Steele v. State
| Decision Date | 09 May 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 105223,ED 105223 |
| Citation | 551 S.W.3d 538 |
| Parties | James E. STEELE, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Emily Danker-Feldman, 1010 Market St., Suite 1100, St. Louis, MO 63101, for appellant.
Joshua Hawley, Evan J. Buchheim, P.O. Box 899, Jefferson City, MO 65102, for respondent.
James E. Steele, Jr. ("Steele") appeals from the motion court’s denial of his Rule 29.151 motion following an evidentiary hearing. A jury found Steele guilty of driving while intoxicated ("DWI"). The trial court sentenced Steele to twelve years prison, as a chronic-DWI offender and a prior and persistent felony offender. Steele raises three points on appeal, each positing that the motion court clearly erred in denying his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Steele argues that defense counsel was ineffective because she failed to: advise him of his right to testify (Point One), strike a biased juror (Point Two), and investigate and introduce the maintenance records of the arresting officer’s patrol vehicle (Point Three). Steele did not plead in his Rule 29.15 motion that defense counsel failed to advise him of his right to testify. Because that issue was not raised before the motion court, we deny Point One. We reject Point Two because the record does not establish that the juror at issue was biased. Because the maintenance records for the patrol vehicle would only impeach the arresting officer’s testimony on a tangential issue, we deny Point Three. We affirm the motion court’s judgment.
Around midnight on September 1, 2012, Sergeant Thomas Rohn ("Sgt. Rohn"), a long-time veteran of the Missouri State Highway Patrol, was driving along the highway when he observed Steele’s truck swerve across the centerline four times. Sgt. Rohn activated his emergency lights to conduct a traffic stop. After the vehicles stopped, Sgt. Rohn approached Steele’s truck.
As he approached the truck, Sgt. Rohn detected a "very strong odor" of alcohol coming from Steele. Sgt. Rohn asked Steele to produce identification. Sgt. Rohn saw Steele struggle to comply; Steele fumbled through his wallet and experienced difficulty extracting his identification. Sgt. Rohn, recognizing that intoxicated people lose dexterity in their extremities and demonstrate low motor skills, suspected that Steele was intoxicated. For safety reasons, Sgt. Rohn instructed Steele to leave his truck and sit in the patrol vehicle during the traffic stop. Instead of complying with the instruction, Steele drank from a nearby soda container. After Sgt. Rohn repeatedly admonished Steele to stop drinking, Steele eventually obeyed. Sgt. Rohn speculated that Steele was using soda to mask the odor of alcohol.
According to Sgt. Rohn, Steele struggled to walk to the patrol vehicle. Steele swayed and was unsteady on his feet. Steele entered the patrol vehicle, but did not close the patrol vehicle’s door. Steele turned his head toward the open door when answering Sgt. Rohn’s questions. Again, Sgt. Rohn believed that, by keeping the door open, Steele was attempting to conceal the odor of alcohol. During the traffic stop, Sgt. Rohn noticed that Steele’s eyes were glossy, he often stared, and his speech was slurred.
Sgt. Rohn asked Steele if he had consumed any drinks. Steele responded that he had drank seven or eight beers. Sgt. Rohn instructed Steele to perform field-sobriety and preliminary-breath tests, but Steele declined. Unprompted, Steele opined to Sgt. Rohn that he was going to jail. Steele’s premonitions were realized; Sgt. Rohn arrested and transported him to a detention station. At the detention station, Steele refused any additional sobriety tests.
The State charged Steele, as a chronic-DWI offender and a prior and persistent felony offender, with one count of DWI.2 The case proceeded to a jury trial. At Steele’s first trial, the parties stipulated that they would not use Steele’s statement that he had consumed seven-to-eight beers. Steele also acknowledged and voluntarily waived his right to testify. The trial resulted in a hung jury. The State sought a retrial. At the second trial, the State admitted into evidence Steele’s incriminating statements regarding the number of beers he had consumed.
During voir dire, defense counsel queried if any veniremembers had "been the victim in an accident involving a DWI?" Veniremember McKenzie ("Juror McKenzie") responded affirmatively. The following discussion occurred:
Juror McKenzie did not respond to any other voir-dire questions. Defense counsel did not challenge Juror McKenzie for cause or use a preemptory strike on him. Juror McKenzie served as the foreperson of the petit jury.
