Stegman v. Sturtevant & Haley Beef & Supply Co.

• Decision Date: 05 December 1922
• Citation: 137 N.E. 363,243 Mass. 269
• Parties: STEGMAN v. STURTEVANT & HALEY BEEF & SUPPLY CO., and three other cases.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

243 Mass. 269

137 N.E. 363

STEGMAN

v.STURTEVANT & HALEY BEEF & SUPPLY CO., and three other cases.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Dec. 5, 1922.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Middlesex County; James H. Sisk, Judge.

Four actions for personal injuries and damages to an automobile, by Merritt Stegman against the Sturtevant & Haley Beef & Supply Company, by Merritt Stegman against Robert A. Perkins, by Frank W. Chase against the Sturtevant & Haley Beef & Supply Company, and by Frank W. Chase against Robert A. Perkins. Verdicts for plaintiffs, and defendants bring exceptions. Exceptions in the two actions against Perkins overruled, exceptions in the two actions against the corporation sustained, and judgment entered for such defendant.

The automobile claimed to have caused the damages was owned by the corporation and driven by one of its salesmen, who at the time was on an errand for the defendant Perkins, the president of the corporation. The bill of exceptions states that there was evidence from which the jury could find negligence on the part of the driver and that the two plaintiffs were exercising due care. The jury found for Stegman against each defendant in the sum of $5,350, and for Chase against each defendant in the sum of $230.78. The exceptions of each defendant were to the refusal of requested instructions.

The corporate defendant excepted to the refusal of requests:(1) That on all the evidence plaintiffs were not entitled to recover; (2) that on all the evidence the automobile was not being used on the business of such defendant of the time of the accident; (3) that on all the evidence the automobile was not being used with its permission at the time of the accident; (4) that, if the automobile was being used at the direction and on the business of Perkins, such use was not in the course of the business of the corporation, and the knowledge and permission of Perkins was not the knowledge and permission of the corporation; (5) that the permission of any officer or manager of the corporation to use the automobile for any use other than that of the corporation's business was ultra vires, and not its act; (8) that an officer of the company had no right or authority to create liability on the company through negligence of an employee in the performance of an ultra vires act; (13) that, in order to deplete the assets of a corporation in payment of damages caused by an employee's negligence, it must be shown that the employee had authority to do the act which he was doing when the accident occurred, with the consent and authority given him by the stockholders of the company, where such act was not done in the exercise of his usual duties; (14) that there was no evidence that the employee Dole, was engaged in his usual employment; that liability of a principal did not begin until the agent reported for work, and Perkins, not having reported for work, was not in the company's employ; that there was no evidence that the company furnished an auto for the personal use of an officer through the vote of the stockholders or directors; and that such act must be the act of the stockholders to be effective.

Perkins requested rulings (1-3) that on all the evidence neither plaintiff was entitled to recover against Perkins; (10) that neither plaintiff could recover from Perkins unless there was negligence on the part of Dole, or unless Dole, in driving the automobile, was acting as the agent or servant of Perkins.James A. Pagum, of Boston, for plaintiff Chase.

Ham, Willard & Taylor, Ralph H. Willard and Michael J. Mulkern, all of Boston, for other plaintiffs.

Francis M. Ryder, of Boston, for defendants.

CARROLL, J.

Between 8 and 9 o'clock on the morning of September 30, 1919, in the city of Melrose, an automobile owned by the defendant Sturtevant & Haley Beef & Supply Company (a Massachusetts corporation having a usual place of business in Somerville and in Boston), and operated by one Dole, its traveling salesman, came into collision with an automobile owned and operated by the plaintiff Chase, in whose car the plaintiff Stegman was a passenger. Riding with Dole was a carpenter named Scannell. There was evidence that Dole was negligent and that Stegman and Chase were in the exercise of due care. Dole lived in Melrose, as did also the defendant Perkins, who was the president and general manager of the defendant corporation. Dole was not given any particular route, but ‘was told to get what business he could in any territory; that the chief part of his business however, had been South Boston, Dorchester and Roxbury.’ Scannell had been employed by Perkins to build and place a skylight on the roof of his house in Melrose. On the night before the accident Perkins asked Dole if it would be convenient for him to call for Scannell and bring him to the house with the skylight. Dole promised to do this, and the following morning went to the office of his employer, thence to its garage in Somerville and obtained the motor car, which he drove to Cambridge, where Scannell lived and had his place of business. Not finding Scannell at his shop, Dole drove to his house, and while the two were on their way from Scannell's house in Cambridge to the Perkins house...