Stein v. State

• Decision Date: 10 January 1962
• Docket Number: No. 34014,34014
• Citation: 172 Tex.Crim. 248,355 S.W.2d 723
• Parties: Bobby Louis STEIN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 723

355 S.W.2d 723

172 Tex.Crim. 248

Bobby Louis STEIN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 34014.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 10, 1962.

Rehearing Denied March 14, 1962.

Jack W. Knight, Houston, W. E. Martin (on appeal) Houston, for appellant.

Frank Briscoe, Dist. Atty., Samuel H. Robertson, Jr., Jon N. Hughes, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, and Leon B. Douglas, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

DICE, Commissioner.

The offense is murder; the punishment, death.

The State's evidence shows that the deceased operated a liquor store in the City of Houston. On the night of New Year's Eve, December 31, 1960, appellant and a companion, George Sullivan, went to the liquor store shortly before 10 P.M., to purchase some liquor. While they were in the store, a shot was fired and the two ran outside and fled. Appellant was carrying two bottles of whisky. After the shot was fired the deceased staggered from the counter and fell mortally wounded with a gunshot in the neck. The deceased's wife, who was present, upon hearing the shot observed a gun in the appellant's hand and identified appellant the next day at a police lineup as the one who shot her husband. She stated that just before the shot was fired, Sullivan tried to pull her from the doorway where she was standing into the store. Appellant was arrested on the night of the killing, around 1:55 A.M., and on the afternoon of January 2nd, accompanied the officers to his home where they recovered a 38 caliber pistol from a trash can, which appellant admitted was the pistol with which he shot the deceased. Ballistics tests showed that a bullet recovered from the body of the deceased had been fired from the appellant's pistol. Later in the afternoon of January 2nd appellant, after being duly warned, made and signed a written confession to Officer D. M. Fults at 3:20 P.M., in which he stated that on the night in question he went to the deceased's liquor store with George Sullivan to purchase some liquor and that while in the place, he (appellant) shot the deceased. The confession, omitting certain portions, was introduced in evidence, without objection, as State's Exhibit No. 4. The State also introduced in evidence without objection, as State's Exhibit No. 5, a written statement made by George Sullivan in which he recited how he and the appellant went to the liquor store to purchase whisky and while in the store he heard a shot and when he looked up he saw a gun in appellant's hand. On April 21st, appellant, after being duly warned, made and signed another statement in which he admitted shooting the deceased on the night in question, but stated that the reason he and Sullivan went to the store was to rob the place. This later statement was introduced in evidence, over appellant's objection, as State's Exhibit No. 6.

Testifying as a witness in his own behalf, appellant admitted going to the liquor store on the night in question, but denied that he went inside and shot the deceased. Appellant stated in substance that it was Sullivan who entered the store and shot the deceased. He also repudiated his two confessions and testified that the statement in the confessions that he killed the deceased was not true. Appellant swore that the reason he made such statement to the officers was to take the 'rap' because of Sullivan's bad record. He further testified that the reason he signed the statement of April 21st was because a lieutenant at the police station told him if he would sign the statement the court would be more lenient with him and he would not get the chair.

Both Lt. Belcher, the officer to whom the statement was made, and Lt. Clark, who was present at the time it was made, denied making any such statement or promises to appellant.

The court submitted the issue of appellant's guilt to the jury upon a charge on the law of principals; gave application to the provisions of Art. 42, Vernon's Ann.P.C., by instructing the jury that if appellant, while in perpetration of a robbery, through mistake or accident did kill the deceased, he would be guilty of murder with malice and submitted to the jury the question as to the voluntary nature of appellant's written statements introduced in evidence.

We shall discuss the contentions urged by appellant in his brief and in oral argument.

Appellant's first claim of error is that the State tendered to him in the presence of the jury the accessory, George Sullivan, and repeatedly challenged appellant to place Sullivan on the stand as a witness.

The record reflects that appellant first called Sullivan as a witness and the State objected, on the ground that: 'He is under indictment in this case and is not a competent witness.' The objection was sustained. Thereupon, the jury was retired and in their absence appellant offered in evidence a certified copy of an indictment which charged Sullivan as an accessory after the fact to the offense of murder for which appellant was on trial.

Later in the trial, State's counsel announced: 'At this time we will withdraw our objection to Mr. Knight calling George Sullivan to testify,' to which appellant objected on the ground that the State was challenging him to call the witness which he was barred from calling and moved for a mistrial. The court instructed the jury not to consider the remark of State's counsel and denied the motion for mistrial.

Art. 711 C.C.P. and Art. 82 P.C. which provide, in effect, that one charged as an accessory cannot be introduced as a witness in behalf of the defendant charged as a principal, further provide in effect that the principal may claim a severance, and if the accessory be acquitted or the prosecution be...