Steen v. Appellate Div.
| Decision Date | 11 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. S174773.,S174773. |
| Citation | 331 P.3d 136,175 Cal.Rptr.3d 760,59 Cal.4th 1045 |
| Parties | Jewerelene STEEN, Petitioner, v. APPELLATE DIVISION, SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; The People, Real Party in Interest. |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
Michael P. Judge and Ronald L. Brown, Public Defenders, Ilya Alekseyeff and John Hamilton Scott, Deputy Public Defenders, for Petitioner.
Frederick R. Bennett ; Reed Smith, San Francisco, Paul D. Fogel and Dennis Peter Maio for Respondent.
Carmen A. Trutanich, City Attorney, Debbie Lew, Assistant City Attorney, Eric Shannon and Katharine H. Mackenzie, Deputy City Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest.
Steve Cooley, District Attorney (Los Angeles), Irene T. Wakabayashi, Head Deputy District Attorney, and Phyllis C. Asayama, Deputy District Attorney, for District Attorney of Los Angeles County as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.
In this case we consider the validity of a misdemeanor complaint issued by a superior court clerk under the authority of Penal Code section 959.1, subdivision (c) (hereafter section 959.1(c) ). The statute provides that "[a] magistrate or court is authorized to receive and file an accusatory pleading in electronic form if," among other things, "[t]he accusatory pleading is issued in the name of, and transmitted by, a public prosecutor or law enforcement agency ..., or by a clerk of the court with respect to complaints issued for the offenses of failure to appear, pay a fine, or comply with an order of the court. " ( § 959.1(c) & (c)(1), italics added.) Petitioner, who pled no contest to the misdemeanor of willfully violating her written promise to appear ( Veh.Code, § 40508, subd. (a) ), charged in a complaint electronically generated by a court clerk, now challenges the ensuing conviction. Invoking the California Constitution's separation of powers ( Cal. Const., art. III, § 3 ) and due process (id., art. I, §§ 7, subd. (a), 15) clauses, petitioner contends the complaint was void because it was not issued by an executive branch officer with prosecutorial authority. Based on that premise, petitioner further contends the complaint did not timely commence a prosecution for purposes of the statute of limitations. ( Pen.Code, § 802, subd. (a).)
We conclude petitioner is not entitled to relief. A legislative enactment that permitted a judicial branch employee to commence criminal prosecutions without the prosecutor's approval would present a serious constitutional question by impairing a core function of the executive branch—the discretionary power to initiate criminal prosecutions. (See People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 134, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073.) But section 959.1(c) does not expressly or by necessary implication permit the clerk to commence prosecutions without the prosecutor's approval, and we must construe the statute in a manner that avoids doubts as to its constitutional validity.
People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 506–507, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 634, 297 P.3d 870 ; Young v. Haines (1986) 41 Cal.3d 883, 898, 226 Cal.Rptr. 547, 718 P.2d 909.) Furthermore, the prosecutor may validate a complaint filed by someone else by approving, authorizing or concurring in it. ( People v. Municipal Court (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 193, 206, 103 Cal.Rptr. 645 (Pellegrino ).) Here, the relevant prosecutorial agency has, through an established practice, implicitly approved in advance the clerk's routine issuance of complaints for the offense of failure to appear, including the complaint against petitioner. Accordingly, the complaint was valid and the prosecution timely commenced. We therefore deny the petition for writ of mandate.
On June 8, 2002, a police officer cited petitioner Jewerelene Steen for three infractions of the Vehicle Code: driving a vehicle with an expired registration ( Veh.Code, § 4000, subd. (a)(1) ), driving without a license (id., § 12500, subd. (a)), and failing to provide evidence of financial responsibility (id., § 16028, subd. (a)). Petitioner signed a written promise to appear in court on or before July 23, 2002, to answer for those infractions (see id., § 40500) and was thereupon released. When petitioner failed to appear, the clerk of the court for the Los Angeles County Superior Court, on August 13, 2002, electronically generated and filed against her a complaint for the misdemeanor of willfully violating her promise to appear. ( Id., § 40508, subd. (a).) The complaint was one of thousands created by the clerk on a weekly basis by means of a computer program that matches citation data from county traffic record information systems with data about delinquencies entered by the court's deputy clerks.
