Stephens v. City of Vista, No. 91-56297
| Decision Date | 04 August 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-56297 |
| Citation | 994 F.2d 650 |
| Parties | L.J. STEPHENS; G. Maxine Stephens, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF VISTA; Orbee Mihalek; Gloria E. McClellan; Robert C. K. Foo, et al., Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
John Morris, Jeffrey R. Davis, Higgs, Fletcher & Mack, San Diego, CA, for defendants-appellants.
Michael S. Gatzke, Martha L. Archibald, Gatzke, Mispagel & Dillon, Carlsbad, CA, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.
Before: WALLACE, Chief Judge, SNEED and HALL, Circuit Judges.
The City of Vista, California timely appeals the judgment of the district court in favor of L.J. Stephens and G. Maxine Stephens (the Stephenses) on their claim for breach of settlement agreement. The settlement agreement at issue was the result of the Stephenses' action against the City for inverse condemnation and for deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We affirm.
The Stephenses purchased the property which is the subject of this litigation in 1973 for the purpose of developing an apartment complex of approximately 140 to 150 units. In 1976, the owner of an adjoining parcel submitted plans to the City which included a proposed lowering of "Street A" which had been contemplated as the primary access to the Stephenses' property. The City approved the lowering of Street A which made it difficult to service the Stephenses' property because of the extreme differences in elevation between the street and the property.
As a result, the Stephenses filed an action against the City in state court for inverse condemnation. While the state court action was pending, the City rezoned the Stephenses' property which reduced the permissible density from approximately 145 to 150 units to 50 units.
In 1981, the Stephenses filed an action against the City and certain city officials in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California for violations of their civil and constitutional rights and for inverse condemnation based on the lowering of Street A and the down-zoning of their property.
In May 1983, the City moved for judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative for summary judgment, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy and that the Stephenses failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Alternatively, the City maintained that the court should abstain from adjudicating the matter pending resolution of the Stephenses' state court action.
The court denied the City's motion, and thereafter, the City entered into settlement negotiations with the Stephenses. The parties discussed the permissible development density for the property and certain design problems, and the Stephenses' support of the City's formation of the "Escondido Avenue Assessment District" (EAAD). 1 The Stephenses maintain they initially wanted the City to agree to zoning which would allow for the construction of 210 units but later settled for 140 units.
The Stephenses and the City reached a settlement. The settlement agreement called for the Stephenses to dismiss all their pending litigation against the City and city officials and to support the formation of the EAAD. Regarding the City's performance, the agreement provided:
3.1 The City shall approve a rezoning of Parcel A [the Stephenses' property] to a use not less than zone R-M-30(Q), permitting development at the ratio of one unit per 3000 square feet of land area. This will permit a maximum total development on Parcel A of 140 dwelling units.
. . . . .
3.6 The City shall approve a specific plan for the development of Parcel A ("the specific plan") which shall create and constitute a binding and continuing obligation of the City with respect to the development of parcel A, and which shall include the following provisions:
3.6.1 The specific plan shall permit a land use equivalent to a zoning of R-M-30(Q), permitting construction of a maximum 140 residential units on Parcel A The City Council reviewed and approved the settlement agreement, and it was executed by both parties. Subsequently, the agreement was approved by the district court, made part of the record, and expressly incorporated into the judgment.
The Stephenses submitted a specific plan for the property, and the City Council adopted the plan and rezoned the property to R-M-30(Q). The Q designation or "Q overlay" required that once the zone was established, a "site development plan" had to be submitted to the City Planning Commission instead of simply to the City Planning staff. The Stephenses submitted to the Planning Commission a site development plan which proposed the construction of a 140 unit apartment complex. On September 1, 1987, after a public hearing, the Planning Commission voted 5-2 in favor of a resolution approving the site development plan and imposed certain design conditions on the project. 2 On September 9, 1987, the City's mayor, Gloria McClellan, appealed the Planning Commission's approval of the plan to the City Council.
The City Council first considered the appeal at a regularly scheduled public meeting held on September 28, 1987. The primary objection of the opponents to the plan was the density of the proposed project. At the close of the meeting, the Council referred the matter back to the City Planning staff in order for the staff to meet with the Stephenses and concerned residents to review density and traffic issues, and attempt a compromise. At the direction of the Council, the Planning staff proposed 11 modifications to the project which would "better affect the density, open space, access and other design features of the project." The Stephenses were willing to compromise on various design issues, but not on the density of the project. The City Council held a final hearing on December 14, 1987 and voted 3-2 to deny the site development plan without prejudice and to adopt the Planning staff's recommendation that the Stephenses resubmit a plan which followed the 11 specified modifications.
