Alvarez v. New Haven Register, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 July 1999
• Docket Number: (SC 16024)
• Citation: 249 Conn. 709,735 A.2d 306
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: REYES ALVAREZ v. NEW HAVEN REGISTER, INC.

249 Conn. 709

735 A.2d 306

REYES ALVAREZ v. NEW HAVEN REGISTER, INC.

(SC 16024)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 18, 1999.

Officially released July 27, 1999.

Berdon, Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Peters, Js.

Stephen R. Bellis, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Michael T. McCormack, with whom, on the brief, was Philip T. Newbury, Jr., for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

KATZ, J.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether, notwithstanding General Statutes § 52-572e,¹ a release executed in favor of an employee operates as a matter of law to release the employer whose sole liability is premised on the doctrine of respondeat superior. We conclude that the employer and employee are not joint tortfeasors pursuant to the statute and that, accordingly, the employer is released from any derivative liability.

The record includes the following undisputed facts. The plaintiff, Reyes Alvarez, brought an action against Grazyna Ziolo² for injuries sustained as a result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred while Ziolo was acting within the scope of her employment with the New Haven Register (Register), the defendant in the present action.³ The accident occurred when the plaintiffs motor vehicle, while stopped at a traffic light, was struck from behind by a motor vehicle operated by Ziolo.

The plaintiff and Ziolo's insurance carrier, the Progressive Insurance Company (Progressive), agreed to submit the claim to high-low binding arbitration. The arbitrator found damages in excess of the $100,000 policy and the plaintiff agreed to accept $90,000, which award took into consideration collateral source offsets. Although the plaintiff's counsel submitted a satisfaction for payment of the award, Progressive rejected the satisfaction, insisting instead that the plaintiff sign a "full release of all claims and demands."⁴ After executing the release, the plaintiff commenced the present action against the Register, claiming that the Register is vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the alleged negligent acts of its employee, Ziolo.⁵ The Register filed an amended answer and asserted special defenses alleging, inter alia, that the plaintiffs claim was barred because, in settling with Ziolo, the plaintiff had executed a general release of all potential tortfeasors. The plaintiff denied the allegations made in the special defenses, and the Register thereafter moved for summary judgment claiming that the release, which had been executed by the plaintiff in favor of Ziolo, discharged the Register from any vicarious liability.

In response to the motion, the plaintiff filed an objection and an affidavit stating that, at the time of settlement with Progressive, he had never intended to release the Register from liability by signing the release and that he had fully intended to pursue a claim against the Register. The trial court determined, as a matter of law, that the Register and Ziolo were not joint tortfeasors under the common law, and that, consequently, § 52-572e does not abrogate the common-law principles regarding vicarious liability of a master and servant. Accordingly, the court rendered summary judgment for the Register, concluding that the release executed in favor of Ziolo operated, as a matter of law, to release the Register.

On appeal,⁶ the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that, because § 52-572e did not apply to this case, the release of Ziolo, as a matter of law, discharged the liability of the Register as her employer. The plaintiff further claims that, pursuant to Sims v. Honda Motor Co., 225 Conn. 401, 406 n.7, 623 A.2d 995 (1993), whether the release was intended to release the Register from liability for its employee's alleged negligence is a question of fact to be determined by the fact finder. We conclude that § 52-572e does not embrace the independent actions against an employer and an employee and that, consequently, the trial court properly granted the Register's motion for summary judgment.⁷

We begin with a brief discussion of the pertinent legal principles. "The standard of review of a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is well established. Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Practice Book § 384 [now § 17-49]. Peerless Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 241 Conn. 476, 481, 697 A.2d 680 (1997)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nichols v. Lighthouse Restaurant, Inc., 246 Conn. 156, 163, 716 A.2d 71 (1998). Because the sole question presented by this case involves the proper application of § 52-572e to an undisputed factual scenario, our review is plenary. Charles v. Charles, 243 Conn. 255, 258, 701 A.2d 650 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1136, 118 S. Ct. 1838, 140 L. Ed. 2d 1089 (1998).

"The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 431, 650 A.2d 557 (1994). In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of this case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.... Id.; Carpenteri-Waddington, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 231 Conn. 355, 362, 650 A.2d 147 (1994); United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, 220 Conn. 749, 755-56, 601 A.2d 1005 (1992)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, 240 Conn. 422, 431-32, 692 A.2d 742 (1997).

Finally, "[w]hen a statute is in derogation of common law ... it should receive a strict construction and is not to be extended, modified, repealed or enlarged in its scope by the mechanics of [statutory] construction.... In determining whether or not a statute abrogates or modifies a common law rule the construction must be strict, and the operation of a statute in derogation of the common law is to be limited to matters clearly brought within its scope.... Although the legislature may eliminate a common law right by statute, the presumption that the legislature does not have such a purpose can be overcome only if the legislative intent is clearly and plainly expressed.... We recognize only those alterations of the common law that are clearly expressed in the language of the statute because the traditional principles of justice upon which the common law is founded should be perpetuated. The rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly construed can be seen to serve the same policy of continuity and stability in the legal system as the doctrine of stare decisis in relation to case law. 3 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (5th Ed. Singer 1992 Rev.) § 61.01, pp. 172-73." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lynn v. Haybuster Mfg., Inc., 226 Conn. 282, 289-90, 627 A.2d 1288 (1993).

Both parties recognize that, in the absence of a specific statute, where the liability of a principal for a tort committed by his agent is predicated solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, a valid release of either operates to release the other. Therefore, the issue before us is whether the legislature, in enacting § 52-572e, intended to abrogate the common law in this regard. On the basis of the language of § 52-572e, its legislative history and the circumstances surrounding its enactment, the policy it was designed to implement, and its relationship to other legislation governing the same subject matter, we conclude that, pursuant to § 52-572e, the release of Ziolo did, as a matter of law, release the Register.

We first examine the language of § 52-572e to determine whether it clearly reflects the legislature's intent to include situations involving vicarious liability. "A release by the injured person, or his legal representative, of one joint tortfeasor does not discharge the other tortfeasors unless, and only to the extent, the release so provides." General Statutes § 52-572e (b). "Joint tortfeasors" are defined as "two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property whether or not a judgment has been recovered against all or any of them." General Statutes § 52-572e (a). The plaintiff contends that although Ziolo and the Register were not jointly liable, they were nevertheless severally liable, and thereby embraced by § 52-572e.

Although the plaintiff could have brought an action against either Ziolo or the Register or both; see Chase v. New Haven Waste Material Corp., 111 Conn. 377, 380-81, 150 A. 107 (1930); that factor in and of itself does not resolve the matter. Joint liability is based upon the concept that all tortfeasors are independently at fault for their own wrongful acts. Caviote v. Shea, 116 Conn. 569, 575, 165 A. 788 (1933). Their liability is direct because they actually contributed to the injury. At common law, an individual injured by the negligence of one or more tortfeasors could proceed against any one of the tortfeasors for payment of damages. This was permitted to ensure that the plaintiff would be made whole. The terms "joint and several liability" and "joint or several liability" essentially meant the same thing—that an injured party could look to either or both of the tortfeasors and that either one would be liable for the full amount of the plaintiff's damages. Sparrow v. Bromage, 83 Conn. 27, 28-29, 74 A. 1070 (1910).

We recently had the opportunity to explain this principle. "Prior to October 1, 1986, this state adhered to the rules of joint...