Steele v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 28 May 2013
• Docket Number: No. SC 92520.,SC 92520.
• Citation: 400 S.W.3d 295
• Parties: Charzetta STEELE, Appellant, v. SHELTER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

400 S.W.3d 295

Charzetta STEELE, Appellant,

v.SHELTER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.

No. SC 92520.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

May 28, 2013.

David C. Knieriem, Law Offices of David C. Knieriem, Clayton, for Steele.

Michael S. Hamlin, Seth G. Gausnell, Pitzer Snodgrass PC, St. Louis, for Shelter.

LAURA DENVIR STITH, Judge.

Charzetta Steele appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment against her on her claim that her young son, who was injured by an uninsured motorist while a passenger in his daycare provider's van, was an insured under the uninsured motorist provisions of the daycare provider's policy with Shelter Mutual Insurance Company. This Court affirms.

The policy defines “insured,” as relevant here, to include owners, operators and other users who exercise physical control or the right of control of the vehicle. It does not include other passengers. This Court rejects Ms. Steele's argument that the uninsured motorist statute, section 379.203, RSMo.2000, requires coverage of all passengers within the definition of “user” and that this Court therefore should write such a provision into the policy as a matter of law. The uninsured motorist statute requires coverage only of those who are insureds under the liability policy. The policy itself does not cover all passengers, and the financial responsibility law, known as the MVFRL, section 303.010, RSMo.2000 et seq., requires it to provide coverage only to users of the vehicle to the extent that liability may be imposed on them under Missouri law for damages arising out of such use. Ms. Steele's son does not come within this required coverage, as his passive use of the van as a passenger did not provide a basis to impute liability on him. Accordingly, he is not an insured and the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

I. FACTS

On November 3, 2009, a vehicle traveling at an excessive speed failed to yield and struck the rear end of Bright Start Academy's daycare van. The driver of the speeding vehicle was uninsured. Following the accident, Charzetta Steele, the mother of a child who was a passenger in the van, filed a petition on behalf of her son against Shelter Mutual Insurance Company (“Shelter”). She alleged that Shelter had issued an insurance policy to Bright Start Academy that covered the daycare van and included a provision for uninsured motorist coverage. Ms. Steele further alleged that her child was an “insured” under the policy, and she requested judgment in her favor to compensate for the serious injuries the child sustained in the accident.

Shelter filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the child was not an “insured” under the policy because he was not the policyholder, a relative of the policyholder, listed on the policy, or “using” the vehicle at the time of the accident under the policy's definition of “user.” Ms. Steele agreed that the policy did not cover her child and that he was not a “user” under it, but she argued that Missouri's MVFRL, read in conjunction with the uninsured motorist (“UM”) law, section 379.203, RSMo.2000, requires that such coverage be provided up to the $25,000 mandatory minimum limits for uninsured motorist coverage.

Following a hearing, the trial court granted judgment to Shelter. This Court granted transfer pursuant to art. V, sec. 10 of the Missouri Constitution after opinion by the court of appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The grant of summary judgment is an issue of law that this Court reviews de novo. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid–Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). The Court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered, without deference to the trial court's findings, and accords the non-movant “the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record.” Id.

III. ANALYSIS

To determine whether a child who is riding as a passenger in a vehicle is entitled to UM benefits, this Court first turns to the policy to determine if it provides coverage. The UM provision of the policy states:

PART IV—COVERAGE E—UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY COVERAGE

INSURING AGREEMENT FOR COVERAGE E:

If an insured sustains bodily injury as a result of an accident involving the use of an uninsured motor vehicle and the owner or operator of the vehicle is legally obligated to pay some, or all, of the insured's resulting damages, we will pay the uncompensated damages, subject to the limit of our liability stated in this coverage.

DEFINITIONS USED IN PART IV

In Coverage E:

(1) Damages means ...

(2) Insured means a person included in one of the following categories, but only to the extent stated in that category.

