Steffy v. The Town of Monroe City

• Decision Date: 08 November 1893
• Docket Number: 16,846
• Citation: 35 N.E. 121,135 Ind. 466
• Parties: Steffy v. The Town of Monroe City
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

35 N.E. 121

135 Ind. 466

Steffy v. The Town of Monroe City

No. 16,846

Supreme Court of Indiana

November 8, 1893

From the Gibson Circuit Court.

The judgment is reversed.

W. A Cullop, C. B. Kessinger, C. A. Buskirk and J. W. Brady, for appellant.

E. F Ritter and H. L. Ritter, for appellee.

OPINION

Hackney, J.

The appellee sued the appellant, in the Knox Circuit Court, for the recovery of penalties prescribed by its ordinance, for maintaining a saloon for the sale of intoxicating liquors without removing from the doors and windows thereof all screens and other obstructions to the view of the interior of and the business transacted within such saloon. The venue of the cause was changed to the Gibson Circuit Court, where, upon issues formed, a hearing resulted in findings and judgment against the appellant. Upon proper assignments of error, the validity of the ordinance in question is attacked in this court.

The ordinance, one section of which was set forth in the complaint, and the whole, as introduced in evidence, is, in its essential features, the same as that involved in the case of Champer v. City of Greencastle, 138 Ind. 339, except that it contained no preamble declaring an object to aid in the detection and prosecution of crimes, and it contained no provision excepting its application to saloons having the usual and ordinary shutters.

It is earnestly and ably insisted that the ordinance is unreasonable in its interference with, and restrictions upon, the lawful traffic in intoxicating liquors, and that, being unreasonable, it is void. Numerous authorities are cited in support of this insistence, and they would, in many instances, appear to support this view, but we do not adopt them in limits to which their language seems to extend. It is firmly settled that when legislative power has been extended, its exercise necessarily involves the authority to determine whether its results are reasonable or unreasonable, and if the judiciary assumes to pass upon the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the results which flow from the exercise of that power, it departs from its functions as one of the independent coordinate branches of the government. A Coal-Float v. City of Jeffersonville, 112 Ind. 15, 13 N.E. 115; Cleveland, etc., R. W. Co. v. Harrington, 131 Ind. 426, 30 N.E. 37.

It would result in the greatest confusion of decisions to permit, in any case, the introduction of evidence as to the effect of an ordinance upon a business, trade or occupation. The jury would, in one case, hold that under the facts proven, the ordinance was invalid, while, in another case, with more or less evidence of its hurtful consequences, the ordinance would be held valid. Nor would it be more just to permit the reasonableness of an ordinance to be determined by the court, as a question of law, arising upon the face of the ordinance, and from a judicial knowledge of its harmful effects. To do so would be to deny the right of the legislative branch of the government, whether local or general, to judge of the wisdom and prudence of its own enactments, or it would result in the coexistence of power in the legislative and judicial departments to judge of that wisdom and prudence, which would invite endless conflict of decision between the departments.

The exact question here is, as it must be in every case involving the exercise of legislative functions, does the power exist to pass the act or adopt the ordinance?

As we said in Champer v. City of Greencastle, supra, "Municipal corporations have such powers only as are conferred upon them by the act of the Legislature creating them, and such incidental powers as are implied by their creation, and as are essential to the accomplishment of the purposes of their creation, and for their continued existence."

In that case it was held that cities had no power to pass such an ordinance as that now before us, and we must adhere to that ruling. If there is no greater power given by the Legislature to towns than to cities, with respect to the liquor traffic, that case must, in its conclusion, rule the present. Cities have the express power to license and regulate the sale of liquors. R. S. 1881, sections 3106 and 3154.

The language of the grant of power to towns is as follows "To license, regulate, or...