Steinman v. Clinchfield Coal Corp.

• Decision Date: 27 February 1917
• Docket Number: 1465.
• Citation: 240 F. 561
• Parties: STEINMAN v. CLINCHFIELD COAL CORP.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

240 F. 561

STEINMAN v. CLINCHFIELD COAL CORP.

No. 1465.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

February 27, 1917

R. T Irvine, of Big Stone Gap, Va. (Irvine & Stuart, of Big Stone Gap, Va., on the brief), for appellant.

W. H Rouse, of Clintwood, Va., and E. M. Fulton, of Wise, Va (Fulton & Vicars, of Wise, Va., and Morison, Morison &amp Robertson, of Big Stone Gap, Va., on the brief), for appellee.

Before KNAPP and WOODS, Circuit Judges, and DAYTON, District Judge.

WOODS Circuit Judge.

The appellant, A. J. Steinman, claiming under a conveyance dated December 18, 1874, made by Philip Fleming of all the coal, iron ore, and other minerals and fire clay in and under a tract of land containing 1,000 acres, brought an action of ejectment against the Clinchfield Coal Corporation for a tract of 54 acres, which was included in Philip Fleming's conveyance. The Clinchfield Coal Corporation then instituted this suit in equity alleging that John W. Fleming had acquired an equitable title to the land from his father, Philip Fleming, by a parol gift in 1870; and that it had acquired the title of John W. Fleming through successive conveyances. The relief asked in the bill was that Steinman be enjoined from prosecuting his legal action and that he be required to specifically perform the alleged agreement of Philip Fleming with his son, John W. Fleming, to convey the land. The decree of the District Court sustaining a demurrer to the bill was reversed by this court. 217 F. 875, 133 C.C.A. 585. The District Court held upon trial of the cause on the merits that the complainant had substantially proved the allegations of the bill, and granted the relief demanded.

In the effort to reverse the judgment, Steinman relies on these positions: (1) There was only a general understanding between Philip Fleming and his son John W. Fleming, revocable at the will of the father, and not a definite and certain contract that the son should have any land. (2) The contract or agreement, if any, was uncertain and indefinite as to the corners and boundary lines. (3) The acts proved as part performance were not done in pursuance of the agreement or with reference to it, and the possession of the son was not distinct from the father and was not defined by marked boundaries. (4) Even if the possession would have been sufficient between father and son, it was not such as gave a purchaser from the father notice.

The equitable principles applicable to the case, so frequently stated by the Virginia court, were set out in the opinion on the former appeal. They were thus clearly summarized by Judge Keith in McLin v. Richmond, 114 Va. 244, 76 S.E. 301:

''First, that the agreement relied on is certain and definite in its terms; second, that the acts proved in part performance must refer to, result from, or be made in pursuance of the agreement proved; and, third, that the agreement must have been so far executed that a refusal of full execution would operate a fraud upon the party and place him in a situation which does not lie in compensation.' Wright v. Pucket, 22 Grat. (63 Va.) 370; Plunkett v. Bryant, 101 Va. 818, 45 S.E. 742; Reed v. Reed, 108 Va. 790, 62 S.E. 792. ' East v. Atkinson, 117 Va. 490, 85 S.E. 468.

