Steinbruegge v. Prudential Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 30 December 1916
• Docket Number: No. 14526.,14526.
• Citation: 190 S.W. 1018,196 Mo. App. 194
• Parties: STEINBRUEGGE v. PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. OF AMERICA.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

190 S.W. 1018

196 Mo. App. 194

STEINBRUEGGE v. PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. OF AMERICA.

No. 14526.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

December 30, 1916.

On Motion for Rehearing, January 16, 1917.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; James E. Withrow, Judge.

Action by Annie Steinbruegge against the Prudential Insurance Company of America. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

James J. O'Donohoe, of St. Louis, for appellant. Fordyce, Holliday & White, of St. Louis, for respondent.

ALLEN, J.

This is an action upon three "industrial policies" of insurance. The suit was instituted, on September 19, 1911, before a justice of the peace, where plaintiff prevailed. Defendant appealed to the circuit court, and, when the cause came on for trial there, defendant's counsel objected "to the introduction of any evidence under the petition on the ground that it shows on its face that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations." The court sustained this objection. Plaintiff's counsel then sought to make an offer of proof, but the court declined to permit him to do so; and, after a spirited colloquy between the court and plaintiff's counsel, plaintiff took an involuntary nonsuit with leave to move to set the same aside; and, after an unsuccessful motion to set aside the nonsuit, plaintiff duly perfected her appeal to this court.

The petition, or statement of plaintiff's alleged causes of action, is in three counts; each predicated upon one of the three policies sued upon. From the allegations thereof it appears that the three policies were issued by defendant in the city of St. Louis, one on April 8, 1895, another on July 8, 1895, and the third on April 5, 1897, insuring the life of one David Cahill, the brother of plaintiff; and that plaintiff sues upon the policies as being within the "facility of payment" clause contained in each thereof, alleging also that it was agreed by and between her and the defendant and the insured that the insurance would be payable to her. In each count it is averred that David Cahill, the insured, died on or about the 6th day of June, 1899, leaving no wife or child surviving him and no estate on which to administer. In each count it is further averred that, at the time of the death of the insured, he had duly performed all conditions in the policy by him to be performed; that within a few weeks after his death plaintiff notified defendant thereof, but that defendant failed and neglected to furnish blanks on which to make proofs of death until the year 1904; that on or about January 8, 1904, plaintiff duly furnished defendant with proofs of death and surrendered to defendant the policy of insurance sued upon in each count, and the receipt book showing the payment of premiums thereon, upon defendant's promise that each policy would be paid immediately; but that payment was not made, and that the policy and receipt book were not returned until October, 1911. It is further alleged in each count that about the month of June, 1907, and again during the months of July and August, 1907, defendant disclaimed all liability under the policy sued upon, upon the sole ground that the insured was not dead, whereby, it is alleged, defendant waived the delay in filing proofs of death, and likewise waived all limitations as to the time within which suit might be brought on the policy; and that until June, 1907, defendant had led plaintiff to believe that it would pay the policy, and from time to time promised to do so. The prayer of the first count is for judgment for $98, with interest, and for 10 per cent. thereof as damages and an attorney's fee of $25 as for vexatious refusal of defendant to pay the amount of the policy. Such is likewise the prayer of the second count. The prayer of the third count is for $168, with interest, with 10 per cent. thereof as damages, and an attorney's fee of $25 as for vexatious refusal to pay.

Evidently the trial court sustained defendant's objection to the introduction of any evidence upon the theory that plaintiff's petition, or statement, shows upon its face that the demand was barred by the general statute of limitations applicable, and that, if plaintiff was relying upon some exception or exceptions such as would operate to relieve against the bar of the statute, it was plaintiff's duty to plead such exception or exceptions. Plaintiff (appellant here) asserts that her proof, had it been received, would have shown an exception or exceptions such as would have operated to prevent the bar of the statute — for one thing that plaintiff is a married woman, though this was not pleaded. And appellant further contends that the petition or statement does plead facts sufficient, if true, to relieve against the bar of the statute.

It is quite true that the rule now established in this state is that the statute of limitations can be invoked by means of a special demurrer, where the petition, on its face, discloses that the action is barred, and nothing is pleaded as an exception relieving against the bar of the general statute; that, if the cause of action is such that the bar of the general statute may be obviated by some exception thereto, plaintiff must plead the facts bringing the case within such exception. See Burrus v. Cook, 215 Mo. 496, 114 S. W. 1065; Garth v. Motter, 248 Mo. loc. cit. 482, 154 S. W. 733. Whatever uncertainty as to this may have existed by reason of some of the earlier decisions of our Supreme Court is removed by the decision in Burrus v. Cook, supra. But in applying this doctrine the trial court must, we think, have overlooked the fact that the suit was one instituted before a justice of the peace, where the technical rules of pleading do not prevail. Our statute, namely, section 7412, Rev. Stat. 1909, provides that "no formal pleadings upon the part of either plaintiff or defendant shall be required in a justice's court," etc. This statute has time and again been considered and applied by our courts, and it has uniformly been held that technical rules of pleading are wholly inapplicable to a statement of a cause of action before a justice of the peace. See Connelly v. Parrish, 189 Mo. App. 1, 176 S. W. 546; Dalton v. United Rys. Co., 134 Mo. App. 392, 114 S. W. 561. Numerous authorities might be cited in this connection, but to do so would be entirely useless. It has been repeatedly said that a very liberal rule is to be applied when testing the sufficiency of a statement filed before a justice of the peace; and that any statement is sufficient if it serves to reasonably apprise the opposite party of the nature of the claim asserted against him, and is sufficiently specific and definite to bar another action on the same demand. See Connelly v. Parrish, supra, 189 Mo. App. loc. cit. 4, 176 S. W. 546; Dalton v. Railways Co., supra, 134 Mo. App. loc. cit. 395, 114 S. W. 561; Rundelman v. Boiler Works Co., 178 Mo. App. 642, 161 S. W. 609; and authorities...