Steinmetz v. State, 06-97-00080-CR

• Decision Date: 24 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. 06-97-00080-CR,06-97-00080-CR
• Parties: Bruce Randall STEINMETZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 427

968 S.W.2d 427

Bruce Randall STEINMETZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 06-97-00080-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Texarkana.

Submitted Feb. 12, 1998.

Decided March 24, 1998.

Lance W. Hinson, Mount Pleasant, for appellant.

Richard Townsend, County Atty., Daingerfield, for appellee.

Before CORNELIUS, C.J., and GRANT and ROSS, JJ.

OPINION

CORNELIUS, Chief Justice.

Bruce Randall Steinmetz was convicted of the state jail felony of delivery of marihuana. A jury assessed his punishment at two years' confinement and a fine of $3,000.00.

Steinmetz contends that the trial court erred (1) in denying his application for writ of habeas corpus seeking dismissal of the charge pursuant to Articles 32.01 and 28.061 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and (2) in refusing to quash the indictment because his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.

The offense occurred on September 27, 1995. On January 31, 1996, Steinmetz was arrested and released on bond. He was indicted on June 18, 1996. When he appeared at docket call in September 1996, he requested a court-appointed attorney, but his request was denied. He returned to docket call in November 1996 and again requested the court to appoint him an attorney. The court granted that request on November 5, 1996. In January 1997, Steinmetz appeared at docket call with his attorney and agreed to a continuance. At the February docket call, which set criminal cases for February and March, the State requested that the case be set for trial, and Steinmetz requested another continuance. The trial court set the case for March.

On February 26, 1997, Steinmetz filed his application for writ of habeas corpus seeking dismissal under Articles 32.01 ¹ and 28.061 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE² and his speedy trial motion. The trial court granted the application and issued the writ. On March 7, 1997, the State filed its response to the writ and attached an affidavit alleging good cause for its failure to bring a timely indictment. The court conducted a hearing on March 10, 1997, and after hearing argument as to which court term applied, determined that Steinmetz was timely indicted in the May 1996 term of the 76 th Judicial District Court. The court ruled (1) that Article 32.01 was unconstitutional because it impermissibly infringed on prosecutorial discretion and was vague; (2) that the Article 32.01 claim was moot; and (3) that the State had shown good cause for delay.

The first issue is whether the trial court correctly ruled that Article 32.01 is unconstitutional. We must always construe a statute as constitutional if it is possible to do so. Ex parte Mallares, 953 S.W.2d 759 (Tex.App.--Austin 1997, no pet. h.).

The Court of Appeals for the 14th District in Houston was the first court to address the constitutionality of Article 32.01. Norton v. State, 918 S.W.2d 25, 28-29 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. granted). ³ The court in Norton found that Article 32.01 was constitutional and did not infringe upon prosecutorial discretion so unreasonably as to violate the constitutionally mandated separation of powers. Norton v. State, 918 S.W.2d at 29.

The State relies primarily on Meshell v. State, 739 S.W.2d 246 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), to support its contention that Article 32.01 is unconstitutional. Meshell did not involve Article 32.01, but the court held that the Speedy Trial Act was unconstitutional because it failed to incorporate the factors articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) ⁴ to determine whether an accused was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Meshell v. State, 739 S.W.2d at 257. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the Act went beyond effectuating constitutional protection and became an impermissible infringement on the prosecuting attorney's discretion, thereby violating the separation of powers. Id.; Norton v. State, 918 S.W.2d at 29.

The court in Norton held that, unlike the Speedy Trial Act, Article 32.01 does not unreasonably infringe on the prosecutor's discretion, and that requiring the State to formally charge a defendant within a specified time is far less burdensome than requiring it to be ready for trial within a specified time. Id. Further, the court noted that Article 32.01 includes a good cause exception, which acts as a procedural safeguard by which a prosecutor can present factors that might justify an untimely indictment, including the Barker factors. Norton v. State, 918 S.W.2d at 29. Based on Norton and the other authorities cited, we conclude that Article 32.01 does not unconstitutionally infringe on prosecutorial discretion.