There was no substantial dispute as to the facts. Philip Fleming was the owner of a tract of land conveyed to him by Warders containing 2,008 acres. Before his transactions with his son John W. Fleming, and with Steinman, here involved, he sold 395.15 acres to Collier 141.7 acres to Rose, and 505.1 acres to Phipps. The tract claimed by John W. Fleming as a gift made in 1870, for which a deed was made to him in 1878, contained 161.3 acres. At the date of these transactions, all of the land referred to was wild mountain land, 40 or 50 miles from any railroad, and having little or no market value. The country was sparsely settled. Philip Fleming lived in a one-room cabin with his entire family. There was little communication between him and the outside world. The manners and customs were primitive, business transactions were few and conducted in a very loose and inartificial way. Little attention was paid to exact boundaries because of the small value of the land. The testimony of John W. Fleming concerning the alleged gift from his father was to this effect: When he was nearly 20 years old and about to marry, his father settled him on a tract of land, gave it to him, telling him pretty much how the lines would run. His father told him that he would make the deed as soon as he should get a surveyor and have the land surveyed. He settled on the land, built a small log house, cleared land from time to time, in all about nine or ten acres, and raised crops on it, planted an orchard, and used the land in all respects as his own. His father always spoke of it as his land and made no claim to it himself after the gift. He was urged by his father to have the land surveyed and the deed made so that his father could be relieved of the taxes on it and have them charged to him. Before he took the land, his father indicated the entire tract intended for him and his brother, Preston, and also in a general way the line of division between him and Preston. He was given choice as to the portion he would take. He did not go around the land with his father, but his father mentioned the particular trees he intended to mark the dividing line and indicated the land he was to take in this way:

'Starting from the beech coming around between me and Pres dividing the north mountain between us two it came around to the top of the ridge at the chestnut corner, giving me the heads of the hollows and Pres the bottom.'

The testimony of John leaves no doubt that he and his father understood that the established Rose and Collier lines would be boundaries. His testimony tends to show, also, that they understood that the northern line, which is the line now claimed to be indefinite, would commence at the beech indicated by his father, which was the beginning corner of the Rose tract, and that they understood very nearly, if not accurately, just where it would come out on the ridge. It was understood that it was to go from that point to the Short Branch, which mean that it would go by the shortest distance. The objection to John's testimony was withdrawn; and it was corroborated by other witnesses who made more definite the location of the trees referred to by him and the boundaries intended, by their testimony as to the statements and conduct of Philip Fleming in their presence. To some of them he pointed out the trees intended to mark the boundary; he warned those cutting timber on the remainder of the land not to cross the line indicated by him as the boundary of John's land.

The definiteness or reasonable certainty as to the land intended required to make valid a parol gift is relative. Definiteness and certainty in the description of a city lot may be a matter of feet; of arable and valuable agricultural land it may be a matter of a few acres or rods. In a wild mountain country among a primitive people where the land has a nominal market value, a variation from absolute accuracy of a number of acres or of many rods may be negligible because a matter of indifference to the parties. The definiteness required is that everything of importance to the parties in the effect of the transaction should be expressed in the contract. The location or indication of a line varying from accuracy even by a number of rods ought not to be regarded vital when the parties themselves would have regarded it unimportant. Looked at in this practical way, there is no doubt that a surveyor going on the land could have made a line under the description of the lines and boundaries expressed by Philip Fleming to John W. that would have been unquestioned by either of them and that would have been regarded satisfactory by any party interested at the time. We think a surveyor could have made a practically accurate survey by the assistance of the other witnesses to whom Philip had indicated the location of the lines. The utmost result that lack of exactness in the description of the land would be that all doubts as to the exact location should be solved against John, the donee.

There is no doubt that John had built and established a permanent home entirely distinct from that of his father, had cleared to the recognized line, and was using the land as his own. This was sufficient notice to Steinman, the purchaser from Philip. Chapman v. Chapman, 91 Va. 397, 21 S.E. 813, 50 Am.St.Rep. 846.

To sum the case up, it was clearly proved that the father and son had a definite agreement that the former should make and the latter receive a gift of a particular tract of land; that the location and boundaries were indicated and understood with reasonable certainty to the entire satisfaction of both parties, the general location of one of the lines being indicated by trees named by the father to be fixed with absolute accuracy by a subsequent survey; that the father renounced all claim to possession and control, and the son entered into possession claiming and holding the land as his own in reliance on the gift; that the son established his home by building a dwelling, clearing and cultivating the land, some of the clearing being up to the line alleged by the defendant to be uncertain; that the improvements, while small in actual value, were of substantial and peculiar value to one in his station and with his means; and that it would operate as a fraud upon him for his father or anyone claiming under him to assert his legal title against the gift. The case is thus brought clearly within the principles laid down in the last deliverance of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in East v. Atkinson, supra.

To deny...