Steldl v. McClymonds

• Decision Date: 10 July 1903
• Docket Number: 13,487 - (149)
• Citation: 95 N.W. 906,90 Minn. 205
• Parties: F. J. STELDL v. LOUIS K. McCLYMONDS
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

95 N.W. 906

90 Minn. 205

F. J. STELDL v. LOUIS K. McCLYMONDS

Nos. 13,487 - (149)

Supreme Court of Minnesota

July 10, 1903

Appeals by plaintiff from an order of the district court for Traverse county, Flaherty, J., granting a motion for judgment in favor of defendant notwithstanding the verdict for $385.70, and from a judgment entered pursuant to the order. Reversed, and remanded.

SYLLABUS

Real Estate Broker.

In an action by a party rendering services in securing a purchaser for a farm, held, that the evidence reasonably tended to show that plaintiff was justified by letters received from the owner in adopting and acting upon the inference that he had authority to negotiate for the sale of the property; also that his efforts were the procuring cause of its transfer, for which he was entitled to receive compensation.

Charles E. Houston, for appellant.

F. W. Murphy and W. H. Townsend, for respondent.

OPINION

LOVELY, J.

This is an action to recover for services in securing a purchaser for defendant's farm in Traverse county. It was tried to the court and a jury. Plaintiff had a verdict. The court ordered judgment for defendant notwithstanding the verdict, which was entered. Plaintiff appeals from the order; also from the judgment.

It is suggested in respondent's brief that the order for judgment is not appealable. While it is not material on this review to consider this question, since the whole record comes here upon the appeal from the judgment, it may be said in passing that we have in a recent case seriously considered the somewhat doubtful question of procedure thus discussed by respondent, and have adopted the conclusion that an order upon the blended motion provided for in Laws 1895, p. 729 (c. 320) is subject to review on appeal directly therefrom. Peterson v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co. supra, page 52.

The complaint, in brief, alleges that plaintiff rendered services for defendant at his request in the sale of the latter's farm of twenty-two hundred forty acres with the improvements, stock, and machinery thereon; that the services were of the reasonable value of $1,000, which defendant agreed to pay. The answer is a general denial.

Plaintiff was the senior member of the firm of Steidl & Rustad, of Wheaton, agents for the sale of real estate; and, while the services in this case were to some extent by the firm, upon the issues and evidence before us plaintiff's claim has been treated as his individual right, and must be so considered here. Numerous letters passed between the defendant and the firm when the sale of the farm was completed through the direct efforts of defendant's manager (Sylvester Johnson) having charge of the property. A contract for its sale for $53,000 was executed between the owner and one Charles Cater on February 28, 1902. The evidence, however, would justify the conclusion that the real purchaser was one Henry Wagner, who received the benefit of the contract between Cater and defendant, taking a deed to himself of the land dated March 4, 1902, but really executed and delivered in April following. We have no doubt that the evidence also authorizes the view that Johnson acted as agent for defendant in concluding this sale, and knew that Cater's intervention in the negotiations was for the benefit of Wagner.

It is claimed for plaintiff that, after writing defendant requesting the privilege of having the farm listed with his firm, the effect of subsequent letters in reply justified the belief that he was employed to secure a purchaser, in consequence of which he rendered valuable assistance in bringing about the sale, the benefits of which were accepted by defendant. The cause was submitted to the jury upon this theory, and the verdict must have been reached upon that view.

The learned trial court, in ordering judgment against the verdict after a careful examination of the correspondence between the parties, adopted the conclusion that while, to some extent plaintiff was encouraged to forward offers to defendant, he was not actually engaged by the latter for that purpose, and, if this is the necessary and conclusive result of the evidence, the order and judgment should be sustained; but, if it appears that plaintiff was encouraged by defendant to aid in the sale, and led by him to believe that he would receive compensation for his services, the...