d 726 (2013).
" Likewise, [t]he existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counteraffidavits and concrete evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States Bank, N.A. v. Foote, 151 Conn.App. 620, 632-33, 94 A.3d 1267, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 930, 101 A.3d 952 (2014). (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, supra, 310 Conn. 320-21.
" Only evidence that would be admissible at trial may be used to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Great Country Bank v. Pastore, 241 Conn. 423, 436, 696 A.2d 1254 (1997), citing Practice Book § 381 [now § 17-46]. " While [a party's] deposition testimony is not conclusive as a judicial admission; General Statutes § 52-200; it is sufficient to support entry of summary judgment in the absence of contradictory competent affidavits that establish a genuine issue as to a material fact." Collum v. Chapin, 40 Conn.App. 449, 450 n.2, 671 A.2d 1329 (1996); see also Barlow v. Palmer, 96 Conn.App. 88, 92, 898 A.2d 835 (2006) (). In general, " [i]t is within the court's discretion whether to accept or decline [to accept] . . . supplemental evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bruno v. Geller, 136 Conn.App. 707, 715, 46 A.3d 974, cert. denied, 306 Conn. 905, 52 A.3d 732 (2012).
Capuano moves for summary judgment on the ground that, as a matter of law, the covenant not to sue releasing the City from liability also releases his liability. Capuano contends that releasing the City (principal) from liability necessarily releases him (agent) from liability. He relies on our Supreme Court's decision in Alvarez v. New Haven Register, 249 Conn. 709, 735 A.2d 306 (1999) that, on its face, holds that releasing the agent from liability releases the principal and suggests that releasing either releases the other. Capuano further argues that the covenant not to sue between Steele and the City has the same legal effect as a release, and therefore, it should be treated as a release and not a covenant to sue. Also, Capuano notes that Steele and the City entered into the covenant after Steele named the City as a defendant, defeating the purpose of a covenant not to sue; thus, there is more reason to legally treat the covenant as a general release. Capuano further claims that there is no factual dispute that he was operating his vehicle in the course of his employment with the City. In support of his motion for summary judgment, Capuano provides the following evidence: excerpts of Capuano's deposition testimony, a copy of the covenant not to sue (Covenant), and a copy of a letter from Chief Michael Grant.
In response, Steele maintains that this court should adhere to the explicit intent of the Covenant. She argues that the Covenant explicitly excludes Capuano as a beneficiary of the agreement with the intention of preserving her cause of action in negligence against Capuano. Steele further argues that the Covenant should not be treated as a general release given that she intended to extinguish her right of action against only the City while preserving her right of action against Capuano. She adds that entering into the Covenant with the City after citing in the City as a defendant is of no consequence to the Covenant's effect. Moreover, taking from the reasoning in Fleming v. Dionisio, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-09-6002255-S (February 7, 2013, Povodator, J.) (55 Conn.L.Rptr. 594), Steele contends that the Alvarez rule does not apply to the present case because there is factual dispute as to whether agency existed at the time of the accident, that the present case is distinguishable from the facts underlying Alvarez, and that the reciprocal language attached to the holding of Alvarez is dictum. In support of her memorandum in opposition to summary judgment, Steele provides the following evidence: a copy of the Covenant, excerpts of Capuano's deposition testimony, Capuano's unsigned, initial answers to interrogatories, Capuano's supplemental discovery response to interrogatories, and the City's answer to Steele's second amended complaint denying that Capuano was acting within the scope of his employment.[1]
This court agrees that there is a factual dispute as to the existence of agency at the time of the collision. Capuano provides contradictory assertions as to whether he was acting within the scope of his employment when he was operating his vehicle. In his initial, unsigned answer to Steele's interrogatories, he denies that he was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Then, in a supplemental...
To continue reading
Request your trial