Stemper v. Higgins

• Decision Date: 14 February 1888
• Citation: 37 N.W. 95,38 Minn. 222
• Parties: STEMPER v HIGGINS.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

38 Minn. 222

37 N.W. 95

STEMPERvHIGGINS.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

February 14, 1888.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Villages, under the general village law of 1885, (chapter 145,) do not constitute election districts for state and county elections, separate from the township in which they are situated.

A general state election for such a village was held in the village, and separate from that held in the township. The village officers acted as officers of the election. No other irregularity and no fraud being suggested, and there being no reason to doubt the good faith of the electors and officers, nor to suppose that the irregularity had affected the result or cast any uncertainty upon it, the vote of the village should not be disregarded.

The return of the judges of election is not conclusive in an election contest, and, the ballots not having been so kept that they might not have been changed, the parol evidence of the judges of election as to the result of the ballot as counted and declared at the polls is admissible.

Appeal from district court, Watanwan county; SEVERANCE, Judge.

Proceedings to determine right to office. A certificate of election to the office of sheriff of Watanwan county was delivered to H. H. Higgins. Thereupon J. C. Stemper, a candidate for the same office, contested the election, and judgment was entered in his favor. Higgins appeals.

Freeman & Pfau, J. J. Thornton, D. Buck, and Collester & Foster, for respondent.

Daniel Rohrer and J. W. Seager, for appellant.

DICKINSON, J.

This is a proceeding to determine, as between these contestants, the right to the office of sheriff of Watanwan county. The returns of the election in 1886, made to the county auditor, and as canvassed by the county canvassing board, showed that this appellant, Higgins, had received 467 votes for that office; this respondent, Stemper, 452 votes; and one Hudson, 190 votes. Higgins was accordingly declared to have been elected, and the proper certificate of election was delivered to him. Stemper contested the election, and upon the trial of the contest in the district court it was found that the contestant, Stemper, had received the highest number of legal votes, and judgment was entered in his favor.

In the village of Madelia the election was conducted as though that village constituted an election district separate from the township of Madelia, where also a separate election for the township was held. The appellant claims that the vote of the village should not have been considered, because it was not a separate election district. This village was originally incorporated by a special act of the legislature, (chapter 3, Sp. Laws 1873,) and in 1884 it formally reincorporated under chapter 73 of the General Laws of 1883. It therefore came within the operation of chapter 145 of the General Laws 1885, so that the latter act is to be referred to as the law governing the village at the time of this election. State v. Cornwall, 28 N. W. Rep. 144;State v. Spaude, 34 N. W. Rep. 164. In the case last cited it was considered that a village governed by the general law of 1885 did not constitute an election district separate from the township. This being a question of public interest, concerning which our statutes are not as plain as would have been desirable, we have re-examined it at this time. We are still of the opinion that our former decision was right. The subject is one of statutory regulation, and we have to consider the state of the law at the time of the election, in 1886. By the general statutes relating to elections it had been enacted that “every organized township, and every ward of an incorporated city, is an election district,” (section 2, c. 1, Gen. St. 1878;) and provision was made as to the mode of holding the general elections for state and county purposes. This specific provision as to incorporated cities, no other municipalities being mentioned, leaves no doubt, even if otherwise there could have been any, that the mere existence of a village corporation within the township was not to affect the general operation of this law. This general election law must be deemed applicable to villages, unless in some way villages have been excepted from its operation. A general village law, adopted in 1875, (chapter 139,) as amended in 1878, (c. 35,) had declared that villages organized under that law should constitute one election district only for the election of village officers. In 1883 (chapter 49) this had been so amended as to make such villages “one election district,” without qualification. But the general village law of 1885 (chapter 145) had superseded the prior law. (State v. Spaude, supra.) In this act no explicit provision was made upon this subject, and the above declaration in the former law was not saved from the general repealing effect of the later statute. Ellis v. Paige, 1 Pick. 43, 45. Thus the general election law was applicable unless the village law of 1885 controlled the subject.

The mere creation of village organizations within townships, for the purposes of local government, could not be deemed to have abrogated, as to such municipalities, the statute regulating elections for other than local purposes. Nor would the fact that very extensive and complete powers as to local affairs had been conferred, justify the conclusion that it was intended that such villages should constitute separate election districts for the purpose of elections pertaining only to the affairs of the county and of the state. The same or like reasons, which may have induced the legislature to confer very large powers upon villages, even to the exclusion of any participation therein by the citizens of the remainder of the townships, might also be proper considerations influencing the legislature in its determination as to the expediency of making villages separate election districts for all purposes; but we cannot infer from such premises that the general election law had been so modified. Whether or not another method has been substituted for the established election law must depend upon the expressed will of the legislature, and not upon the fact that it ought or ought not to be so.

Section 16 of the law of 1885 provides for the holding of the annual election in March for the election of officers, designates who shall be judges of election, and the manner in which the election shall be conducted. Section 17 authorizes the calling of special elections, and makes the law relating to town meetings (which are held at the same time) to apply, so far as applicable, to “all village elections,” except as otherwise provided. These provisions were framed with obvious regard to elections pertaining to local affairs, and it is impossible to construe them as expressing an intention on the part of the legislature that the general state elections occurring in November, and which have no direct connection with the village or township administration, shall be conducted in the same manner and independent of the township organization. We look in vain through this law for any provision which can justify such a conclusion. We therefore consider that the general law relating to state and county elections must be held to govern. See Green v. Dietrich, 114 Ill. 628, 633, 3 N. E. Rep. 800; Wade v. City of Richmond, 18 Grat. 583;State v. Ward, 17 Ohio St. 543.

It is contended that chapter 172 of the laws of 1885 authorized the corporate authorities to make the village a separate election district, and that it is to be presumed, in the absence of proof, that this was done. This law requires the corporate...