Steil v. Ackli

• Decision Date: 31 October 1851
• Parties: JOHN STEIL, v. JOHN ACKLI.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

15 Mo. 289

JOHN STEIL,

v.JOHN ACKLI.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1851.

APPEAL FROM ST. LOUIS CIRCUIT COURT.

This was an action for malicious prosecution, brought in the St. Louis Court of Common Pleas. The petition stated, that the defendant did falsely, maliciously and without probable cause, cause the plaintiff to be indicted; that the plaintiff was indicted, imprisoned, gave bail, was tried and acquitted by the jury, without leaving the box, and asked damages for the injury sustained. The answer denied that the defendant falsely, maliciously and without probable cause, prosecuted the plaintiff, but that he informed against him from good and justifiable motives, and upon probable cause, and which answer was duly sworn to by the defendant. Upon the trial the plaintiff gave no testimony to prove the facts stated in his petition, except to show, by the testimony of a juror, who heard the case, that the plaintiff had been acquitted, and that the rock he was charged with taking was taken by his men through mistake. The defendant in this case was not a witness against the plaintiff. There was no proof of the prosecution at all, except in the pleadings; the court, holding that all the facts stated in the petition were admitted by the answer, and therefore required no proof from the plaintiff. The plaintiff gave testimony to show how the rock was taken. To the decision of the court, as to the effect of the pleadings, the defendant excepted, and moved the court to permit him to amend his answer so as to admit the defense of want of malicious motives, which the court refused and defendant excepted. The defendant also offered to prove by the testimony of two grand jurors the statement made by him before them, which the court refused, and defendant excepted. The defendant also proved how the rock was stolen, and the conduct of Steil in relation to it, as he had received the rock and refused to account for it. The court then gave the following instructions, to the giving of which the defendant excepted: 1. Malice may be inferred from the want of probable cause, taken in connection with the other circumstances in evidence. 2. If the jury find from the evidence, that the defendant did prosecute the plaintiff as alleged, with malice, and without probable cause, they will find for the plaintiff and assess the damages accordingly. 3. If the jury believe from the evidence, that the plaintiff did not steal the rock mentioned, then the mere refusal to pay therefor is not, of itself, any grounds for the criminal prosecution alleged in the petition. But the statement made by the plaintiff to defendant, concerning the rock alleged to have been stolen, the jury will consider, in arriving at the conclusion, whether there were malice or want of probable cause or not. 4. If the jury believe from the evidence, that there was plainly a want of probable cause, they may infer malice, and in arriving at a conclusion in this case, they should take into consideration all the facts and circumstances connected with the prosecution; also the fact of the plaintiff's acquittal. The acquittal of the defendant is like any other fact in evidence, and although standing alone, would not make out the want of probable cause, yet it should be considered by the jury as evidence to be weighed by them in connection with the other testimony. 5. The question for the jury to determine from the evidence is whether the defendant did maliciously and without probable cause, prosecute the plaintiff, as stated in the petition, and the burden of proof is on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove to the satisfaction of the jury, that there was want of probable cause or he cannot recover, and he must also prove malice in the defendant, either express or implied, to be collected from the circumstances, showing plainly the want of probable cause. It is not sufficient that the criminal charge was false, it must be shown that it was so without malice and without probable cause, in order to maintain this action.

All of the averments in the petition, not denied in the answer, are to be taken as admitted, but every averment in the petition which is denied, is not evidence, nor is the denial of the averment in the answer evidence, but all averments when denied and the denials also are to be supported by proofs or disregarded by the jury.

The defendant then asked the following instructions, which the court refused, to the refusal of which the defendant excepted at the time: 1. That neither the plaintiff's petition nor the defendant's answer to the same, are by the jury, to be considered as any evidence, unless sustained by the testimony. 2. That the bare acquittal of the plaintiff in the Criminal Court, is not sufficient evidence of want of probable cause. 3. That it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant was instigated by malice in his prosecution before the Criminal Court. 4. The indictment found by the grand jury is evidence from which the jury may infer that there was probable cause for the indictment.

The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for $500, and the defendent filed his motion and reasons for a new trial, which the court refused, and the defendant excepted, and brings his case to this court by appeal.

______, for Appellants. 1. That the court erred in the constructions placed upon the pleading, in holding that all the facts stated in the petition were admitted. The petition sets out, that the defendant did maliciously prosecute the plaintiff, and beside the facts necessary to constitute a cause of action, sets forth facts merely in aggravation; as for instance, that the plaintiff was imprisoned, &c. The answer denied that the defendant did willfully, maliciously and without probable cause, prosecute the plaintiff. The defendant's counsel supposed that the answers put in answer all the facts of the petition and that the answer was a good general issue....