Steinwinter v. Maxwell
| Decision Date | 20 July 1960 |
| Citation | 6 Cal.Rptr. 496,183 Cal.App.2d 34 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Howard G. STEINWINTER and John W. Bancroft, a co-partnership, Plaintiffs, Cross-Defendants and Appellants, v. Frank O. MAXWELL and Buela T. Maxwell, Defendants, Cross-Complainants and Respondents. Howard G. STEINWINTER and john W. Bancroft, a co-partnership, Plaintiffs, Cross-Defendants and Appellants-Respondents, v. Frank O. MAXWELL and Buela T. Maxwell, Defendants, Cross-Complainants, and Respondents-Appellants. Civ. 6175, 6411. |
Howard s. Dattan, San Diego, for appellants.
Higgs, Fletcher & Mack, and Ferdinand T. Fletcher and Frederick G. Tellam, San Diego, for respondents.
These are two appeals which have been consolidated for hearing in this court. The case arises out of a contract for the construction of a residence. Plaintiffs are the contractors and defendants are the owners. They will be so designated in this opinion.
The contractors, as a co-partnership, entered into a written contract with the owners to construct a residence. The contract provided for normal progress payments during the course of construction with a final payment of $4,700 to be paid upon the filing of a notice of completion. The contractors built the house and upon completion, demanded final payment. The owners complained of certain defects in the construction and refused payment, whereupon the contractors filed and recorded a mechanic's lien and commenced this action to foreclose the lien. The owners answered in the action and subsequently cross-complained for a breach of the contract alleging that the contractors had not done the construction in a good and workmanlike manner in accordance with the plans and specifications. The contractors answered the cross-complaint by a general denial and as an affirmative defense alleged the money due them as final payment under the contract.
The owners then made a motion for summary judgment on the complaint for the reason that the contractors did not have a contractor's license as required by Section 7028 of the Business and Professions Code, and therefore under Section 7031 could not maintain their action. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and entered judgment for the owners as to the complaint. The first of these appeals is from that summary judgment.
Thereafter a trial was had on the issues raised by the cross-complaint and the trial court, being the same judge who had previously ruled on the motion for summary judgment, found that the owners are entitled to recover $2,386.65 from the contractors for defects in the construction. The court also found that the owners are the 'successful party' and, under a provision in the contract, awarded them attorney's fees in the amount of $1,750. The court then concluded that the owners are entitled to recover on the cross-complaint the sum of $4,136.65.
The court then found that there was a balance of $4,751.09 due to the contractors, and ruled that the contractors are entitled to an equitable offset in that amount against the recovery allowed to the owners. The court then ruled that by reason of the fact that the contractors' equitable offset exceeded the amount of the owners' recovery, no monetary judgment could be rendered. The court then gave the owners judgment for their costs.
As to this judgment, both parties have appealed. The contractors appeal from that portion of the judgment which finds the owners to be the 'successful parties' and awards them attorney's fees. The owners appeal from that portion of the judgment which allows the contractors and equitable offset.
We shall first consider the issue raised by the appeal from the summary judgment. The question raised on this appeal is whether or not the contractors are barred from bringing an action to recover the balance due on the contract for the reason that the co-partnership did not have a contractor's license.
It is admitted that the co-partnership did not have a contractor's license at the time of the execution of the contract or at any time during the construction of the residence. (The partnership did subsequently obtain one several months after this suit was filed.) The members of the co-partnership contend, however, that they have substantially complied with the contractor's licensing law and that they were entitled to be heard in the trial court on the issue of whether or not there had been substantial compliance.
The facts pertaining to the license status of the partnership are not in dispute. The members of the partnership are Steinwinter and Bancroft. At all times material to this case Steinwinter personally had a valid contractor's license. In addition, Steinwinter and Bancroft were the sole stockholders and the president and vice-president respectively of a corporation known as Casas de Campo, Inc. At all times material herein this corporation had a valid contractor's license.
The contractors contend that, under the licensing laws, precisely the same qualifications are required of an officer of a corporation applying for a license as would be required of the members of a partnership, and that when the corporation was granted a license the qualifications of Bancroft were as fully determined as they would have been if they had applied for a partnership license. Also the qualifications of Steinwinter had been determined when he was issued his personal license. On this basis they argue that there has been substantial compliance with the statute in that the qualifications of both of the members of the partnership have been considered and passed upon by the Contractor's Licensing Board. They have both been found qualified as officers of a corporation and hence they have satisfied the purpose and the policy of the statute. They further argue that where the purpose behind the law has been substantially satisfied, the law should not bar an otherwise legitimate claim.
In support of their position they rely principally upon Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, Inc., 27 Cal.2d 687, 166 P.2d 265, and Citizens...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Ranchwood Communities Limited Partnership v. Jim Beat Construction Co., s. D022053
...unenforceable due to the absence of a license. (Marshall v. Von Zumwalt (1953) 120 Cal.App.2d 807, 262 P.2d 363; Steinwinter v. Maxwell (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 34, 6 Cal.Rptr. 496; Dahl-Beck Electric Co. v. Rogge (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 893, 80 Cal.Rptr. 440; S & Q Construction Co. v. Palma Cei......
-
Mw Erectors v. Niederhauser Ornamental
...on the strength of the contract." (Id., at p. 282, 49 Cal.Rptr. 676, 411 P.2d 564; see also, e.g., Steinwinter v. Maxwell (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 34, 37-38, 6 Cal.Rptr. 496 [rejecting substantial compliance where contractor whose license lapsed during performance was not licensed at the time ......
-
Mw Erectors v. Niederhauser Ornamental
...on the strength of the contract." (Id., at p. 282, 49 Cal.Rptr. 676, 411 P.2d 564; see also, e.g., Steinwinter v. Maxwell (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 34, 37-38, 6 Cal.Rptr. 496 [rejecting substantial compliance where contractor whose license lapsed during performance was not licensed at the time ......
-
Culbertson v. Cizek
...363; S & Q Const. Co. v. Palma Ceia Development Organization (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 364, 367, 3 Cal.Rptr. 690; Steinwinter v. Maxwell (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 34, 38, 6 Cal.Rptr. 496.) The philosophy of these cases permits the unlicensed contractor to assert his counter-demands defensively as i......