The Stephenses then reinstituted their original action, filing an amended complaint in the district court against the City and Mayor McClellan alleging inverse condemnation, breach of the settlement agreement, and violations of their civil and constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The City brought a motion for dismissal, judgment on the pleadings, or in the alternative, abstention. The court decided to abstain from adjudication of the Stephenses' claim for inverse condemnation, and denied the City's request for dismissal and judgment on the pleadings.
The remaining claims were tried before the district court. The court concluded that the City had breached the settlement agreement. 3 It found that the guaranteed density of a 140 unit development was the principal consideration for which the Stephenses had bargained, and that in denying the site development plan, the City had deprived the Stephenses of the essential benefit of their bargain. The court also found that "the circumstances leading to the formation, development, and execution of the Settlement Agreement together with the City's actions prior to Mayor McClellan's appeal underscore the fact that the City understood it was obligated to approve development at a density of 140 units."
The court concluded that as a matter of law, the settlement agreement entitled the Stephenses to develop their property at a guaranteed density of 140 units. The court based this conclusion on the provisions of the settlement agreement as a whole, the circumstances under which the settlement agreement was formed, and the actions of the parties subsequent to the execution of the settlement agreement and before Mayor McClellan's appeal of the approval of the site development plan.
The court permitted damages for the difference in the fair market value of the property with an entitlement and approved site development plan of 140 two bedroom units and the fair market value of the property in its "present state." The court found that the City would not have approved a site development plan for 128 two bedroom apartments as proposed by the City's expert, and concluded that the present feasible density of the property was 55 units (as testified to by the Stephenses' expert). The court agreed with the City's expert that the fair market value of the property with an entitlement of 140 units was $2,240,000 and found that the fair market value of the property with a feasible density of 55 units was $1,512,500. The court determined that this resulted in a diminution in value of $727,500 and awarded this sum as damages.
The City appealed the district court's judgment, contending that (1) as a municipality, it could not contract away its police powers and thus could not guarantee the Stephenses a development of 140 units, (2) by agreeing to rezone the property to R-M-30(Q), specifically with the Q overlay, it reserved its broad discretionary authority to review the site development plan, (3) the court erred in interpreting the agreement to guarantee the Stephenses a development of 140 units, and (4) the court erred in its award of damages by finding that the feasible density of the property was 55 units.
Although the jurisdictional issue in this case is a bit more difficult than is usual, we are satisfied that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the present controversy. See Latch v. United States, 842 F.2d 1031, 1032 (9th Cir.1988) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Facebook, Inc.
...by any breaches. But that is wrong. The plaintiffs can seek damages for "the detriment caused by the breach." Stephens v. City of Vista , 994 F.2d 650, 657 (9th Cir. 1993). As discussed in Sections II and III, the detriment the plaintiffs suffered was an invasion of their privacy. Perhaps s......
-
In re Google Assistant Privacy Litig.
...interests—is adequately pled. Generally, a plaintiff may seek damages for "the detriment caused by the breach." Stephens v. City of Vista , 994 F.2d 650, 657 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 3300 ). In this case, the detriment Plaintiffs say they suffered was an invasion of their pr......
-
In re Google Assistant Privacy Litig.
...interests—is more promising. Generally, a plaintiff may seek damages for "the detriment caused by the breach." Stephens v. City of Vista , 994 F.2d 650, 657 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 3300 ). In this case, the detriment Plaintiffs say they suffered was an invasion of their pri......
-
U.S. ex rel. Lindenthal v. General Dynamics Corp., s. 93-16690
...based on the extrinsic evidence for clear error, and the principles of law applied to those facts de novo. Stephens v. City of Vista, 994 F.2d 650, 655 (9th Cir.1993). None of these findings is clearly erroneous. One AF officer, for instance, testified in deposition that the government's in......
-
Case List
...v. Missoula , 166 Mont. 385, 533 P.2d 1087 (1975) Steel v. Cape Corp ., 111 Md. App. 1, 677 A.2d 634 (1996) Stephens v. City of Vista , 994 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1993) Stewart v. Inhabitants of Town of Durham , 451 A.2d 308 (Me. 1982) Stone v. Mississippi , 101 U.S. 814, 25 L. Ed. 1079 (1879) ......
-
Development Agreements
...100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 748, 84 Cal. App. 4th 221, 233 (2000). 589. 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 748, 84 Cal. App. 4th 221, 223 (2000). 590. 994 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1993). 94 III. DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS sued. The city and the Stephenses eventually entered into a settlement agreement providing for a......