Steele v. Thurston
Decision Date | 15 October 2020 |
Docket Number | No. CV-20-546,CV-20-546 |
Citation | 2020 Ark. 320,609 S.W.3d 357 |
Parties | Tom STEELE, Appellant v. John THURSTON, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of State for the State of Arkansas, Appellee |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
David A. Couch, for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Michael Mosley, Ass't Att'y Gen.; and Brittany Edwards, Att't Att'y Gen., for appellee.
Appellant Tom Steele appeals an order of the Pulaski County Circuit Court granting a motion to dismiss filed by appellee John Thurston, Secretary of State for the State of Arkansas ("the Secretary"), thereby denying Steele's request to strike two proposed constitutional amendments, Issue 2 and Issue 3, from the general-election ballot on November 3, 2020. For reversal, Steele argues that the circuit court erred in ruling that (1) the ballot titles were sufficient, and (2) Issue 3 did not violate article 19, section 22 of the Arkansas Constitution. We affirm.
In 2019, the Arkansas General Assembly referred three proposed amendments to the Arkansas Constitution to be placed on the general-election ballot on November 3, 2020. Among those three proposed amendments, the Secretary designated Senate Joint Resolution 15 as Issue 2 and House Joint Resolution 1008 as Issue 3.
On June 29, 2020, Steele filed a complaint against the Secretary in his official capacity requesting a writ of mandamus, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief and seeking to have Issue 2 and Issue 3 removed from the November 3 general-election ballot. He challenged the sufficiency of both ballot titles and alleged that, with the passage of Act 376 of 2019 ("Act 376"), all ballot-title challenges should be evaluated solely under amendment 7 to the Arkansas Constitution. Steele also filed a motion to expedite and a motion for preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the Secretary from counting, canvassing, and certifying ballots or votes cast for Issue 2 and Issue 3.
The Secretary filed a motion to dismiss requesting that the circuit court dismiss the complaint with prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim. The Secretary responded to Steele's motion for preliminary injunction by arguing that Steele could not overcome a threshold question of irreparable harm and that, as a result, the motion must be denied.
On September 9, 2020, the circuit court entered an order granting the Secretary's motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, denying Steele's motion for preliminary injunction, and denying Steele's motion for a writ of mandamus or declaratory relief. Specifically, the circuit court ruled, inter alia , that "both Issue 2 and Issue 3 comply with the applicable governing procedures of Article 19, [section] 22 of the Arkansas Constitution." Steele timely filed his notice of appeal.
Because this case involves an amendment proposed by the Arkansas General Assembly, our jurisdiction is appellate only. See Forrester v. Daniels , 2010 Ark. 397, 373 S.W.3d 871 ; Becker v. McCuen , 303 Ark. 482, 798 S.W.2d 71 (1990) ; Berry v. Hall , 232 Ark. 648, 339 S.W.2d 433 (1960).
Steele argues on appeal that the circuit court erred in ruling that the ballot titles of Issue 2 and Issue 3 were sufficient because, with the passage of Act 376, all ballot titles should now be evaluated under amendment 7—instead of article 19, section 22—of the Arkansas Constitution.
When reviewing a circuit court's order granting a motion to dismiss, we treat the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Wade v. Ferguson , 2009 Ark. 618, at 2, 2009 WL 4723356. In testing the sufficiency of a complaint on a motion to dismiss, all reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of the complaint, and all pleadings are to be liberally construed. Id. When a complaint is dismissed on a question of law, this court conducts a de novo review. State v. West , 2014 Ark. 174, 2014 WL 1515898 ; Fatpipe, Inc. v. State , 2012 Ark. 248, 410 S.W.3d 574.
Further, we review issues of statutory construction de novo, as it is for this court to interpret a statute. City of Rockport v. City of Malvern , 2012 Ark. 445, at 3, 424 S.W.3d 870, 873. This court is very hesitant to interpret a legislative act in a manner contrary to its express language, unless it is clear that a drafting error or omission has circumvented legislative intent. Weeks v. Thurston , 2020 Ark. 64, at 5, 594 S.W.3d 23, 25.
This court recognized the distinction between constitutional amendments proposed by the Arkansas General Assembly and those initiated by the people in Coulter v. Dodge , 197 Ark. 812, 125 S.W.2d 115 (1939). Those two methods are governed by entirely different procedures and requirements. Id. , 125 S.W.2d 115. The first method, which has been available in all five of our constitutions, is through the Arkansas General Assembly. Forrester v. Martin , 2011 Ark. 277, at 4, 383 S.W.3d 375, 378. The requirements for this first method are set forth in article 19, section 22 of the Arkansas Constitution. Id. , 383 S.W.3d at 378. The second method, adopted in 1920, is through an initiative-and-referendum power reserved for the people of Arkansas, and those requirements are set forth in amendment 7 of the Arkansas Constitution. Id. at 4, 383 S.W.3d at 378–79. This court has stated that amendment 7 does not govern constitutional amendments proposed by the Arkansas General Assembly. Id. , 383 S.W.3d at 379.
The article 19, section 22 standard is a different, and less demanding, one than that employed for amendment 7 initiatives. McCuen , 303 Ark. 482, 798 S.W.2d 71. This court has rejected the invitation to apply one uniform standard to all proposed amendments. See Kurrus v. Priest , 342 Ark. 434, 29 S.W.3d 669 (2000) ; Thiel v. Priest , 342 Ark. 292, 28 S.W.3d 296 (2000).
Steele contends that the newly enacted Act 376 now governs our examination of ballot titles and that Act 376 has overruled our holdings in Becker v. Riviere , 277 Ark. 252, 641 S.W.2d 2 (1982) ( ), and its progeny. Steele asserts that, by enacting Act 376, the Arkansas General Assembly must have intended for ballot titles and popular names to be included on referred constitutional amendments.
Act of March 8, 2019, No. 376 § 12, 2019 Ark. Acts 2651.1
We agree. The plain language of Act 376 allows for a "qualified elector" to "challeng[e] the sufficiency of" a proposed constitutional amendment in one of three ways—by challenging the text, ballot title, or popular name of the proposed constitutional amendment. Nowhere in Act 376 does it expressly state that this court must review a...
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