Steele v. New York Life Ins. Co

• Decision Date: 30 August 1935
• Docket Number: 5483
• Citation: 87 Utah 63,48 P.2d 436
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: STEELE v. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO

48 P.2d 436

87 Utah 63

STEELE v. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO

No. 5483

Supreme Court of Utah

August 30, 1935

Appeal from District Court, Third District, Salt Lake County; O. W McConkie, Judge.

Action by Harry M. Steele against the New York Life Insurance Company. From a judgment for the defendant, the plaintiff appeals.

AFFIRMED.

Paul E Reimann, of Salt Lake City, and K. C. Tanner, of Portland Ore., for appellant.

Critchlow & Critchlow and A. W. Watson, all of Salt Lake City, for respondent.

MOFFAT Justice. ELIAS HANSEN, C. J., and FOLLAND and EPHRAIM HANSON, JJ., WOLFE, Justice, concurring.

OPINION

MOFFAT, Justice.

This cause was tried to the court sitting with a jury, upon a claim for benefits pursuant to the terms of a policy of insurance issued to Harry M. Steele by the New York Life Insurance Company. The policy was issued June 14, 1925. It is what is termed a life policy with a provision for the payment of benefits in the event the insured became disabled. It is over the disability features the issues herein arise. The language relating to the disability features is as follows:

"The Company agrees to pay to the insured $ 100 each month during the lifetime of the insured and also to waive the payment of premiums if the insured becomes wholly and presumably permanently disabled before age sixty years, subject to all the terms and conditions contained in Section 1 hereof. * * *

"Section 1--Disability Benefits.

"1. Total Disability.--Disability shall be deemed to be total whenever the Insured is wholly disabled by bodily injury or disease or so that he is prevented thereby from engaging in any occupation whatsoever for remuneration or profit.

"2. Permanent Disability.--Disability shall be presumed to be permanent,--(a) Whenever the Insured will presumably be so totally disabled for life; or--(b) After the Insured has been so totally disabled for not less than three consecutive months immediately preceding receipt of proof thereof.

"3. Benefits.--Upon receipt at the Company's Home Office, before default in payment of premium, of due proof that the Insured is totally and presumably permanently disabled and that such disability occurred after the insurance under this Policy took effect and before its anniversary on which the Insured's age at nearest birthday is sixty years, the following benefits will be granted:

(a) Income Payments.--The Company will pay to the Insured a monthly income of $ 10 per $ 1,000 of the face of the policy during his lifetime and continued disability, beginning immediately on receipt of said proof. Any income payment due before the Company approves the proof of disability shall be payable upon such approval. If disability results from insanity income payments under this section will be paid to the beneficiary in lieu of the Insured.

"(b) Waiver of Premiums.--The Company will waive payment of any premium falling due after approval of said proof and during such disability. Any premium due prior to such approval is payable in accordance with the terms of the policy, but if due after receipt of proof will, if paid, be refunded upon approval of proof."

The complaint alleges the issuance of the policy of insurance and quotes the disability benefit clauses above recited. The defendant admits the issuance of the policy and that it is in good standing, but denies total or permanent disability. Evidence was offered and received on behalf of both parties to the action, and following instructions to the jury by the court the matter in issue was submitted. The jury found for the defendant and against plaintiff, "no cause of action." That the jury found that the plaintiff suffered no total or presumably permanent disability within the period limited by the court's instructions is a necessary conclusion from the verdict rendered. No question is raised as to the verdict not finding support in the evidence.

Several errors are assigned, all of which are reduced to two, viz., the giving of one instruction and the refusal to give another except as modified. The assignment as to the modified instruction is not argued, presumably for the reason that the instruction given and the modified instruction both relate to the limiting of the period to be covered by the indemnity to be paid in the event the jury found disability as limited and defined by the court. As stated substantially by appellant, the question presented in this appeal is whether plaintiff is entitled to indemnity at the rate of $ 100 per month ($ 10 on each $ 1,000 of the face of the policy) from July 15, 1930, or whether he is entitled to receive such amount monthly immediately upon submitting his proof.

The instruction complained of, and which limits the period the jury could consider relating to disability benefits, reads:

"You are instructed that under the policy involved in this case, the right of the insured to receive disability benefits does not accrue to him until proof of disability is submitted to the insurance company and received by it at its home office. The evidence in this case discloses that such proof was not submitted until the 15th day of July, 1930, and consequently, in no event is the plaintiff entitled to any disability payments for any period prior to said 15th day of July, 1930." (Italics ours.)

It is not questioned that the proof of disability was submitted to the Insurance Company at its home office on the 15th day of July 1930. The point raised and argued by appellant involves the interpretation of the wording of the disability provision of the policy. Respondent argues that it is obvious if the case made by plaintiff is insufficient to sustain the burden of establishing that he had been totally disabled within the meaning of and for the time required by the policy, the motion for the directed verdict for defendant and the errors if any, in the instructions, were not prejudicial to plaintiff, and maintains the evidence establishes that plaintiff had not been wholly disabled so that he was prevented from engaging in any occupation...