Stephens v. Bowles

Decision Date25 November 1918
Citation206 S.W. 589,202 Mo.App. 599
PartiesJOHN M. STEPHENS, Respondent, v. A. P. BOWLES, IDA BOWLES, J. H. ODGEN and E. L. VERNON, Appellants
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Appeal from Dent County Circuit Court.--Hon. L. B. Woodside, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Judgment affirmed.

J. J. & C. C. Cope and G. C. Dalton for appellants.

BRADLEY J. Sturgis, P. J., and Farrington, J., concur.

OPINION

BRADLEY, J.

Plaintiff brought suit on a promissory note, and upon trial before the court without the intervention of a jury, recovered, and defendant, Vernon, appealed. The note is in the usual form payable to the order of plaintiff, and signed by all the defendants, except Vernon, on the face thereof where makers usually sign. Vernon signed on the back of the note, and wrote the words "as surety" after his name. No notice of presentment and non-payment was given defendant, Vernon, and for failure to treat him as an indorser, he seeks to escape liability.

Defendant, Vernon, asked a declaration of law defining his status as an indorser, and providing that in the absence of the usual notice to an indorser, the finding should be for him. The declaration was refused, and exception saved. Under the law as it was in this State prior to the enactment of the Negotiable Instrument Law one who, not otherwise a party, signed his name on the back of a note was prima facie a maker. [First National Bank v. Payne, 111 Mo. 291, 20 S.W. 41.] But this rule was abrogated by the adoption of the Negotiable Instrument Law in 1905 ( Walker v. Dunham et al., 135 Mo.App. 396, 115 S.W. 1086; Phenix National Bank v. Sarah A. Hanlon, 183 Mo.App. 243, 166 S.W. 830; Wurlitzer Company v. Tekla Rossmann, 196 Mo.App. 78, 190 S.W. 636; Bank v. Trust Company, 187 Mo. 494, 86 S.W. 109.] In the Dunham case, supra, the defendants resisting payment had signed their names on the back of the note without any designation of their status or relation to the instrument, and it was there held that they were endorsers, and, no notice being given, were not liable.

Section 10033, Revised Statutes 1909, provides that "A person placing his signature upon an instrument otherwise than as maker, drawer or acceptor is deemed to be an indorser, unless he clearly indicates by appropriate words his intention to be bound in some other capacity." Defendant, Vernon, placed his name on the back of the note, and had he left off the "as surety" there could not have arisen an argument as to his relation to the instrument. Judge REYNOLDS of the St. Louis Court of Appeals in Walker v. Dunham et al., supra, quoting from Crawford's Annotated Negotiable Instrument Law (3 Ed.), says that when a plain man puts his name on the back of a negotiable instrument he ordinarily understands that he is becoming liable as an indorser; and if he puts it there before the instrument is delivered he usually does so for the purpose of giving the maker or drawer credit with the payee or other person to whom the instrument is negotiated. The words surety has a specific meaning as distinguished from indorser; and in disposing of this cause we must consider that appellant is a surety because he chose his own status, and gave written expression thereto. We cannot say that defendant is an indorser within the meaning of section 10033, supra, because he clearly indicated by appropriate words his intention to be bound otherwise. Appellant cites no case in our own State, and we find none supporting his contention that he became an indorser and entitled to notice. In 4 Words and Phrases (2 Series), 803, quoting from Rouse v. Wooten, 140 N.C. 557, 53 S.E. 430, Am. St. R. 875, 6 Ann. Cases 280, decided with the Negotiable Instrument Law in view, a surety on a promissory note is defined as follows: "A surety is an original maker, and becomes primarily and absolutely liable, as much so as the principal, to any party lawfully holding the paper."

It is held in Ballard v. Burton, 64 Vt. 387, 24 A. 769, 16 L. R. A. 664, that a surety on a note is an original maker and is primarily...

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