CATEGORY A:

(a) You;

(b) relatives; and

(c) individuals listed in the Declarations as an “additional listed insured” who do not own a motor vehicle, and whose spouse does not own a motor vehicle.

CATEGORY B:

Any individual, not included in Category A, who is using the described auto with permission or general consent. The limit of our liability for individuals in this category is the minimum limit of uninsured motorist insurance coverage specified by the uninsured motorist insurance law or financial responsibility law applicable to the accident, regardless of the limit stated in the Declarations.

(emphasis added). The general definitions section of the Shelter policy defines “use” as:

Use means physically controlling, or attempting to physically control, the movements of a vehicle. It includes any emergency repairs performed in the course of a trip, if those repairs are necessary to the continued use of the vehicle.

(emphasis added).

Neither party understands Ms. Steele's child to fall within the definition of an “insured,” thereby entitling him to UM coverage under these policy definitions. That is because he was not an “insured” person under category A in that he was not the policyholder, a relative of the policyholder or an additional listed insured. He also was not an “insured” person under category B because he does not come within the definition of what constitutes “use” of the vehicle under the liability policy.

As just quoted, the liability policy defines “use” to include only those persons “physically controlling, or attempting to physically control” the vehicle. Ms. Steele's child, while a passenger in the vehicle, was not operating or otherwise physically controlling or attempting to physically control it. This unambiguously means he was not a user of the van as the term “use” is defined in the policy, therefore, he was not an insured under the terms of the policy in and of themselves. When insurance contracts are unambiguous, they will be enforced as written absent a public policy to the contrary. Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., Ltd., 827 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Mo. banc 1992).

Ms. Steele suggests that public policy requires this Court to expand the definition of “use” as used in the liability provisions of the policy. She would have the Court write into the contract, as a matter of law, a broader definition that includes all vehicle passengers. In support, she says that the UM statute mandates such coverage. As she notes, it is against public policy to give effect to policy provisions that condition, limit or otherwise dilute insurance coverage mandated by statute. See Shepherd v. American States Ins. Co., 671 S.W.2d 777 (Mo. banc 1984).

This Court, therefore, must determine whether Missouri UM or other statutes require all those who are passengers in motor vehicles to be considered users of the vehicles and, so, included within the definition of “insured,” even when the policy itself provides otherwise. Missouri's UM statute states in relevant part:

1. No automobile liability insurance covering liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued ... in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, ... for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom.

§ 379.203.1, RSMo.2000 (emphasis added). This language unambiguously requires every automobile liability insurance policy to provide UM coverage for the protection of persons “insured thereunder”—that is, insured under the liability policy—who legally are entitled to recover damages from the uninsured vehicle owner or operator. So, if a person is insured under the liability policy on the vehicle, then that person also as a matter of law must receive UM coverage under the policy (at least equal to the minimum limits set out in Missouri statutes) if the person legally is entitled to recover damages from the person owning or operating the uninsured vehicle.

This begs the question whether the person seeking UM coverage is insured under the liability policy; if not, then section 379.203.1 by its terms does not require UM coverage. As discussed earlier, the liability policy at issue here provides liability coverage to users only if they are physically controlling or attempting to physically control the vehicle. As it is uncontested that Ms. Steele's son did not come within this provision, the policy considered on its face does not provide coverage to him.

But that does not end the Court's inquiry for, as Ms. Steele notes, if Missouri's statutes governing liability policies require a policy to provide liability coverage for passengers such as Ms. Steele's child who are riding passively in a vehicle, then such coverage provision will be written into the policy as a matter of law. See Stahlberg v. Travelers Indem. Co., 568 S.W.2d 79, 85 (Mo.App.1978) (“where parties contract upon a subject which is surrounded by statutory limitations and requirements, they are presumed to have entered into such contracts with reference to such statutes, and such provisions become part of the contract”).

This Court turns to ...