Steffes v. Bruner, No. 8-831/08-0126 (Iowa App. 12/31/2008)

• Decision Date: 31 December 2008
• Docket Number: No. 8-831/08-0126,8-831/08-0126
• Parties: BLANE STEFFES, LEONA FRAZIER, DIANA FISCHER, and LEONA FRAZIER and DIANA FISCHER as Executors of the Estate of Cordellia Steffes, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BARRY T. BRUNER, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals

Page 1

BLANE STEFFES, LEONA FRAZIER, DIANA FISCHER, and LEONA FRAZIER and DIANA FISCHER as Executors of the Estate of Cordellia Steffes, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BARRY T. BRUNER, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 8-831/08-0126

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

Filed December 31, 2008

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Carroll County, Carl D. Baker, Judge.

The plaintiffs appeal from the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiffs' legal malpractice suit. AFFIRMED.

Christopher P. Welsh of Welsh & Welsh, P.C., L.L.O., Omaha, Nebraska, for appellants.

Kevin J. Driscoll and Eric G. Hoch of Finley, Alt, Smith, Scharnberg, Craig, Hilmes & Gaffney, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.

Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Mahan and Miller, JJ.

MAHAN, J.

Blane Steffes, individually, and Leona Frazier and Diana Fischer, individually and as executors of the estate of Cordellia Steffes, (Plaintiffs) appeal from the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Barry Bruner. The Plaintiffs argue the district court erred in finding their legal malpractice claim barred under Iowa Code section 614.1(4) (2005). We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

This case arises from Barry Bruner's representation of Cordellia Steffes and his alleged simultaneous representation of her son, Alden Steffes. The Plaintiffs in this case are Cordellia's three other children. Cordellia was married to Frank Steffes, and Cordellia and Frank were parents to the four children.

In 1972 Frank and Cordellia gave Alden a 184-acre farm. From 1977 to 1982, Frank and Cordellia provided Alden with the money to purchase three farms, consisting of 160, 191, and 115 acres. The understanding was that Alden would hold title to the farms until Frank and Cordellia passed away, at which time he would sell the land and split the proceeds with his siblings. Frank passed away in 1982, and Cordellia inherited two more farms, consisting of the 180-acre "East Place" and the 160-acre "Home Place." Although Bruner did not draft Frank's will, he probated his estate.¹

In 1984 Bruner represented Cordellia in a transfer to Alden of the "Home Place" for one dollar. Between 1984 and 1987 Bruner allegedly represented both Cordellia and Alden in several land transfers from Cordellia to Alden. In 1987 Blane questioned Bruner about the transfers between Cordellia and Alden. Bruner allegedly told Blane that he was looking out for Cordellia's best interests. In 1997 Alden filed for dissolution of his marriage from his wife, Sharon. Blane's attorney, Robert Kohorst, drafted a motion to intervene for Blane due to Blane's concerns that Sharon might receive land in the dissolution that was supposed to be held in trust for Blane and his siblings. The motion was denied.²

In 1997, following Alden and Sharon's dissolution proceedings, Blane spoke with Alden and Alden's attorney for the dissolution, Greg Siemann. Blane claimed Bruner represented both Cordellia and Alden during the land transfers and that Bruner's dual representation created a conflict of interest. In his deposition, Siemann stated he specifically remembered Blane using the term "conflict of interest" because he was surprised Blane used a legal term to describe the situation.

In 1998 Cordellia filed a lawsuit against Alden to get back the property she transferred to him. Robert Kohorst represented Cordellia in that action. Trial was set for December 1999. Alden's attorney became ill and had to withdraw from the case. Trial was reset for October 2000. At trial, Kohorst introduced into evidence Alden's deposition testimony from Alden's dissolution proceedings where he stated that Bruner represented him on the land transfers between himself and Cordellia. Alden failed to appear at the trial, and the court granted a default judgment.³

Cordellia passed away in 2002. Following several unsuccessful lawsuits in an effort to recover the land transferred to Alden, the Plaintiffs, in their individual capacities, filed a legal malpractice action against Bruner in August 2005. The basis for the action was that Bruner simultaneously represented Alden's interest on various transactions and therefore breached his duty to Cordellia with regard to the transfer of certain real property.⁴ Finding Blane had knowledge of the alleged conflict of interest in 1997, the district court determined the Plaintiffs' action was barred by the five-year statute of limitations and granted Bruner's motion for summary judgment.

