Stephens v. Hamilton Cnty. Jobs & Family Servs., Case No. 1:12cv603.
| Decision Date | 02 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:12cv603. |
| Parties | Clarence STEPHENS, Jr., Plaintiff, v. HAMILTON COUNTY JOBS AND FAMILY SERVICES, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Clarence STEPHENS, Jr., Plaintiff,
v.
HAMILTON COUNTY JOBS AND FAMILY SERVICES, et al., Defendants.
Case No. 1:12cv603.
United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division.
Filed Sept. 2, 2014
Motion granted in part and denied in part.
[46 F.Supp.3d 757]
James Edward Kolenich, Cincinnati, OH, for Plaintiff.
Robert W. Hojnoski, Reminger Co. LPA, Cincinnati, OH, Thomas Edward Grossmann, Christian Joseph Schaefer, Cincinnati, OH, for Defendants.
ORDER & OPINION
MICHAEL R. BARRETT, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant Eryn Hunt's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Doc. 28.) Plaintiff has filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. 30) and Defendant has filed a Reply (Doc. 31).
I. BACKGROUNDPlaintiffs Clarence and Kimberly Stephens brought this action in their individual capacity and as next friends of their natural children, O.S. and C.S. (Doc. 25).
According to the Second Amended Complaint, on the morning of August 9, 2011, Plaintiffs were both arrested at their home on charges of domestic violence. O.S. and C.S. were taken to their nearest relatives' home, which was their grandfather. However, their grandfather is elderly and was not able to provide long-term care for the children.
It is further alleged in the Second Amended Complaint that because both parents were arrested, Hamilton County Ohio's Department of Jobs and Family Services (“HCJFS”) was notified. Defendant Eryn Hunt was employed by HCJFS and assigned to the case. Hunt went to the Hamilton County jail to speak with Mrs. Stephens about family members who could watch O.S. and C.S. Mrs. Stephens informed Hunt that there were several relatives who were able to care for the children, and also advised Hunt that C.S. is severely disabled and requires special attention and particularized care. However, Hunt did not process these relatives in an effort to clear them to receive the children. Instead, Hunt approached Hamilton County Juvenile Court prosecutors or other HCJFS personnel and provided false information to them about the case. Hunt also falsely obtained an “on duty” magistrate's permission to seize the children by providing false information through a “telephone EO” or telephone emergency order. ( See Doc. 29–1, PAGEID # 145). The false information included a statement that there were no relatives who could watch the children, the amount of time Plaintiffs would be detained and that an emergency situation existed.
On the morning of August 9, 2011, the Hamilton County Juvenile Court ordered the children into the custody of HCJFS. That same morning, Plaintiffs were released from jail. Plaintiffs did not reacquire custody of the children until August 12, 2011.
Plaintiffs bring their claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs bring an unreasonable seizure claim under the Fourth Amendment on behalf of O.S. and C.S.; and a claim for violation of the right to familial association under the Fourteenth Amendment on behalf of themselves and O.S. and C.S.
II. ANALYSIS A. Standard of ReviewThe standard of review for a Rule 12(c) motion is the same as for a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
[46 F.Supp.3d 758]
Fritz v. Charter Tp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir.2010). “For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.” Id. (quoting JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir.2007)). “The factual allegations in the complaint need to be sufficient to give notice to the defendant as to what claims are alleged, and the plaintiff must plead ‘sufficient factual matter’ to render the legal claim plausible, i.e., more than merely possible.” Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949–950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “ ‘probability requirement,’ ... it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).
Hunt also argues that she is entitled to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) because this Court does not have jurisdiction over decisions made by the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division. “A Rule 12(b)(1) motion can either attack the claim of jurisdiction on its face, in which case all allegations of the plaintiff must be considered as true, or it can attack the factual basis for jurisdiction, in which case the trial court must weigh the evidence and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists.” DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 516 (6th Cir.2004). “A motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be considered before a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Pritchard v. Dent Wizard Int'l Corp., 210 F.R.D. 591, 592 (S.D.Ohio 2002) (citing Moir v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority, 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir.1990)); see also Hutcherson v. Lauderdale Cnty., Tennessee, 326 F.3d 747, 755 (6th Cir.2003) (explaining that the Rooker– Feldman doctrine and res judicata “ ‘are not coextensive,’ ” and “ Rooker– Feldman should be considered first since its application strips federal courts of jurisdiction and the ability to hear a res judicata, or other affirmative, defense.”) (quoting Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir.1996)). Therefore, the Court will first address Hunt's arguments related to jurisdiction.
B. Rooker–Feldman DoctrineHunt argues that this Court does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. This doctrine derives its name from the Supreme Court decisions in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). Rooker–Feldman is a narrow doctrine, “confined to ‘cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’ ” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 163 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005)). “If the source of the injury is the state court decision, then the Rooker–Feldman doctrine would prevent the district court from asserting jurisdiction. If there is some other source of injury, such as a third party's actions, then the plaintiff asserts an independent claim.”
[46 F.Supp.3d 759]
McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir.2006).
In Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., a mother brought claims on behalf of herself and her minor children alleging that the defendants violated their constitutional rights when they entered her home by force and removed her two children. 606 F.3d 301 (6th Cir.2010), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2696, 189 L.Ed.2d 739 (U.S.2014). The Sixth Circuit held that Rooker–Feldman did not bar the claims because the plaintiffs did not seek review or reversal of the juvenile court's decision, but instead focused on the conduct of the defendants “that led up to” the juvenile court's decision to award temporary custody to the county. Id. at 310. The Sixth Circuit noted that the plaintiffs were seeking “compensatory damages for alleged unconstitutional conduct by a government agency, not injunctive or other equitable relief, because any action concerning their return to their mother's custody became moot when they were reunited with their mother in January 2003 and the Juvenile Court complaint was dismissed in 2005.” Id.
As Kovacic makes clear, Rooker–Feldman does not apply in this case. Plaintiffs are not seeking to reverse the Hamilton County Juvenile Court's decision to order the children into the custody of HCJFS. Instead, Plaintiffs are challenging the conduct of Hunt that led up to the Juvenile Court's decision. Therefore, Hunt's motion is denied to the extent that it argues that this Court does not have jurisdiction based on the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.
C. Res judicataHunt also argues that res judicata bars Plaintiffs' claims. Hunt explains that all the issues concerning the initiation of the action in Juvenile Court were necessarily litigated in that court. Hunt points out that the magistrate found that there were no relatives who were willing or able to provide care for the children.
A federal court hearing a case based on diversity jurisdiction applies the law of the state in which it sits in determining the application of res judicata. Ventas, Inc. v. HCP, Inc., 647 F.3d 291, 303 (6th Cir.2011) (citing Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767, 783 (6th Cir.2007)). Under Ohio's rules of civil procedure, the defense of res judicata may not be raised by a motion to dismiss. Jim's Steak House, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 81 Ohio St.3d 18, 688 N.E.2d 506, 508 (1998). However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to the contrary. See Apseloff v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 1:06–CV–133, 2006 WL 1881283 (S.D.Ohio July 6, 2006) (citing DeNune v. Consolidated Capital of North America, Inc., 288 F.Supp.2d 844 (N.D.Ohio 2003)).
The Sixth Circuit has interpreted Ohio's doctrine of claim preclusion as having four elements:
(1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising...
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