Steers v. City of Brooklyn

• Decision Date: 22 December 1885
• Citation: 101 N.Y. 51,4 N.E. 7
• Parties: STEERS v. CITY OF BROOKLYN.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

101 N.Y. 51

4 N.E. 7

STEERS

v.CITY OF BROOKLYN.¹

Court of Appeals of New York.

Filed December 22, 1885.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE1. WHARF-RIGHTS OF OWNER OF ADJOINING LAND.

Plaintiff, by paper title and certain acts of the legislature, was vested with the fee of land to the center of Java street, and extending to the water-line of the East river, and defendant built a pier at the end of Java street, thus shutting off plaintiff's wharf across one-half of the street. Held, that plaintiff had the right to the wharfage on his half of the street, subject to the easement of the public for travel, and could recover damages for the wrongful building of such pier.

2. WHARF-EVIDENCE-DAMAGES.

That plaintiff was entitled to the wharfage received by defendant, and the latter refusing to state the amount received, plaintiff was entitled to prove what the reasonable wharfage would have been.

3. WHARF-NO DEDUCTIONS FROM WHARFAGE.

That defendant is not entitled to show that plaintiff would not have received as much as plaintiff did, nor the cost of the wrongful structure, nor the expense of collecting such wharfage.

4. WHARE-ACCRETION.

The such pier so wrongfully built was an accretion to the upland, and became the property of plaintiff.

John A. Taylor, for appellant, City of Brooklyn.

James R. Steers, Jr., for respondent, Henry Steers.

EARL, J.

Under his paper title and the acts of the legislature (chapter 302, Laws 1849; chapter 305, Laws 1868; and chapter 518, Laws 1880) there can be no doubt that the plaintiff was vested with the fee of the land to the center of Java street, and extending to the water-line of the East river, and that he had a right to maintain his wharf in front of his land and his one-half of the street, and take and receive wharfage from all persons using the same. His fee in the street, however, was subject to the public easement for travel over the street to the water-line, and is still so subject. When, therefore, the defendant built a pier at the end of Java street, thus shutting off the plaintiff's wharf across one-half of the street from the water, it interfered with his rights, and became liable to him for damages. That structure was a wrongful interference with the plaintiff's franchise secured to him by the acts of the legislature referred to. The plaintiff was therefore entitled to the judgment which was ordered in his favor.

The court below was right in holding that the pier wrongfully built by the defendant across the end of Java street must be treated as an accretion to the upland or mainland, and thus so much of it as was in front of plaintiff's half of Java street, and in front of his wharf, became his, (subject, however, to the public easement for travel upon Java street,) as it was attached to his soil, and was between his land and the water-line. When soil is by natural causes gradually deposited in the water opposite upland, and thus the water-line is carried further out into the ocean or other public water, it becomes attached to the upland, and the title of the upland owner is still extended to the water-line, and the accretion thus becomes his property. Natural justice requires that such accretion should belong to the upland owner, so that he will not be shut off from the water, and thus converted into an inland rather than a littoral owner. The same rule should be applied, for the same reason, where the soil in front of the upland has been wrongfully placed there by human hands. The wrong-doer should gain nothing by his wrong, and justice cannot be done to the upland owner except by awarding to him, as against the wrong-doer, the accretion attached to his soil as an extension thereof. Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb. 102, 125;Langdon v. Mayor, 93 N. Y. 129;Mulvy v. Norton, 3 N. E. Rep. 581, (November 24, 1885,) recently decided in this court; ...