Steere v. State Bar of Texas

• Decision Date: 27 June 1974
• Docket Number: No. 16358,16358
• Citation: 512 S.W.2d 362
• Parties: Arthur C. STEERE, Appellant, v. STATE BAR OF TEXAS, Appellee. (1st Dist.)
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 362

512 S.W.2d 362

Arthur C. STEERE, Appellant, v. STATE BAR OF TEXAS, Appellee.

No. 16358.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas Houston (1st Dist.).

June 27, 1974.

Rehearing Denied July 18, 1974.

Arthur C. Steere, pro se.

Michael L. Graham, Houston, Davis Grant, Austin, for appellee.

EVANS, Justice.

Appellant, Arthur C. Steere, by judgment of the 129th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas, effective January 31, 1969, was disbarred as an attorney at law. See Steere v. State of Texas, 445 S.W.2d 253 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston (1st Dist.), writ dism'd w.o.j.).

This is an appeal from an order entered by the same court dated February 28, 1974, denying appellant's petition for reinstatement after disbarment which had been filed pursuant to Sections 32 and 33 of the Rules Governing the State Bar of Texas. Title 14 App. art. 12, Vol. 1--A, pp. 384--385, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes.

The Rules referred to above governing reinstatement of disbarred members provide as follows:

'Section 32. Petition for Reinstatement after Disbarment

'At any time after the expiration of five years from the date of final judgment of disbarment of a member, he may petition the District Court of the county of his residence for reinstatement. The petition shall allege in substance that petitioner at the time of filing is of good moral character, and since his disbarment, has been living a life of generally good conduct, and that he has made full amends and restitution to all persons, if any, naming them, who may have suffered pecuniary loss by reason of the misconduct for which he was disbarred. The petition shall state the name and address of the Chairman of the District Grievance Committee and the name and address of the Secretary of the State Bar.

'Section 33. Notice, Hearing and Judgment

'The court shall examine the petition and, if satisfied that it states sufficient grounds to authorize reinstatement under these rules, shall fix by order endorsed on the petition a time and place for a hearing, and shall direct the clerk to serve each of the parties required to be named in the petition, by mailing to each of them by registered mail, return receipt requested, a certified copy of such petition and order. Thereafter, in term time or vacation, after the expiration of not less than fifteen days from the date of mailing of such notices, the court shall proceed without the aid of a jury to hear testimony both for and against the petitioner. Any of the parties named in such petition may contest the granting of such petition and may introduce evidence in opposition. If the court is satisfied that all the material allegations in the petition are true and that the ends of justice will be subserved, the court may reinstate the petitioner and enter judgment accordingly.

'No judgment of reinstatement shall be entered by default, but the court in all cases shall hear evidence on such petition before rendering judgment. Either party to such hearing shall have the right of appeal from the judgment as provided in this Article. After final judgment granting reinstatement, the petitioner shall furnish both the Clerk of the Supreme Court and the Secretary of the State Bar a certified copy of such judgment, and shall pay all membership dues for the current fiscal year. His name, as a member of the State Bar, shall be entered then on the rolls of the Clerk of the Supreme Court.'

In view of the nature of this proceeding, we have decided to give due consideration to all of appellant's points and arguments notwithstanding that his amended brief is not in compliance with the provisions of Rule 418, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Walker v. Bedell, 320 S.W.2d 913 (Tex.Civ.App.--Texarkana 1958, n.w.h.); Rule 422, T.R.C.P.

Appellant first complains that his motion for reinstatement should have been heard and determined by the same trial judge who heard the original disbarment proceeding. Section 32 of the State Bar Rules provides that the disbarred member 'may petition the District Court of the county of his residence for reinstatement'; it does not provide that the petition must be filed and heard by the same district judge who rendered the disbarment judgment.

The judgment from which this appeal was taken was signed and entered by the Honorable R. W. Williford as Presiding Judge of the 129th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas. The record is silent as to his appointment and selection and his judicial authority must be presumed on this appeal. See Johnson v. Willacy County Water Control & Imp. Dist., 136 S.W.2d 877 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1940, n.w.h.). Judge Williford properly signed and entered his judgment as Presiding Judge of the 129th Judicial District Court . See also McDonald, Texas Civil Practice, Vol. 1, Sections 1.29 and 1.30, pp. 124--131; Article 199, Section 11, Vernon's Ann.C.S.; Rule 330, T.R.C.P.; Boyles v. Cohen, 230 S.W.2d 604 (Tex.Civ.App.--Galveston 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Mullins v. Mullins, 300 S.W.2d 133 (Tex.Civ.App.--Galveston 1957, no writ hist.) We overrule these points of appellant.

We next consider appellant's contention that he had no notice that his petition would be contested and that the answer to his petition filed on the date of hearing by the State Bar of Texas was not timely filed. The State Bar Rules governing the hearing of a petition for reinstatement after disbarment do not prescribe any time period for filing response to the petition for reinstatement. Section 33 does provide that no judgment of reinstatement shall be entered by default and that the court in all cases shall hear evidence on the petition before rendering judgment. We note that in paragraph III of his petition appellant recites that the State Bar may resist the investigation and consideration of his petition. It appears that appellant reasonably anticipated the State Bar would participate and present evidence at the hearing and its answer constituted a general denial and special exceptions to appellant's petition. Appellant was permitted to amend his petition and we find no reversible error presented under this point.

Appellant next complains that the trial court erred in permitting appellee to introduce in evidence 'fragments of court files' from other proceedings. Over his objection that the entire record in the other proceedings should have been offered, the trial court admitted in evidence the plaintiff's original petition in Cause No. 906,315 styled The State Bar of Texas v. Arthur C. Steere, in the 165th Judicial District Court of Harris County, seeking to enjoin appellant from filing lawsuits and harassing members of the State Bar and the Judiciary; the order granting a temporary injunction in said cause dated May 11, 1972; a motion for contempt asserting that appellant had violated said injunctive order by filing a suit in the nature of a bill of review seeking to set aside the original disbarment suit; an order of commitment finding appellant guilty of contempt of court dated March 26, 1973; an order of the United States District Judge for the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, dated October 26, 1973 in Civil Action No. 75--H--1146, styled Arthur C. Steere v. The State Bar of Texas, and appellant's vituperative motions in response to such order. We find no error of the trial court in admitting these documents in evidence. Appellant was at liberty to offer documentary exhibits consisting of other parts of the record from such proceedings but did not choose to do so. Appellant's contention on this point is overruled.

Appellant next complains that the trial court failed to read and consider the matters stated in his petition for reinstatement and the entire record of the disbarment proceedings. Appellant also complains that the only evidence offered on the hearing was from witnesses who were hostile to his petition for reinstatement. Appellant called four witnesses to testify at the hearing. Two of these witnesses testified in effect that they did not have knowledge pertinent to the inquiry before the court.

One of the remaining witnesses, the Honorable Vincent W. Rehmet, President of the Houston Bar Association and a former prosecutor in appellant's disbarment...