With regard to vagueness, the trial court stated at the pretrial hearing:

This statute in multi-district counties with multi-district courts, particularly in counties where there's common dockets and case transfer by statute without assigning, or operating common dockets, this statute is too vague so that the State or the defendant can read that statute and with reasonably (sic) certainty understand what they have to do and the penalties of failing to so do. Or to read and with reasonable certainty understand the benefits and what has to happen to acquire those benefits.

At the conclusion of that hearing, the court stated:

[F]actually [this case] doesn't fit under the Courts (sic) of Criminal Appeals cases, because it appears that in this case probably the defendant was indicted within the second term of the 76th District Court and that that is the Court that this defendant probably has to look at to apply the statute....

....

... I'm ruling this statute to be unconstitutional for vagueness and for impermissible infringement of prosecutorial discretion. I'm holding that it's moot. I'm holding that good cause has been shown. And I'm holding, to begin with, this case doesn't fit under the Courts of Appeals cases [Norton and Lawson ]....

Indictments must be timely. Because "timely" is subject to different interpretations, the legislature defined its meaning when it enacted Article 32.01. Ex parte Lawson, 966 S.W.2d 532 (Tex.App.--San Antonio Dec.26, 1996, no pet. h.). Article 32.01 states:

When a defendant has been detained in custody or held to bail for his appearance to answer any criminal accusation before the district court, the prosecution, unless otherwise ordered by the court, for good cause shown, supported by affidavit, shall be dismissed and the bail discharged, if indictment or information be not presented against such defendant at the next term of the court which is held after his commitment or admission to bail.

TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32.01 (Vernon 1989) (amended 1997) (emphasis added).

Steinmetz relies on Lawson, where the court stated, "As statutes go this is not overly difficult to understand. The prosecution of the defendant shall be dismissed unless the indictment ... is presented against the defendant at the next term of court." Ex parte Lawson, at 533. This case presents a different situation from that in Lawson. In Lawson, there was only one court in the county. In this case, there are two. The Norton case did involve a county with two district courts, but the court in that case did not discuss the vagueness aspect of Article 32.01 when applied to multi-court districts.

The Norton court determined, inter alia, that only one of two district courts within Brazoria County should be considered when applying Article 32.01. The court concluded that because no formal transfer of the case was made from the 23rd District Court to the 239th District Court, and because all papers relating to the action referenced the 23rd District Court only, the appropriate court's time line from which to determine if an indictment was timely was only the 23rd District Court. Norton v. State, 918 S.W.2d at 27.

Terms of court are defined by statute. Two district courts in Morris County have concurrent jurisdiction, the 76th Judicial District Court and the 276th Judicial District Court. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 24.178, 24.453 (Vernon 1988). The terms of the 76th Judicial District Court begin on the first Mondays in January, May, July, and November and the third Monday in September. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 24.178(e)(2). The terms of the 276th Judicial District Court begin on the first Mondays in February, March, and September. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 24.453(b)(2).

The indictment against Steinmetz states that it was issued by "[t]he Grand Jurors for the County of Morris, State of Texas, duly selected, impaneled, sworn, charged and organized as such at the June, Term, A.D.1996, of the 276th Judicial District Court." There is no June term for either the 76th or the 276 th Court in Morris county. Thus, we must determine, if possible, to which court the indictment was returned.

The issue here is made more difficult by the fact that both the 76th and the 276th District Courts have continuous terms. Because of that fact, grand juries and others may refer to the court's "term" as the month in which the action is actually taken.

Based on the schedule of the 76th and 276th Judicial District Courts' terms, Steinmetz was arrested and released on bond during the January 1996 term of the 76th District Court, which began on the first Monday in January 1996 and ended on the first Monday in May 1996, or the September 1995 term of the 276th District Court, which began on the first Monday in September 1995 and ended on the first Monday in February 1996.

The trial court determined that because the grand jury's minute book expressly stated the indictment was returned at the May term, it was reasonable to find that the minutes corresponded with the court that actually has a May term, namely, the 76th District Court. This is a reasonable conclusion, especially considering that the 276th District Court had an active March term grand jury working, which means that a second impaneled grand...