Steiner v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., B190839 (Cal. App. 7/31/2007)
| Decision Date | 31 July 2007 |
| Docket Number | B190839 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | FRED STEINER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CBS BROADCASTING, INC., Defendant and Respondent. |
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. BC320759. William F. Fahey, Judge. Affirmed.
Freund & Brackey, Thomas A. Brackey II, Craig A. Huber and Derik S. Lemkin for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Irell & Manella, Richard B. Kendall, Philip M. Kelly and Adam A. Hime for Defendant and Respondent.
In this suit for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, plaintiff Fred Steiner (plaintiff) appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of defendant CBS Broadcasting Inc. (defendant). Plaintiff contends defendant owes him royalties for defendant's use of music plaintiff composed for some of defendant's television programs. Specifically, plaintiff claims royalties from defendant's sale of the television programs in home video (DVD and VHS) format.
The trial court determined as a matter of law that plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. It further that determined the terms of the contracts entered into by plaintiff and defendant for plaintiff's composition of music do not support plaintiff's breach of contract claims.
Our examination of the contracts and the record shows that plaintiff is correct when he contends there are issues of fact regarding the statute of limitations. There are also issues of fact regarding whether production of the DVDs and VHS tapes involved motion picture synchronization and the licensing of motion picture synchronization rights. However, those issues are not material issues that need to be resolved by trial because the controlling issue in this case is whether production of DVDs and VHS tapes involves licenses relating to theatrical motion picture synchronization rights. There is a provision in the subject contracts that provides that plaintiff is only entitled to royalty payments based on money received by defendant that is attributable to "licenses relating to theatrical motion picture synchronization rights." Because the production of the home video of the television programs for which plaintiff composed music did not involve theatrical motion picture synchronization, plaintiff is not entitled to royalties from the sale of that home video. Therefore, we will affirm the summary judgment.
Plaintiff's first amended complaint (complaint) makes the following allegations. Plaintiff is a composer of scores for motion pictures and television. Acting as an independent contractor, he entered into contracts with defendant to compose music for various episodes of certain of defendant's television programs, including "Gunsmoke," "Have Gun Will Travel," "Rawhide," "Twilight Zone," and "Perry Mason."2 This contractual relationship between plaintiff and defendant began in the 1950's.3 The parties entered into a contract for each individual episode for which plaintiff composed music.4
Under the contracts, plaintiff was to be paid royalties based on certain of defendant's uses of plaintiff's compositions, including a royalty of fifty per cent of the net proceeds received by defendant from third parties for (1) "licenses for the manufacture of commercial phonograph records" and (2) "licenses of motion picture synchronization rights."5
Plaintiff alleges that in the early 2000's, defendant began exploiting the subject television programs on DVD and other media, but contrary to defendant's duties under the contracts, defendant did not provide plaintiff with accountings and payments related to that exploitation, and although plaintiff demanded the remuneration due him from said exploitation, defendant has not paid it.
This case was filed on August 27, 2004. At a case management conference held in April 2005, the parties agreed to engage in private mediation, however mediation did not produce a settlement and so at the post mediation status conference, a timeline for summary judgment motions was set.
Defendant filed its motion for summary judgment on January 20, 2006. Plaintiff's tardy opposition papers were filed on February 6, 2006. His 28-page opposition points and authorities exceeded a page limit of 20. Plaintiff stated he served an ex parte application for an order allowing him to exceed the page limit but he acknowledged that the ex parte request was not made prior to filing the opposition papers. The court indicated, in its written order on the motion for summary judgment, that it had exercised its discretion and considered all but the last eight pages of plaintiff's opposition papers.6 Defendant's motion was granted and summary judgment was entered on March 8, 2006. Thereafter, plaintiff filed this timely appeal.
We review, on a de novo basis, the order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Price v. Wells Fargo Bank (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 465, 474.) In doing so, we apply the same rules the trial court was required to apply in deciding the motion. When the defendant is the moving party, it has the burden of demonstrating as a matter of law, with respect to each of the plaintiff's causes of action, that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
If a defendant's presentation in its moving papers will support a finding in its favor on one or more elements of the cause of action, or on a defense thereto, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence showing that contrary to the defendant's presentation, a triable issue of material fact actually exists as to those elements or the defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) That is, the plaintiff must present evidence that has the effect of disputing the evidence proffered by the defendant on some material fact. Thus, section 437c, subdivision (c), states that summary judgment is properly granted "if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Because a summary judgment denies the adversary party a trial, it should be granted with caution. (Michael J. v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Adoptions (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 859, 865.) Declarations of the moving party are strictly construed, those of the opposing party are liberally construed, and doubts as to whether a summary judgment should be granted must be resolved in favor of the opposing party.7 The court focuses on issue finding; it does not resolve issues of fact. The court seeks to find contradictions in the evidence, or inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, which raise a triable issue of material fact. (Id. at pp. 865-866.) If, in deciding this appeal, we find there is no issue of material fact, we affirm the summary judgment if it is correct on any legal ground applicable to this case, whether that ground was the legal theory adopted by the trial court or not, and whether it was raised by defendant in the trial court, or first addressed on appeal. (Western Mutual Ins. Co. v. Yamamoto (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1481.) If, on the other hand, we find that one or more triable issues of material fact exist, we must reverse the summary judgment.
Paragraphs 4(a) and 4(b) of the contracts provide that in exchange for payments to plaintiff, defendant would own all right, title and interest in plaintiff's compositions, including copyrights and copyright renewals, and the right to grant licenses concerning the compositions. Defendant would also have the right to communicate the compositions, or any version of the compositions, by any means, "whether now known or hereafter devised."8
Terms in paragraph 4(d) of the contracts address the licensing of defendant's rights in plaintiff's compositions, and payment to plaintiff of royalties received by defendant for such licensing. The contract states: "As additional consideration hereunder, [defendant] agrees to pay [plaintiff] as royalties, [¶] (i) sums equal to fifty (50%) per cent of the net proceeds received by [defendant] from third parties for licenses for the manufacture of commercial phonograph records and/or licenses of motion picture synchronization rights, exclusive of such motion picture synchronization rights as may be necessary to perform the music in connection with television programs produced by or on behalf of [defendant]; . . ." (Italics added.) Regarding the term "net proceeds" in that royalties provision, the contract states: "The term `net proceeds' as used hereinabove, shall mean all monies actually received by [defendant] . . . which are directly attributable to licenses issued authorizing the manufacture of commercial phonograph records and/or licenses relating to theatrical motion picture synchronization rights, after the deduction of all costs, expenses, fees and commissions which are directly attributable to the exploitation of the music by way of commercial phonograph records or by way of motion picture synchronization, . . ." (Italics added.)
Paragraph 4(d) also provides that defendant assumed the responsibility for keeping track of when royalties were due plaintiff and providing plaintiff with a written accounting of them.
When an agreement is in writing, the intent of the parties should be determined from the words alone, if that is possible, and "[t]he whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other." (Civ. Code, §§ 1639, 1641.) Defendant contends the contracts at issue here are unambiguous, and defendant notes that plaintiff twice stated in his discovery...
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