About five years later, on July 27, 2007, petitioner appeared with counsel before a court commissioner. Respondent informs us that the vast majority of offenses charged under section 959.1(c) are, with the defendants' consent, treated as infractions and punished with fines. (See Pen.Code, § 17, subd. (d)(2).) Instead of consenting to such a disposition, petitioner demurred to the complaint. ( Pen.Code, § 1004, subds. 1, 5.) The court lacked jurisdiction, she argued, because the clerk has no authority to commence a criminal prosecution and because section 959.1(c), if read to confer such authority, unconstitutionally impairs the separation of powers and due process. The People, represented by a deputy of the Los Angeles City Attorney's Office, criminal division, offered a constitutional defense of the statute. Asked by the court whether the People approved and concurred in the complaint against petitioner, the deputy responded that the People's and "[w]e have not asked the Court and/or its clerk to stop." In rebuttal, petitioner argued that the People had needed to concur in the complaint against her at the time it was filed and that it was "too late for the City Attorney to concur" five years later at the hearing.
Rejecting petitioner's arguments, the court overruled the demurrer, accepted her plea of no contest, found her guilty of violating Vehicle Code section 40508, subdivision (a), denied probation, and sentenced her to 50 days in county jail with six days of credit. The appellate division affirmed petitioner's conviction, and the Court of Appeal denied her petition to transfer. Having no right to petition for review from the order denying transfer ( Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(a)(1) ), petitioner invoked our original jurisdiction by filing the instant petition for writ of mandate to compel the appellate division to vacate the conviction. We took jurisdiction by issuing orders to show cause directing real party in interest the People, and also respondent appellate division,1 to show cause before this court why the relief petitioner seeks should not be granted.
Petitioner, as noted, challenges her conviction as impairing the separation of powers ( Cal. Const., art. III, § 3 ), denying her due process (id., art. I, §§ 7, subd. (a), 15) and violating the statute of limitations ( Pen.Code, § 802, subd. (a) ). We address petitioner's separation of powers argument first, as our analysis of it informs the remainder of our analysis.
Petitioner contends section 959.1(c) impairs the separation of powers by permitting the clerk, a judicial branch employee, to issue misdemeanor complaints. Reasoning that California law entrusts the initiation of criminal proceedings exclusively to executive branch officers with prosecutorial authority, petitioner argues that section 959.1(c) is unconstitutional to the extent it provides otherwise and that the clerk's complaint is accordingly void. We conclude the statute, properly and narrowly construed, does not permit the clerk to initiate criminal proceedings without the prosecutor's approval and is thus constitutional, and that the complaint against petitioner is therefore valid.
Penal Code section 959.1 was enacted in 1988 to permit prosecutors and law enforcement agencies to commence criminal prosecutions by filing electronic pleadings. (Stats.1988, ch. 516, § 1, p. 1945.) The language that engendered the present dispute by assigning a role to the clerk was added to the statute in 1990 by Assembly Bill No. 3168 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.). (See Stats.1990, ch. 289, § 1, p. 1561 [enacting Assem. Bill No. 3168].) Presently, the statute provides that "a criminal prosecution may be commenced by filing an accusatory pleading in electronic form with the magistrate or in a court having authority to receive it" ( § 959.1, subd. (a) ) and sets out conditions a court must satisfy in order to accept electronic pleadings. Section 959.1(c), with the 1990 amendment set out here in italics, provides that "[a] magistrate or court is authorized to receive and file an accusatory pleading in electronic form if all of the following conditions are met: [¶] (1) The accusatory pleading is issued in the name of, and transmitted by, a public prosecutor or law enforcement agency ..., or by a clerk of the court with respect to complaints issued for the offenses of failure to appear, pay a fine, or comply with an order of the court. " (Italics added.)
In describing the role the clerk is to play with respect to accusatory pleadings, the language added to section 959.1(c) in 1990 is somewhat ambiguous. Considering that language in context and in light of the legislative history, it appears the Legislature intended to permit superior court clerks to generate, electronically and automatically, accusatory pleadings charging certain offenses that arise out of court proceedings and are thus necessarily based on facts that lie uniquely within the clerk's knowledge.
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