The State presented Sgt. Rohn’s testimony as outlined above. In addition to describing the traffic stop, Sgt. Rohn testified about the performance of his patrol vehicle’s recording equipment. Under normal circumstances, the recording equipment on Sgt. Rohn’s patrol vehicle automatically engages when the patrol vehicle’s emergency lights are activated and the recording equipment stores the subsequent footage on a "blade" device. According to Sgt. Rohn, when he attempted to download the recording of the traffic stop from the "blade" device, he realized that, due to a malfunction, the "blade" device was blank. Sgt. Rohn noted that, previously, the "blade" device malfunctioned when it was not formatted properly and that technicians could reformat the "blade" device remotely.
Defense counsel cross-examined Sgt. Rohn about the recording equipment’s performance. Sgt. Rohn conceded that he did not mention the equipment malfunction in his arrest report, his deposition, or his preliminary-hearing testimony. Sgt. Rohn acknowledged that department policy documents when the vehicles and recording equipment are "out of service" for repair. Sgt. Rohn explained that, to him, "out of service" meant that the recording equipment and vehicles were sent somewhere for repair. Sgt. Rohn said that his patrol vehicle and recording equipment were not sent away for repair after the equipment malfunction.
Steele did not testify in his defense. However, defense counsel called Amy Starbuck ("Starbuck"), who did not testify in the first trial. Starbuck testified that, on the night of Steele’s arrest, she observed him outside a grocery store. Starbuck interacted with Steele and did not detect any signs of intoxication. Steele left the grocery-store parking lot in his truck, and Starbuck followed in her vehicle. Starbuck drove behind Steele’s truck and did not notice him swerve across the centerline before or after Sgt. Rohn’s patrol vehicle passed her.
After deliberating, the jury found Steele guilty. The trial court additionally found that Steele was a chronic-DWI offender—with four previous DWI convictions—and a prior and persistent felony offender. The trial court denied Steele’s post-trial motions and sentenced him to twelve years in prison. Steele appealed his conviction and sentence. We affirmed. State v. Steele, 454 S.W.3d 400, 407 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015).
Steele timely filed for post-conviction relief under Rule 29.15, contending that defense counsel was ineffective. Steele attached his pro se claims to the amended motion subsequently filed by counsel. Pertinent to this appeal, Steele alleged in his motion for post-conviction relief that his defense counsel was ineffective for unreasonably failing to call him to testify, for failing to strike Juror McKenzie from the jury, and for failing to investigate and introduce the maintenance records for Sgt. Rohn’s patrol vehicle. The motion court granted an evidentiary hearing.
At the evidentiary hearing, Steele explained that he wanted to testify at the second trial. But, according to Steele, neither defense counsel nor the trial court asked him whether he wanted to testify. Steele admitted that he discussed his right to testify in the first trial and voluntarily waived it. Steele said he wanted to testify that he was sober during the traffic stop. Yet, at the evidentiary hearing, Steele could not recall the details of the traffic stop. Steele also acknowledged that he made incriminating statements to Sgt. Rohn, but insisted that he told Sgt. Rohn that he consumed the beers at lunchtime. Steele understood that, by testifying, the jury would learn about his prior DWI convictions. Further, Steele presented evidence that the Missouri State Highway Patrol did not have any maintenance...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Harding v. State
...value, particularly if the evidence would be considered merely cumulative. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6 ; see also Steele v. State , 551 S.W.3d 538, 549 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018) (citing State v. Twenter , 818 S.W.2d 628, 643 (Mo. banc 1991) ). In fact, counsel may fairly determine that the use of c......
-
Hicks v. State
...discovery of such information, and (3) prove that the information would have aided or improved his position at trial. Steele v. State , 551 S.W.3d 538, 548 (Mo. App. 2018). Here, Movant's claim 8(c) alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel "in that his trial counsel failed......
-
Marshall v. State
...extent of trial counsel’s impeachment of a witness, absent something more, does not warrant post-conviction relief. Steele v. State , 551 S.W.3d 538, 548 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018).During redirect examination, Victim testified that she was unaware of anything in Movant’s physical condition that w......
-
McClendon v. State
...motion to determine whether the motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous." Steele v. State , 551 S.W.3d 538, 544 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018) (citing Hopkins v. State , 519 S.W.3d 433, 435 (Mo. banc 2017) and Rule 29.15(k)). The motion court's findings of fact an......