Stephens v. Am. Airlines, Inc.
| Decision Date | 31 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21 CV 6934 |
| Citation | 596 F.Supp.3d 1059 |
| Parties | Clarence J. STEPHENS et al., Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
1st Ilia Usharovich, Ilia Usharovich, Attorney at Law, Wheeling, IL, for Plaintiffs.
Charles Joseph Mahoney, Pro Hac Vice, Mark W. Robertson, Pro Hac Vice, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, New York, NY, LaVanga Vusitha Wijekoon, Paul Ehrich Bateman, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Chicago, IL, for Defendant.
Manish S. Shah, United States District Judge Defendant's motion to dismiss, [8], is granted. Plaintiffs’ motion to remand, [13], is denied. This is a minor dispute arising under the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, one that the court lacks authority to decide. The case is referred to an adjustment board under the Railway Labor Act. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 151a, 184. Enter judgment and terminate civil case.
Defendant American Airlines required that its employees receive a COVID-19 vaccine. Plaintiffs—four passenger service employees at the airline—allege that American's vaccination
and testing policies breached their employment agreement. American removed the case to this court, and now moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). Plaintiffs move to remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
Under Rule 12(b)(1), a court must dismiss a claim over which it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A defendant makes a facial attack on subject-matter jurisdiction when it asserts that the plaintiffs’ allegations, taken as true, don't support an inference that subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Bazile v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc. , 983 F.3d 274, 279 (7th Cir. 2020). When plaintiffs file a case in state court that could have been filed originally in federal court, a defendant can remove that case to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The party invoking federal jurisdiction must prove that all elements of jurisdiction existed at the time of removal. Collier v. SP Plus Corp. , 889 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ). And when federal law completely occupies a field, any claim within that scope rests on federal law and can be removed to federal court under the federal-question jurisdiction. Miller v. Southwest Airlines Co. , 926 F.3d 898, 904–05 (7th Cir. 2019).
American contracted with plaintiffs—represented by a union, the CWA/IBT Association—for plaintiffs’ work as passenger service employees. [1-1] at 14 ¶¶ 7–8; id. at 22.1 Under the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, American could require a service employee to submit to company-paid medical examinations if the airline decided that the employee's conditions impaired their ability to work or posed a safety hazard. Id. at 14 ¶ 11; id. at 84. American, the union, and the employees also agreed to "promote safe and sanitary conditions in all facilities." Id. at 14 ¶ 10; id. at 263. American retained "sole jurisdiction" over "the management and operation of its business, the direction of its working force, the right to establish rules and regulations, to maintain efficiency in its place of employment, and the right ... to hire, promote, demote, select for training, discipline and discharge employees for just cause." Id. at 14 ¶ 9; id. at 24. The contract included a grievance procedure. See id. at 16 ¶¶ 19–20; id. at 242–247.
The airline instituted a COVID-19 vaccine mandate for its employees. [1-1] at 15 ¶ 12. If an employee failed to prove that they were vaccinated, they faced consequences including termination. Id. at 15 ¶ 15. American didn't require employees to be tested for COVID-19, and didn't offer testing as an alternative to vaccination
. Id. at 15 ¶¶ 13–14. Plaintiffs allege that the airline's policies did not promote safe and sanitary conditions in all facilities because the absence of testing could lead to break-through infections and because the vaccine caused side effects. Id. at 15 ¶¶ 16–17. The vaccine mandate required employees to submit to unpaid medical examinations. Id. at 15–16 ¶ 18. There's also an allegation that the contract's grievance procedure was futile because it wouldn't address the serious safety risks associated with American's policies in a timely fashion. Id. at 16 ¶¶ 19–20.
Plaintiffs filed suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. [1-1] at 13. American removed the case to federal court based on jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)2 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, alleging that plaintiffs’ contract claims were completely preempted by the Railway Labor Act. [1] ¶¶ 4–27; see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
The RLA governs collective bargaining agreements in the airline industry. See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris , 512 U.S. 246, 248, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994) (citing 45 U.S.C. §§ 181 – 188 ); Tice v. American Airlines, Inc. , 288 F.3d 313, 314 (7th Cir. 2002). The Act was intended to "substitute bargaining, mediation, and arbitration for strikes," and includes a "strong preference for arbitration, as opposed to judicial resolution of disputes." Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen (Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, Cent. Region), et al. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. , 879 F.3d 754, 755 (7th Cir. 2017) ; see 45 U.S.C. §§ 153, 157.
