Stephens v. Jno. L. Roper Lumber Co.
| Citation | 75 S.E. 933,160 N.C. 107 |
| Parties | STEPHENS v. JNO. L. ROPER LUMBER CO. |
| Decision Date | 03 October 1912 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina |
Appeal from Superior Court, Pamlico County; Justice, Judge.
Action by A. H. Stephens against the Jno. L. Roper Lumber Company to recover $1,400 alleged to be due by contract. From a judgment of nonsuit on motion at the close of plaintiff's evidence, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
It is not within the implied power of the superintendent of a lumber company's plant to contract with an employee that he shall be dropped from the company's pay roll for an indefinite time, cease all regular work, and take no other employment, but hold himself in readiness to resume work when notified; he to be paid during the time he is unemployed.
A. D Ward and D. L. Ward, both of New Bern, for appellant.
Moore & Dunn, of New Bern, for appellee.
Plaintiff a witness, in support of his demand, testified in effect as follows: That in November or December of 1907, a short while after the panic, he was an employé of defendant company, and in charge of a logging squad in connection with the plant of said company at Oriental, N. C.; that the superintendent of defendant plant at that place was one W. J. Moore, in general charge of same, having power to make contracts, employ and discharge hands, etc.; that the general offices of the company were at Norfolk, Va., the general superintendent of defendant lumbering business being one Harriss, and that the employés of defendant company were paid off monthly according to a pay roll sent to the general offices; that on or about the date specified (November or December, 1907) plaintiff and W. J. Moore, as superintendent of defendant's plant at Oriental, entered into the contract sued on, by the terms of which plaintiff was to be dropped from the company's pay roll for an indefinite period, and cease all regular work for the company, and was to be paid during such time as he was unemployed the sum of $100 per month, and meantime was not to take other employment, but hold himself in readiness to resume work when notified; that pursuant to this agreement plaintiff remained practically idle for 14 months, when he was again given active employment as a boss of the company's logging force at $75 per month; that not long after plaintiff resumed work Moore, the local superintendent was discharged by the company, and soon thereafter plaintiff was discharged; that shortly after Moore was discharged plaintiff mentioned his claim for $1,400 against the company to -- Harriss, general superintendent, and same was repudiated and denied by the company, and after his own discharge the suit was instituted.
Plaintiff, repelling the suggestion that it was any part of his motive or inducement for entering into the contract, testified further that W. J. Moore told him, at or about the time the same was made, that the company wanted him as a witness in a lawsuit, and that he would be dropped from the pay roll on that account. Plaintiff admitted that he had been paid for all the work actually done for the company, but said that nothing had been paid on the present claim; that the general superintendent was frequently around the works at Oriental; and that plaintiff had never mentioned the subject to him until after the discharge of Moore, but had frequently mentioned the matter to Moore while he was superintendent at Oriental, and was told by Moore not to be uneasy that he would get his money.
If it be conceded that the evidence was sufficient to establish the contract, and, further, that the reprehensible purpose to impose plaintiff on the court as an entirely disinterested witness, when he was in fact an employé of the company, was not sufficiently shown as an inducement to the contract on the part of plaintiff to vitiate it (Martin v. McMillan, 63 N.C. 486; Phillips v. Hooker, 62 N.C. 193) we are of opinion that the judgment of nonsuit has been properly rendered. It is not claimed that there was any direct authority from the company to make this particular contract; nor is there any evidence of special instructions limiting the powers of defendant's agent incident to his position. This being true, the real and apparent authority of such agent should be held one and the same, and the right of plaintiff to recover in this case depends upon whether the contract declared on was within the scope of W. J. Moore's powers as general superintendent of defendant's lumbering business at Oriental. Gooding v. Moore, 150 N.C. 195, 63 S.E. 895; Tiffany on Agency, p. 180.
By virtue of his position, then, this superintendent had general power to do what was usual and necessary to carry on the business intrusted to him, and in furtherance of his employer's interest to make all such contracts as were reasonable and appropriate to that end; but this authority is not without limitations. Such an officer is by no means a universal agent, but is restricted, as stated, to "those acts and contracts usually exercised by other agents in the same line of business under similar circumstances, and must conduct the particular business of the principal in the manner usually employed by other agents of the same kind." 1 Clark & Skyles on the Law of Agency, § 203, p. 475.
Again it is well recognized that a third person dealing with...
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