Stengel v. Town of Woodstock Zoning Bd. of Appeals

• Decision Date: 22 November 1989
• Citation: 155 A.D.2d 854,547 N.Y.S.2d 961
• Parties: In the Matter of Gregory T. STENGEL, Appellant, v. TOWN OF WOODSTOCK ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 961

547 N.Y.S.2d 961

155 A.D.2d 854

In the Matter of Gregory T. STENGEL, Appellant, v. TOWN OF WOODSTOCK ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

Nov. 22, 1989.

Franklyn J. Engel, Woodstock, for appellant.

Wilkie & Graff (Mark Grunblatt, of counsel), Kingston, for respondent.

Before MAHONEY, P.J. and WEISS, MIKOLL, YESAWICH and LEVINE, JJ.

MIKOLL, Justice.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Bradley, J.), entered July 20, 1988 in Ulster County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of respondent denying petitioner's request for an area variance.

In April 1986, petitioner acquired a complex known as the White Birch Motel (hereinafter complex) for $250,000. The complex consisted of 4.632 acres of land, a 15-unit motel building, a workshop and laundry room in a separate building, a swimming pool and pool house, a tennis court and a 48-car parking lot. The complex was located in the Town of Woodstock, Ulster County, and the acreage also included a 26-foot by 40-foot recreation lodge.

The complex is located in a residential district with an authorized density of one family per two acres. The motel building was built in 1967 pursuant to a special use permit authorizing the construction of an 18-unit motel. The code enforcement officer for Woodstock inspected the premises in June 1986 and found several violations. Thereafter, petitioner applied to respondent for and was unanimously granted a variance authorizing use of the 15-unit motel building as a multiple dwelling. In November 1987, petitioner again applied to respondent for an area variance, this time to convert the recreational lodge into a residential apartment. In support of this application petitioner informed respondent that (1) his insurance company advised him that the lodge could not be used by tenants for recreational purposes without full-time supervision which he found would be cost prohibitive, (2) no new construction would be required, (3) no new or increased parking area would be required, (4) a new septic system would be installed, and (5) without the proposed change his operating expenses exceeded income from the property. On February 11, 1988, after a public hearing, respondent, by a vote of 4 to 1, denied the variance. Members of respondent voiced doubts concerning both the figures submitted by petitioner and the claimed necessity for the conversion of the lodge. Petitioner then commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to annul the determination. Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the merits and this appeal ensued.

Supreme Court's decision should be affirmed. Petitioner failed to show that denial of the variance was illegal, arbitrary or an abuse of discretion. We reject petitioner's contention that Supreme Court incorrectly applied the standard of proof of practical difficulties rather than that of significant economic injury. We also reject his claim that respondent's denial was in error based on his contention that he met the latter test of significant economic injury.

A zoning board determination must be sustained if it has a rational basis and is supported by substantial evidence (see, Matter of Fuhst v. Foley, 45 N.Y.2d 441, 444, 410 N.Y.S.2d 56, 382 N.E.2d 756; Matter of Cowan v. Kern, 41 N.Y.2d 591, 599, 394 N.Y.S.2d 579, 363 N.E.2d 305). The application for the grant of an area variance must demonstrate that "strict compliance with the zoning ordinance will result in practical difficulties" (Conley v. Town of Brookhaven Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 40 N.Y.2d 309, 314, 386 N.Y.S.2d 681, 353 N.E.2d 594). Additionally, an applicant must demonstrate that he cannot use the property without coming into conflict with the zoning ordinance (Matter of Fuhst v. Foley, supra ). Factors to be considered when determining an application for an area variance are (1) how substantial is the variance in relation to the requirement, (2) whether a substantial change will be produced in the character of the neighborhood, (3) whether the difficulty can be obviated by some method feasible for the applicant to pursue other than a variance, and (4) whether, in view of the manner in which the problem arose, the interest of justice will be served by allowing the variance (see, Matter of Friendly Ice Cream Corp. v. Barrett, 106 A.D.2d 748, 749, 483 N.Y.S.2d 782). Consideration also must be given as to whether strict application of the...