Whether plaintiffs’ claims belong in any court depends on if their resolution requires interpreting the collective bargaining agreement. See Miller , 926 F.3d at 903–04 ; Hughes v. United Air Lines, Inc. , 634 F.3d 391 (7th Cir. 2011). If a claim centers on a subject "independent of collective bargaining," rests entirely on state law, and concerns different treatment of different workers, litigation can proceed. See Miller , 926 F.3d at 904 ; Hughes , 634 F.3d at 392–95 ; Hawaiian Airlines , 512 U.S. at 260–63, 114 S.Ct. 2239. But when a dispute "necessarily entails the interpretation or administration of a collective bargaining agreement, there's no room for individual employees to sue under state law" because the RLA preempts any attempt to overrule a union's choices on behalf of its workers. Miller , 926 F.3d at 904 ; see Hughes , 634 F.3d at 395.
Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims depend entirely on the collective bargaining agreement. See [1-1] at 14–16 ¶¶ 7–20. To determine whether American's COVID policies breached the agreement, an adjudicator will be required to interpret the management-rights clause and articles addressing medical examinations and safety and health. Id. at 24, 84, 263. The contract governs the rules and working conditions of plaintiffs’ employment, and the contract claims depend on interpretation of and reference to those terms. See id. at 14–16 ¶¶ 7–21. Because plaintiffs can't pursue their contract claims without an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, their claims are preempted by the RLA and must be submitted to the arbitral framework established under that law. See Hawaiian Airlines , 512 U.S. at 253, 114 S.Ct. 2239 (citation omitted) (minor disputes subject to arbitration under the RLA "are those that involve duties and rights created or defined by the [collective bargaining agreement]"); Miller , 926 F.3d at 904 ; Hughes , 634 F.3d at 395.
Plaintiffs claim that it was futile to follow the grievance procedures in the collective bargaining agreement because those procedures were slow and the consequences of American's COVID policies were potentially deadly. See [1-1] at 16 ¶¶ 19–20. But speculation that a grievance procedure would be futile doesn't excuse a failure to exhaust those procedures. See Douglas v. American Info. Technologies Corp. , 877 F.2d 565, 573–74 (7th Cir. 1989) ; Perry v. Midstates Indep. Union and Krooswyk Trucking and Excavating , 20 Fed.App'x 527, 531 (7th Cir. 2001). In order to show futility, plaintiffs needed to allege that they had "been unable to obtain relief" through those procedures. Mechmet v. Four Seasons Hotels, Ltd. , 825 F.2d 1173, 1178 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Vaca v. Sipes , 386 U.S. 171, 183–86, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967) ). Plaintiffs don't allege that they tried to solve their dispute before filing this lawsuit, and haven't shown that the agreement's grievance procedures were futile.
Plaintiffs argue that American should be estopped from challenging the court's jurisdiction because American invoked subject-matter jurisdiction when removing the case. [12-1] at 1–2; see Spaine v. Cmty. Contacts, Inc. , 756 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing New Hampshire v. Maine , 532 U.S. 742, 749, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001) ) ("The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents litigants from manipulating the judicial system by prevailing in different cases or phases of a case by adopting inconsistent positions."). But federal courts have an "independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction," Bazile v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc. , 983 F.3d 274, 281 (7th Cir. 2020), which means that an estoppel argument doesn't apply.
To remove this case, American needed to show that plaintiffs could have originally filed suit in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The airline did that by alleging both diversity and federal-question jurisdiction. See [1] ¶¶ 4–27. American was entitled to remove the case on the basis of federal-question jurisdiction because the RLA did, in fact, completely preempt plaintiffs’ claims. See Miller , 926 F.3d at 904 (); Hughes , 634 F.3d at 393 (citing Franchise Tax Board v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust , 463 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983) ) (a claim that is completely preempted "itself arises under federal law").3 With the case properly removed, this court could decide whether the RLA's arbitration procedures applied. See Miller , 926 F.3d at 903–05 ; Seaway Bank & Tr. Co. v. J&A Series I, LLC , 962 F.3d...
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