The Plaintiffs requested that the court reconsider its ruling. The court confirmed its ruling and further found the Plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the claim as individuals. The court's second ruling prompted Leona and Diana,⁵ as executors of Cordellia's estate, to bring a claim on behalf of the estate against Bruner. Determining Cordellia was on inquiry notice of the potential legal malpractice claim against Bruner in 1998 when she filed suit against Alden in an attempt to retrieve land she had transferred to him, the court again found the action barred by the five-year statute of limitations and granted Bruner's motion for summary judgment. The Plaintiffs now appeal.

II. Standard of Review.

We review a district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; Wallace v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Dirs., 754 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Iowa 2008). Summary judgment is available only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Buechel v. Five Star Quality Care, Inc., 745 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Iowa 2008); Rodda v. Vermeer Mfg., 734 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Iowa 2007). An issue of material fact occurs when the dispute involves facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law. Wallace, 754 N.W.2d at 857. Such issue is "genuine" when the evidence allows a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The burden of showing the nonexistence of a material fact is on the moving party, and every legitimate inference that reasonably can be deduced from the evidence should be afforded the nonmoving party. Id.; Rodda, 734 N.W.2d at 483.

III. Issues on Appeal.

A. Imputed Knowledge.

The statute of limitations for legal malpractice actions is five years. See Iowa Code § 614.1(4). The district court found Cordellia's claim accrued and the statute of limitations began to run in September 1998 (when her attorney at that time, Kohorst, filed a lawsuit on behalf of Cordellia in attempt to retrieve land she had transferred to Alden) and determined the Plaintiffs' claim filed in August 2005 was time-barred.⁶ Prior to filing the lawsuit, Kohorst reviewed Alden's deposition testimony from his dissolution proceeding in which Alden stated that Bruner represented him on the land transfers between himself and Cordellia. The court determined Kohorst's knowledge of Alden's statements was imputed to Cordellia. See Robinson v. State, 687 N.W.2d 591, 594 (Iowa 2004) ("Our courts have long recognized the general rule that notice to an attorney in respect to a matter in which he is then acting for a client is notice to the client." (quotations omitted)); In re R.E., 462 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990).

There are four exceptions to the general rule that knowledge of an attorney is chargeable to the client:

(1) the knowledge possessed by the attorney came from a privileged source and is therefore not legally or properly communicable to the client; (2) the attorney had a personal interest that was adverse to the client; (3) the attorney acted fraudulently; or (4) the particular facts of the case allow the general rule to be avoided.

R.E., 462 N.W.2d at 728. The supreme court has noted that the fourth exception is not well-defined or well-based. Moser v. Thorp Sales Corp., 312 N.W.2d 881, 888 (Iowa 1981). The district court did not find any of the exceptions to be present in this case.

The Plaintiffs argue the district court erred in imputing the knowledge of Cordellia's attorney to Cordellia and finding the statute of limitations on her claim began to run in September 1998. They contend there is a genuine issue of material fact as to when Kohorst reviewed the deposition of Alden, and the only definitive evidence that could be imputed to Cordellia is that Kohorst introduced the deposition at the trial on Cordellia's claim in October 2000.⁷ Further, the Plaintiffs allege they did not individually have actual knowledge of Bruner's dual representation until Bruner testified in 2004 in the case brought against Alden's ex-wife, Sharon. The Plaintiffs filed the present claim against Bruner in August 2005. Therefore, the Plaintiffs contend that considering either situation, the present claim was filed within the five-year statute of limitations.

The Plaintiffs further allege the district court misapplied Iowa law in determining Kohorst's knowledge of Bruner's dual representation was imputable to Cordellia. The Plaintiffs argue that under Farnsworth v. Hazelett, 197 Iowa 1367, 199 N.W. 410, 412 (1924), the presumption of imputed knowledge applies only to the case the attorney was retained to litigate and not to everything the attorney may have knowledge of. The Plaintiffs contend (1) the court had no basis for imputing any knowledge of Kohorst regarding Bruner's dual representation of Alden and Cordellia because that knowledge was not relevant to Cordellia's claim against Alden and (2) there is nothing in the evidence to prove Kohorst communicated to Cordellia that he discovered Bruner had been involved in concurrent representation of Alden while he represented her and that she could bring a claim against Bruner for breach of fiduciary duty.

Bruner contends the Plaintiffs' claim against him is barred by the statute of limitations because Cordellia was on inquiry notice of the potential conflict of interest claim in 1998 when her attorney,...